Globe Grain and Milling Company, a corporation v. Industrial Commission of Utah and Albert E. Thomas : Response to Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Globe Grain and Milling Company, a corporation
v. Industrial Commission of Utah and Albert E.
Thomas : Response to Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph Chez; Attorney General; S. D. Huffaker; Assistant Attorney General; A. M. Ferro; Special
Assistant Attorney General.
Unknown.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Globe Grain and Milling Company, a corporation v. Industrial Commission of Utah and Albert E. Thomas, No. 6050.00 (Utah
Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/34
UTAH SUPR~ME COURT 
BRIC:F 
T NO. {o()S'Q A--Ptt 
In the Supreme Court 
of the Sn.te of Utah 
GLOBE GRAIN AND MUJJNG 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff o,nd, Petitio-ner, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH and ALBERT 
E. THOMAS, 
DefetzdCIInlts and Respondents. 
BRIEF AND ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General, 
S. D. HUI!'F AKER, 
Assistant Attorney Gener~ 
A.M. FERRO, 
Special .Assistafft Attorney 
General. 
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
BRIEF OF THE ARIGUMENT: 
L THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER GLOBE GRAIN AND 
MILLING COMPANY IS AN EMPLOYER AS DEFINED 
IN THE UNEIMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT AND 
THE ISSUES AS TO WHETHER THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE STATUTE 
TO MAKE THE ORDER APPE:ALED FROM, AND IF 
THE STATUTE' DID SO AUTHORIZE, WHETHER IT 
CONTRAVENED THE CONSTITUTION, CANNOT HE 
CONSIDEHED IN HIS PROCEE'DING. -------------------------------------- 4 
A. The question of whether Globe Grain and Milling Com-
pany is an employer under the unemployment com-
pensation statute cannot be considered at this stage 
of the proceeding ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4 
B. The issues as to whether the Industrial Commission 
invalidly exercised "tax" authority or whether the 
unemployment compensation law invalidly delegates 
such authority to the Industrial Commission are not 
matters for consideration in this proceeding -------------------- 9 
IL .EVEN IF THIS ISSUE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT, THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COULD DE· 
TERMINE WHETHER THOMAS WAS IN "EMPLOY-
MENT" AS DEF'INED BY THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION LAW: THE LEGISLATURE, IN CON-
FERING UPON THE' INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION THE 
POW.ER TO DETERMINE "EMPLOYMENT", DID NOT 
VIOLATE AHTICLE XIII, SECTION 11 OF THE' STATE 
CONSTITUTION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 
A. The Industrial Commission is authorized to conduct 
proceedings to determine the validity of claims for 
benefits and, pursuant to such authorization, may deter-
mine whether a claimant was engaged in employment.... 12 
B. In conferring 'authority upon the Industrial Commission 
to make determinations with respect to the existence 
of the employment relationship, the unemployment 
·Compensation law is not in conflict with the State 
Constitution -----·------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 16 
III. THE DENIAL BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
GLOBE GRAIN AND MILLING COMPANY'S APPLICA-
TION FOR A REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE AP-
PEAL TRIBUNAL WAS PROPER ---------------------------------------------- 46 
INDEX-Continued 
IV. THE COURT PROPERLY DECIDED THAT E,MPLOY-
MENT UNDER THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-
TION LAW IS BROADE!lt THAN THE COMMON LAW 
Page 
RELATIONSHIP -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54 
A. The legislative history, language and plan of the stat-
ute clearly contemplate coverage under the law broader 
in s.cope than the traditional common law relationship 
of master and servant ---------------------------------------------------------------- 54 
B. The relationship between Thomas and Globe Grain 
and Milling Company constituted employment as de-
fined in Section 19(j) (5) of the law -------------------------------------- 70 
C. The statutory definition does not impair the obligations 
of contracts ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 83 
D. The argument of amici curiae that if coverage extends 
beyond the common law master-servant relationship, 
the statute is a guaranteed income law, is disproved 
by the provisions of the statute -------------------------------------------- 86 
V. CONTRARY TO THE CONTENTIONS OF AMICI, AD-
MINISTRATIVE OPINIONS IN OTHER JURISDIC-
TIONS HAVE NOT RESTRICTED THE SCOPE OF THE 
A-B-C PROVISIONS TO THE COMMON LAW MASTER-
SERVANT RELATIONSHIP: THE SCOPE OF COVER-
AGE UNDER THE STATUTE IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH 
COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL LAW, OR UNDER 
STATUTES DEFINING E1MPLOYMENT IN TERMS OF 
THE MASTER-SERVANT RIDLATIONSHIP: A DIS-
REGARD OF THE STATUTORY DE1FINITION WILL 
NOT INSURE UNIFORMITY OF COVERAGE ------------------------ 90 
VI. THIS COURT DID NOT ERR IN DEGL·ARING THAT 
THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE WAS TO DETERMINE 
WHETHIDR THE EVIDEN'Cffi WAS SUCH AS TO SHOW 
THAT THE COMMIS,SION WAS ARBITRARY OR UN-
RE:ASONABLE IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RELA-
TIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CLAIMANT AND THE 
COMPANY COMPLIED WITH THE THREE, TIDSTS SET 
FORTH IN SECTION 19(j) (5) -------------------------------------------------- 110 
APPENDIX: 
EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT 
"A" 
"B·" 
"C" 
"D" 
"E" 
1i 
117 
118 
122 
137 
143 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Abrott v. Athanastos, (Cal. App. 19'36), 61 P. (2d) 982, 984 ........ 16 
Aisenberg v. C. F. Adams Company, Inc., et al., 
9'5 Conn. 419, 111 Atl. 591 .............................................................. 81 
Alexander v. Casden, 2'90 U. S. 484, 4'9·6 .......................................... 88 
Ard v. People, 66 Colo. 480, 182 P. 892 ................................................ 27 
Asplund v. Alarid, 29 N. Mex. 129, 219 P. 786 .................................. 11 
Auer v. Sinclair Refining Company, et al., 
103 N. J. Law 372, 137 Atl. 555 .................................................. 83 
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311 ............................................................ 86 
Ballew v. United States, 160 U. S. 187 .................................................. 46 
Barwise v. Sheppard, 299 U. S. 33 ...................................................... 84 
In re: Batter (N. Y. 1939), 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 42 .............................. 40 
Beland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, (Ala. 1937), 17 4 So. 516 ........ 23 
The Best Foods Co. v. Christensen, 7,5 Utah 392, 285 P. 1001, 1004 37 
Bonifas-Gorum Lumber Co. v. Mich. Unemployment Com-
pensation Com. (Cir. Ct., Keweenaw Co., Mich.) ................ 103 
Borah v. Zoellner Motor Car Company, 
(Mo. App. 1924), 257 S. W. 145 .................................................... 83 
Brindly-Roth, Inc. v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation 
(Circuit Court, Wayne County, Michigan) ................................ 103 
Bronx Home News v. Miller, 
(N. Y. 1939), 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 55 ............................................. .40, 83,91 
Brown v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, et al., 
174 Cal. 457, 163 Pac. 664 ................................................................ 83 
Burgess v. Garvin, et al., 219 Mo. App. 162, 272 S. W. 108 ............ 83 
Burgess v. Lasby, et al., 91 Mont. 482, 9 P. (2d) 164, 166 ............ 8 
Caldwell v. Modern Woodmen, 89 Kan. 11, 133 P. 843, 844 ............ 8 
Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 520 .......................................... 86 
Capitol Building & Loan Ass'n v. Kansas Commissioner of 
Labor and Industry, (Kansas 19.38), 83 P. (2d) 106 ............... 93 
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 
301 U. S. 495, 57 S. Ct. 868 .............................................................. 21, 23 
Cates v. Williamson, (Mo. 1938), 117 S. W. (2d) &55 .................... 67 
Chase v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 141, 17 P. (2d) 205...... 112 
Chicago N. S. & M. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 
331 Ill. 360, 163 N. E. 141, 147 .................................................... 16 
Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Forrester, 72 Okla. 8, 177 P. 593.... 46 
Colonial Building & Loan Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 
85 Utah 65, 38 P. (2d) 737 .............................................................. 112 
Colorado Public Welf,are Board v. Viles, 
S. Ct. of Colo., October 2, 1939 .................................................... 9 
Comer v. State Tax Commission, (N. Mex. 1937), 69 P. (2d) 936 73 
Commercial Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
71 Utah 359, 266 P. 721 ................................................................ 96 
Consolidated Edison v. National Labor Helations Board, 
305 u. s. 197, 224-2,28 ···································································· 47 
iii 
CASES CITED-Continued 
Page 
Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 
44 Mont. 180, 119 P. 564 .............................................................. 32 
Corning v. Patton, (Ala. 1938), 182 So. 39, 42 .................................. 5 
Dahlquist v. Denver and Rio Grande Railway Co., 
152 Utah 438, 174 P. 833, 844 .......................................................... 5, 47 
Davis v. Hailey, 143 Tenn. 247, 227 S. W. 1021 .................................. 27 
Davis v. McCasland, (Okla. 19·3·8), 75 P. (2d) 1118 ........................ 12 
Derr v. Weaver, 173 Okla. 140, 29 P. (2d) 97, 99 ............................ 53 
Dillon v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, et al., 
75 Cal. App. 266, 242 Pac. 736 .................................................... 83 
Dinet v. Orleans Dredging Co., 
(La. App. 1933), 149 So. 126, 129 .............................................. 5 
Dishman v. Whitney, et al., 121 Wash. 157, 209 P. 12 .................... 83 
Emack's Case, 232 Mass. 596, 123 N. E. 86 ........................................ 113 
Fire Department of Milwaukee v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 142 ........ 34 
First State Bank of Claremont v. Smith, 
49 S. D. 518, 207 N. W. 467, 469 ................................................ 29 
First State Bank of Sutherlin v. Kendall Lumber Corp., 
107 Ore. 1, 213 P. 142 ........................................................................ 35 
Fuqua v. Watson, et al., 172 Okla. 624, 46 P. (2d) 486 ................ 46 
Globe Grain and Milling Company v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah and Thomas, decided June 20, 1939, 91 P. (2d) 512 .... 1, 18, 24 
Hall v. Esslinger, (Ala. 1938), 179 So. 639 .................................... 6 
Hardward Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151.... 86 
Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 160 ................................................ 11 
Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc. v. Huiet & Cruce, 
(Super. Ct. DeKalb County, Georgia) ........................................ 103 
Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 
256 N. Y. 199, 176 N. E. 141, aff'd 284 U. S. 594 .................... 114 
Helvering, Comr. of Internal Revenue v. St·ockholms Enskilda 
Bank, 293 U. S. 84 ............................................................................ 88 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 ........................................................ 21 
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.· .S. 610 .............................................. 35 
Home Accident Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission of 
Arizona, 34 Ariz. 201, 269 Pac. 501 .............................................. 29, 32 
Howell v. Continental Casualty Go., 
(Texas 1937), 110 S. W. (2d) 210 ............................................ 83 
Howes Bros. v. Massachusetts Unemployment Compensation 
Commission, (Mass. 1936), 5 N. E. (2d) 720 ............................ 18, 29 
Hoyne v. Chicago & 0. R. E:levated Ry. Co., 
294 Ill. 413, 128 N. E. 587, 591 ........................................................ 16 
Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Co., 
17·5 Ia. 245, 154 N. W. 1037 .......................................................... 32 
Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 391 ............................................ 70 
iv 
CASES CITED-Continued 
Page 
Index Mines Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 
82 Colo. 272, 259 P. 1036 ................................................................ 113 
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Blake, 
154 Okla. 151, 7 P. (2d) 1:5,3, 155 .................................................. 16 
Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Bonfils, 
78 Colo. 306, 241 P. 7315 .................................................................. 80 
Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Northwestern Mutual 
Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 560 ....... . 
······································································ 58, 68, 71, 75, 91, 94, 116 
Industrial Commission of Utah v. Evans, 
52 Utah 394, 17 4 P. 825 .................................................................. 111 
James v. Appel, 192 U. S. 129 ............................................................ 47 
Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. North Carolina Un-
employment Compensation Commission ............................ 92, 93, 116 
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571 ............................................ 10 
Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 196, 246 P. 698 .. 112, 114 
Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60 ............................................................ 84 
Kidd, Dater & Price Co. v. Musselmum Grocery Co., 271 U. S. 461 86 
In re: Kinney, (N. Y. 1939), 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 11 .............................. 40 
In re: Knowles, 295 Pa. 571, 145 At!. 797 .......................................... 11 
In re: Kootz' Will, (Wis. 1938), 280 N. W. 672 ................................ 12 
Leuis v. National Cash Register Company, 
84 N. J. Law 598, 87 At!. 345 .......................................................... 83 
Lilimiewx v. Young, 211 U. S. 489 .................................................... 86 
Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, 65 Utah 182, 235 P. 884, 888 .... 78, 79 
McDermott v. State of Washington, 
(Wash. 1938), 82 P. (2d) 568 ...................................................... 69, 91, 92 
McDonald v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 
120 Me. 52, 112 At!. 719 .............................................................. 52 
McDowell v. Duer, 78 Ind. App. 440, 133 N. E. 839 ........................ 67 
McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S. W. 688 (1908) ................ 34 
Manigault v. Springs, 190 U. S. 473 .................................................... 85 
Memphis Commercial Appeal v. Bryant, Chancery 
(Davidson County, Tenn.) ............................................................ 103 
Mid-American Company, Bankrupt 
(USDC, So. Dist., N. Div. of Ill.) ................................................ 103 
Miller v. Industrial Commission, (Utah 1939), 92 P. (2d) 342.... 113 
Mitchem v. Shearman Concrete Pipe Company, 
45 Ga. App. 809, 165 S. E. 889 ...................................................... 83 
Moffat Tunnel Improvement District v. Denver & S. L. Ry. Co., 
49 Fed. (2d) 715, 722 (C. C. lOth, 1930), cert. denied 
283 u. s. 837 ······················································································ 6 
v 
CASES CITED-Continued 
Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 --------------------------------------------
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 ............... . 
Noble State Bank v. Has·kell, 219 U. S. 104 ------------------------------------
North Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission v. 
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 215 N. Oar. 479, 
2 s. 'E-. (2d) 584 --------------------------------------------------------------------------
Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moin€S, 239 U. S. 486 ----------------
Ntamanakis v. Industrial Commission, 
67 Utah 19'7, 246 P. 706 ················:·········-···------------------------------
O'Boy'le v. Parker-Young Co., 95 Vt. 58, 112 Atl. 385 .............. .. 
Oklahoma Pipe Line Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 
149 Okla. 162, 299 P. 180, 184 --------------------------------------------------
People v. Globe Grain and Milling Co., 211 CaL 121, 294 P. 3 .. .. 
People v. Hasbrouck, 11 Utah 291, 305 ........................................ .. 
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 ----------------------------------------
City of Phoenix v. Drinkwater, 
46 A,riz. 470, 52 P. (2d) 1175, 1176 ----------------------------------------
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsyl¥ania, 232 U. S. 531, 544 .............. .. 
Pingree National Bank v. Weber County, 
54 Utah 5919, 183 P. 334, 336 ------------------------------------------------
Pinyon Queen Mining Co., et a,L v. Industrial Commission 
Page 
47 
22 
35 
68 
86 
112 
67 
53 
114 
115 
114 
6 
11 
5, 47 
of Utah, 59 Utah 402, 204 P. 323 ----------------------------------------------51, 52 
Pittsburgh C. C. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 ____________________ 47 
Pond v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission 
and Heinz Lumber Co., Circuit Court, Michigan, Mar-
quette County, 9-18-39 ------------------------------------------------------ 68, 72, 73 
L. B. Price Mercantile Co. v. Industrial Commission, et aL, 
43 Ariz. 257, 30 P. (2d) 491 -------------------------------------------------------- 80 
Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (U. S. 514) ........................ 84, 85 
Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505 -------------------------------------------------- 114, 115 
Rellf•oot Lake Levee District v. Dawson, 
97 Tenn. 171, 36 S. W. 1046 ........................................................ 27 
Rhinehart v. State, 121 Tenn. 420, 440; 117 S. W. 508................ 27 
Ridge v. Manker, 132 Fed. 599 (1904) .............................................. 7 
Roberts v. Elder, decided Aug. 15, 1939, 
...... Utah ...... , ______ P. (2d) ______ -------------------------------------------------- 4 
Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Industrial A·ccident Commis-
sion, 194 CaL 660, 230 P. 1 -------------------------------------------------------- 113 
Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260 ------------------------------------------ 86 
Salter v. Nelson, 85 Utah 460, 39 P. (2d) 1061 ............................ 37 
Schevenell v. Blackwood, 35 F. (2d) 421, 423 -------------------------------- 8 
Saylor v. Duel, 236 Ill. 429, 86 N. E. 119 ........................................ 47 
vi 
CASES CITED-Continued 
Page 
Shields v. Utah-lda;ho R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 180 .................... 114, 115 
Singer Manufacturing Company v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518 ............ 83 
Sligh v. Kirbough, 2,37 U. S. 52, 58 ------------------------------------------······ 86 
Siocum Straw Works v. Industrial Commission, 
(Wis. 1939), 286 N. W. 593 -------------------------------------------------------- 95 
Smith v. 'Commonwealth, 175 Ky. 286, 194 S. W. 367 ................ 35 
Southern Railway Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524 ................................ 10 
State v. Oassidy, 22 Minn. 312 -------------------------------------------------------- 35 
State v. Oity of Alibuquerque, 31 N. Mex. 576, 249 P. 2,42, 248 .... 5, 11 
State ex rei. Attorney General v. Wis. Constructors, 
(Wis. 1936), 268 N. W. 238, 242, 243 ---------------------------------------- 29 
State ex rei. Brewster v. Ross, 101 Kan. 377, 166 P. 505............ 27 
State ex rei. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 
65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101 ------------------------------------------------ 29, 32, 36 
State ex rei. J'ohnson v. Alexander, 
87 Utah 376, 49 P. (2d) 408, 413 -------------------------------------------- 10 
State ex rei. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 308 Mo. 359, 272 S. W. 957 -------------------------------- 44 
State ex rei. Sherman v. Pape, 103 Wash. 319, 174 P. 468 ........ 35 
State ex rei. Stearns v. Olson, 43 N. D. 619, 175 N. W. 714 ........ 32, 33 
State v. Martin, 210 Iowa 207, 230 N. W. 540................................ 11 
State v. Paoker Corp., 77 Utah 500, 297 P. 1013 ------------------------ 24, 37 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 ............................ 21, 109 
St. Joseph Stockyard Go., v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38, 50-52 ............ 114, 115 
Tantum v. Wheeless, (Miss. 1936), 178 So. 95, 101 ------------------------ 21 
Taylor v. Blackwell Lumber Oo., 37 Idaho 707, 218 P. 356........ 113 
Texas Oil Company v. Wheeless, (Miss. 1939), 187 So. 880 ........ 54, 91 
Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah County, 
80 Utah 49'1, 16 P. (2d) 637...................................................... 37 
Unemployment Compensation Commission of North Carolina 
v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 215 N. Car. 479, 
2 S. E. (2d) 584 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 58, 91 
Unemployment Compensation Commission of North Carol~na 
v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 2 S. E. (2d) 59'2.................... 92 
United States v. Heintz, 218 U. S. 532 -------------------------------------------- 47 
United States Fidelity Co. v. Superior Court of City of 
San Francisco, 214 Oal. 468, 6 P. (2d) 243 ---------------------------- 16 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company of BaWmore, 
Maryland v. Lowry, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), 231 S. W. 818.... 83 
Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Deland, 
216 Mich. 261, 185 N. W. 353, 354 ---------------------------------------- 5 
Ut,ah Fuel Co. v. Indus'trial Commission, 
57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122, 124 .......................... 15, 25, 41, 112, 114 
Utah State Fair Ass'n v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 249 P. 1016............ 37 
vii 
CASES CITED-continued 
Page 
ViJ,liage of Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U. S. 365, 392 ------------------------ 86 
Virginia Railway Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 663________ 115 
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 
83 Utah 321, 28 P. (2d) 161, 167 37 
Warren County v. Mississippi River Ferry Co., 
170 Miss. 183, 154 So. 349, 351 -------------------------------------------------- 16 
Washington Reco.rder Co. v. Ernst, 
(W~sh. 19139), 91 P. (2d) 718 -------------------------------------------- 69, 90, 9·1 
Wilson v. Times Printing Company, et a!., 
158 Wash. 95, 290 P. 69•1 -------------------------------------------------------- 83 
Wirtz v. Nestos, 51 N. D. 603, 200 N. W. ,524 ---------------------------- 35 
Wisconsin Bridge Go. v. Ramsey, et a!., 
Prentice-Hall, U. G. S. Wis. § 29624 ________________________________________ 40, 73 
Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Company v. Industrial Commission 
of Wisconsin, ( Ci·rcuit Court, Dane County, Wisconsin, 
M•arch 13, 1939, C. G. H. Unemployment Insurance 
Service, Wis. Para. 8122 -------------------------------- 65, 68, 72, 76, 95, 103 
viii 
OTHER CITATIONS 
Page 
C. C. Unemployment Compens,ation Se·rviee ---------------- 65, 98, 100, 101 
"A Comparison of State Unemployment Compensation Laws".... 107 
Constitution of Utah, Article XIII, Section 11 ------------ 3, 10, 17, 24, 36 
Delaware Unemployment Compensation 1Law -------------------------------- 98 
Digest of Workmen"s Compensation Laws, 1937 ed. ---------------- 67 
House of Representatives Report, No. 615 ------------------------------------ 107 
Interstate Bal'ds and Yale Reviewers, 
(84 U. of Pa., Law Review 449) -------------------------------------------- 61 
Internal Revenue Code ( 19'39) -------------------------------------------------------- 30, 91 
3 Law and Contemporary Problems, (1936 p. 122) -------------------- 65 
The Law of Taxation, 4th ed. 1924, vol. 4, e. 29, 
(p. 3511, 3513) Cooley ---------------------------------------------------------------- 26, 27 
6 R. C. L., Constitutional 1Law ------------------------------------------------------ 11 
25 R. C. L. p. 100 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 37 
25 R. C. L., p. 983, Sec. 230 -------------------------------------------------·---··· 94 
26 R. C. L., p. 17 ·---------··········--············-·-···-·--·-························-······· 27 
Prentice-Hall U. C. Service, Wisconsin ......................................... 40 
Regulations of Industrial Commission of Utah ............................ 39 
Restatement of the Law of Ageney .................................... 56, 57, 61 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933: 
Title 4 .............................................................................................. 26, 29 
'Title 6 ························----·················-·-···--·--···························--········· 26, 29 
Title 7 ·····························-------·-·····················-····-··········---·-···--·-······· 26, 29 
Title 30 ............................................................................................ 25, 29 
Title 42 ·····--·--····················-······························-········-·---·-····· 25, 29, 112 
Title 79 ·········-·········-···············-·········-···········--····------------·-···---········· 25, 29 
Title 80 ····---·····················--··-······························--·····--····--····---·-····· 30 
State Journal, Day 52, 1939 (p. 5) .................................................... 58 
Senate Report No. 628 ····--·································---·-··-·-···············-······· 106 
Social Security Act ............................................ 30, 38, 42, 104, 106, 110 
Unemp,loyment Compensation-What and Why. (Publication 
No. 14. Government Printing Office, Maroh, 1939) ·-·-··-----· 107 
Utah Unemployment Compensation 1Law .............................. 13 et. seq. 
ix 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GLOBE GRAIN AND MILLING 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH and ALBERT 
E. THOMAS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 6050 
BRIEF AND ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT. 
This brief is submitted in opposition to the petition 
filed by GLobe Grain and Milling Company for a rehear-
ing of the case of Globe Grain and Milling Company v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah and Thoma,s, decided 
June 20, 1939, (Utah, 91 P. (2d) 512), as well as in reply 
to the arguments advanced by amici curiae urging this 
court to reconsider and annul the decision it previously 
rendered. 
2 
No issue is raised upon this rehearing witH respect 
to the facts £ound by the Industrial Commission and by 
the court, which are set forth at length in the court's 
opinion. The issues are rather as to the interpretations 
to be given to provisions in the unemployment compen-
sation law. 
The grounds upon which rehearing is s<ought by the 
Globe Grain and Milling Company are stated on pages 
1-3 of its petition for rehearing. An examination of 
the allegations enumerated in the petition indicates, that 
apart from the question whether the Industrial Commis-
sion was bound to entertain an appeal from the deter-
mination of the appeal tribunal and was required under 
the law to grant Globe Grain and Milling Company a 
hearing before the Industrial Commission (Petition for 
Rehearing, points 2 (b) and (c), p. 3), the subject matter 
of the assignments of error all were previously oon-
sidered by this court upon the original hearing. The 
brief of amici curiae, in addition to urging a reversal for 
the reasons advanced by Globe Grain and Milling Com-
pany, suggests that the decision previously rendered by 
this court should be annulled because, first, there is no 
proof in the record to show that Globe Grain and Milling 
Company is an employer, as defined in the act (Amici 
Brief, pp. 2, 3), and, second, the unemployment compen-
sation law, in their opinion, does not authorize the In-
dustrial Commission to determine the contribution li-
ability of the Globe Grain and Milling Company and 
require it to file wage reports; and if the law be con-
strued to oontain such an authorization, it is in conflict 
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with Art. XIII, Sec. 11 of the State Constitution in that 
it permits the Industrial Commission to perform func-
tions under a ''tax law" which can be exercised only by 
the State Tax Commission (Amici Brief, pp. 3-15). 
The Industrial Commission, however, takes the posi-
tion that the original decision of this court in this case 
should be affirmed and that the petition of Globe Grain 
and Milling Company for a rehearing of this cause 
should be denied. The Industrial Commission contends: 
First, that Globe Grain and Milling Company cannot 
for the first time on this application for rehearing assail 
the correctness of the procedure before the Industrial 
Commission which resulted in the order awarding unem-
ployment compensation benefits to the claimant Thomas; 
Second, that the award was properly made under 
terms of the State unemployment compensation act; 
Third, that amici curiae are in no position to attack 
the validity of the proceedings of the Industrial Com-
mission under the law, the order issued by the Commis-
siOn, or the validity of the provisions of the statute; 
and 
Fourth, that even if it he assumed that the new 
matter suggested by Globe Grain and Milling Company 
in its petition for rehearing and by amici curiae in 
their brief were pDoperly in issue, the decision pre-
viously rendered by this court should he affirmed in all 
respects, 
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THE FSSIUE A:S TO WHETHIDR GLOBE GRAIN AND MILLING 
COMPANY IS AN EMPLOYER AS DEFINED IN THE UN-
EJMRLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT AND THE ISSUES AS 
TO WHETHER THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS AU-
THORIZIDD BY THE STATUTE TO MAKE THE ORDER AP-
PEALED FROM, AND IF THE STATUTE DID SO AUTHORIZE, 
WHETHER IT CONTRAVENEID THE CONSTITUTION, CAN-
NOT BE CONSIDEREID IN THIS PROCEE'DING. 
A. The question of whether Globe Grain and Mill-
ing Company is an employer under the un-
employment c;ompensation statute cannot be 
considered at this stage of the proceeding. 
In reliance, apparently, upon the decision of this 
court in Roberts v. Elder, decided August 15, 1939, (not 
yet reported), amici curiae make much of the fact that 
the record made before the Industrial Commissi,on does 
not establish, either affirmatively or by a stipulation of 
the parties, that Globe Grain and Milling Company was 
an employer subject to the provisions of the unemploy-
ment compensation act. No such contention, howe;ver, 
was made by Globe Grain and Milling Company. in its 
original petition for a writ of review, nor in its original 
brief, and no such contention is made by the company 
in its application for rehearing. Accordingly, this con-
tention, not having been listed by a party to the suit 
as a ground for reversal of the decision of the Indus-
trial Commission in its original petition for a writ of 
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review, it cannot be considered by the court because 
''An inflexible rule of this court requires that every 
proposition relied on as grounds for reversing a judg-
ment must be assigned as error in the original petition 
for review." Pingree National Bank v. Weber Oownty, 
54 Utah 599, 183 P. 334, 336; Dahlquist v. Denver and 
Rio Grande Railway Company, 52 Utah 438, 174 P. 833, 
844. 
It is equally well settled that this issue cannot be 
raised by an amicus curiae neither upon an original 
hearing nor upon a rehearing. An amicus has no control 
over a suit. His function is merely to assist the court 
in its consideration of the issues framed by parties; he 
has no standing to assist in the framing of issues by 
pleadings or otherwise. Therefore, since Globe Grain 
and Milling Company has evidenced no interest on its 
part to contest its status as an employer under the 
unemployment compensation act, and merely confined its 
application for rehearing to those matters set forth in 
its petition, the issue raised by amici curiae only as to 
whether or not Globe Grain and Milling Company is an 
employer and whether the reeord sufficiently supports 
that conclusion is not a proper one for consideration in 
this proceeding. Dinet v. Orleans Dredging Co., (La. 
App. 1933), 149 So. 126, 129; Union Steam Pump Sales 
Co. v. Deland, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N. vV. 353, 354; State v. 
City of Albuquerque, 31 N. Mex. 576, 249 P. 242, 248; 
Moffat Twnnel Improvement District v. Denver & S. L. 
Ry. Co., 49 Fed. (2d) 715, 722 (C. C. lOth, 1930), cert. 
denied 283 U. S. 837; Corning v. Patton, (Ala. 1938), 182 
6 
So. 39, 42; Hall v. Esslinger, (Ala. 1938), 179 So. 639; 
City of Phoenix v. Drinkwater, 46 Ariz. 470, 52 P. (2d) 
1175, 1176. 
The rule concerning the province of amici curiae to 
raise issues not the subject of an assignment of error 
by a party to a suit is tersely .summarized in City of 
Phoenix v. Drinkwater, supra. In that case, the Supreme 
Oourt of Arizona refused to ·consider issues raised by 
amicus curiae in his brief but with respect to which the 
parties made no complaint upon appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Arizona, and said (p. 1176): 
''The Arizona Municipal League asked for and 
received permission to file a brief as amicus 
curiae. In such brief, in addition to arguing 
the questions raised by the assignments of error 
presented by defendant, it has attempted to as-
sign other errors and to argue them. This is 
not within the rights of an amicus curiae, and we, 
therefore, consider the brief of the League only 
so far as it discusses questions raised properly 
by defendant's assignments of error. Farmers' 
Union Ditch Co. v. Rio Grande Canal Oo., 37 
Col. 512, 86 P. 1042." 
Even if the status of Globe Grain and Milling Com-
pany as an employer under the unemployment compen-
sation act of this State were properly in issue before 
this court in this proceeding, the certified copy of the 
status report of the company, attached as "Exhibit A" to 
this prief (p. 117 infra), would dispose of the contention 
made by amici curiae. The contention of amici is based 
upon the argument that there is no evidence in the 
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£ormal record before the Industrial Commission which 
would justify it in reaching the conclusion that Globe 
Grain and Milling Company employed a sufficient num-
ber of individuals during the calendar years involved 
to constitute it an employer under the unemployment 
compensation act. Although such evidence was not for-
mally reflected in the transcript, the fact, nevertheless, 
remains that this company, by its own admission, has 
been an employer subject to the unemployment com-
pensation act since its passage. It has filed wage re-
ports, and has paid contributions periodically to the 
unemployment compensation fund. At no time has it 
ever seriously contested its liability as an employer. The 
only issue which it has seen fit to raise is whether 
Thomas, the claimant for benefits in this proceeding, 
was engaged in employment, as that term is defined in 
the unemployment compensation law. 
Although ordinarily courts do not consider evidence 
not in the record on appeal, it is clearly within the 
province of the court to accept in this case as evidence 
of the status of Globe Grain and Milling Company the 
certified copy of the employment record filed with this 
brief. Appellate courts are fully empowered to accept 
supplementary evidence where to do so would avoid mis-
carriages of justice or unnecessary circuity of action. 
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit in Ridge v. Manker, 132 Fed. 599 (1904) stated 
the applicable rule in the following terms (p. 601): 
"An appellate court may avail itself of authentic 
evidence outside of the record before it of matters 
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occuring since the decree of the trial court when 
such course is necessary to prevent a miscarriage 
of justice, to avoid a useless circuity of proceed-
ing, to preserve a jurisdiction lawfully acquired, 
or to protect itself from imposition or further 
prosecution of litigation where the controversy 
between the parties has been settled, or for ·other 
reasons has ceased to exist. Chamberlain v. 
Cleveland, 1 Black, 419, 17 L. Ed. 93; Lord v. 
Veazie, 8 How. 251, 12 L. Ed. 1067; Wood Paper 
Co. v. Heft, 8 Wall. 333, 19 L. Ed. 379; Board of 
Liquidation v. Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 221, 3 Sup. 
Ct. 144, 27 L. Ed. 916; Dakota v. Glidden, 113 
U. S. 222, 5 Sup. Ct. 428, 28 L. Ed. 981; Little v. 
Bowers, 134 U. S. 547, 10 Sup. Ct. 620, 33 L. Ed. 
1016; vV ashington and Idaho Railroad Co. v. 
Coeur D'Alene R. & N. Co., 160 U. S. 101, 16 
Sup. Ct. 239, 40 L. Ed. 355; Bryar v. Campbell, 
177 U. S. 649, 20 Sup. Ct. 794, 44 L. Ed. 926.'' 
See also: Caldwell v. Modern Woodmen, 89 Kans. 
11, 133 P. 843, 844; Burgess v. Las by, et al., 91 Mont. 
482, 9 P. (2d) 164, 166; Schevenell v. Blackwood, 35 F. 
( 2d) 421, 423. 
If the issue of whether Globe Grain and Milling 
Company was an employer had been raised before the 
Industrial Commission, unquestionably the document an-
nexed to this brief as an exhibit or some other similar 
proof would have been put in evidence in the hearings 
before the Commission, and would have appeared in 
the record originally presented to this court. The im-
portance of the proof represented by the exhibit arises 
at this time only by virtue of a contention of amici 
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curiae-a contention raised only after the decision of this 
-court on the original appeal to this court. 
But, if for any reason, this court is inclined to 
consider the absence of evidence in the formal record 
of the employer-status of Globe Grain and Milling Oom-
pany, we submit that it should not dispose of this case 
and enter final judgment without affmding an oppor-
tunity to the parties, by remanding the case to the Indus-
trial Commission, to perfect the reoord in those respects 
in which the court deems it to be insufficient. Colorado 
Public Welfare Board v. Viles, Supreme Court of Colo-
rado, October 2, 1939. (A Copy of this decision is 
attached hereto "Exhibit B ", p. 118 infra.) 
B. The issues as to whether the Industrial Com-
mission invalidly exercised "tax" authority or 
whether the unemployment compensation law 
invalidly delegates such authority to the Indus-
trial Commission are not matters for consider-
ation in this proceeding. 
Amici curiae contend that the Industrial Commis-
sion's order in this case is invalid because in the course 
of determining the benefit rights of Thomas, the claim-
ant, it ordered Gl,obe Grain and Milling Company to file 
a liability report with respect to the wages paid to 
Thomas and to pay contributions. This contention 
seems to be supported by the following argument: The 
unemployment compensation law does not authorize the 
Industrial Commission to determine contribution liability 
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and if the statute be read so as to permit such deter-
minations, it is invalid because in conflict with Article 
XIII, Sec. 11 of the State Constitution. • 
This attack on the validity of the order of the 
Industrial Commission is presented only by amici curiae. 
It is not a ground upon which Globe Grain and Milling 
Company seeks a reversal of the Commission's deter-
mination; neither is it a ground upon which the com-
pany seeks rehearing. The authorities uniformly hold 
that an amicus curiae cannot be heard to challenge the 
validity of a law or its application upon grounds not 
advanced by parties to the litigation. Amici curiae are 
not aggrieved by the order of the Industrial Commis-
sion which requires Globe Grain and Milling Company 
to file a "tax" liability report with respect to the wages 
paid to Thomas and to pay contributions thereon. That 
issue can be determined in a proper case where a similar 
order is directed to a party to the proceeding who 
chooses to challenge the order on such gDounds, and 
a decision in this case would not foreclose the possi-
bility of this question being considered by the court at 
a later date. It has been repeatedly held in numerous 
decisions of State Supreme Courts and of the United 
States Supreme Court that constitutional issues can be 
raised only by those adversely affected. State ex rel. 
Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 49 P. (2d) 408, 413; 
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571; Southern Ry. 
*Article XIII, Bee. 11 of the State Constitution provides in part, as 
follows: "The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise 
the tax ~aws of the State." · 
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Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 544; Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 
152, 160; In re Knowles, 295 Pa. 571, 145 Atl. 797; 
Asplund v. Alarid, 29 N.Mex. 129, 219 P. 786; 6 R. C. L. 
"Constitutional Law", section 87. This rule, that a per-
son may only raise questions which directly affect his 
own interests and may not invoke questions which may 
properly be raised only by others, is rigidly followed 
with respect to amici curiae. In State v. Martin, 210 
Iowa 207, 230 N. W. 540, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
said (p. 543): 
"The eourt will not, at the instance of a stranger 
to the litigation, search for or pass upon grounds 
of invalidity of the statute not presented by the 
parties. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hardi-
son, 199 Mass. 190, 85 N. E. 410, 127 Am. St. Rep. 
478; State v. Lee, 288 Mo. 679, 233 S. vV. 20." 
And in State v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N. Mex. 
576, 249 P. 242, the Supreme Court of New Mexieo, in 
refusing to consider an issue of invalidity raised ex-
elusively by an amicus curiae, said (p. 248): 
''Only persons claiming to be adversely affected 
are authorized to question the constitutionality 
of an act * * * and particularly is this true 
of amicus curiae whose authority is to call the 
court's attention to facts or situations that may 
have escaped consideration. He is not a party 
and cannot assume the functions of a party. He 
must accept the case before the court with the 
issues made by the parties. In re McClellan's 
Estate v. State, 27 S. Dak. 109, 129 N. vV. 1037, 
Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1029; Farmers', etc., Co. et al. v. 
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Rio Grande Canal Co., et al., 37 Colo. 512, 86 
P. 1042; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hardison, 
199 Mass. 190, 85 N. E. 410, 127 Am. St. Rep. 478. 
''The constitutim1ality of the provision in ques-
tion is not contested by an authorized person, 
and jurisdiction of the court is not involved. 
Cram v. Ry. Co., 85 Neb. 586, 123 N. vV. 1045, 26 
L. R. A. ( N. S.) 1028, 19 Ann. Cas. 170, and note 
at page 175; 12 C. J. "Constitutional Law," S. 
217. Under these circumstances, this c>ourt will 
not raise the questi~on on its own account, and 
amici curiae have no authority to do so." 
See also: In re Koot.z' Will, ("Wis. 1938), 280 N. W. 
672; Davis v. McCasland, (Okla. 1938), 75 P. (2d) 1118; 
3 Cor. Jur. (Secundum) 1050. 
II. 
EVEN IF THIS ISSUE IS PHOPERLY BEFORE THE COURT, THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COULD DETERMINE WHETHER 
THOMAS WAS IN "E,MPLOYMENT" AS DEFINED BY THE 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAW: THE LEGISLA-
TURE, IN CONFERRING UPON THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION THE POWER TO DETERMINE "EMPLOYMENT", DID 
NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 11 OF THE STATE 
CONSTITUTION. 
A. The Industrial Commission is authorized to con-
duct proceedings to determine the validity of 
claims f,or benefits and, pursuant to such author-
ization, may determine whether a claimant was 
engaged in employment. 
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In enacting the Utah unemployment compensation 
law, the legislature entrusted its administration to the 
Industrial Commission (section 11). It imposed upon 
this Commission the duty to administer the act, granted 
it full authority to issue rules and regulations, within 
the framework of the law, to accomplish its purposes, 
and empowered the Industrial Commission ''to require 
such reports" and "make such investigations" as it 
might deem necessary to carry out the provisions ,of the 
statute (section ll(a) ). One of the clear statutory duties 
vested in the Commission is that relating to the payment 
of benefits to those entitled thereto under the law (sec-
tions 4 and 5). Section 4( e) of the law, (Chapter 43, 
Sessi,on Laws of 1937) prior to the amendment thereof 
in 1939, (Chapter 52, Se~ssion Laws of 1939) provided 
that an unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive 
benefits with respect to any week "only if it has been 
found by the Commission" that he has, "within the first 
four of the last five completed calendar quarters immed-
iately preceding the first day of the benefit year," 
earned wages ''for employment by empl,oyers '' in a 
specified amount. Further, section 19 (j) (5) of the law 
requires the exclusions from ''employment'' to be de-
termined by ''the commission'' which, in turn, is speci-
fically defined by section 19 (f) of the law to mean ''the 
industrial commission of Utah." Thus, by the terms of 
the statute, the Commission is under a duty to determine 
whether a claimant earned wages in "employment." 
Moreover, ,section 6 (b) of the original law and sec-
6(c) of the law as amended provide that if an appeal 
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tribunal or the Commission affirms a decision all:owing 
benefits, "such benefits shall be paid regardless of any 
appeal which may be taken, but if such decision is finally 
reversed, no employer's account shall be charged for the 
benefits so paid.'' Manifestly, no benefits could be paid 
unless and until the Commission or its representatives 
or the appeal tribunal decided that services perf.ormed 
for wages or under a contract of hire constituted em-
ployment as defined by the law. To hold that the Indus-
trail Commission does not possess the power to deter-
mine ''employment'' Wiould be to destroy integral parts 
of the law. It would amount to ignoring completely 
section 4 (e) of the law; the provisions of section 6 
which are designed to set up procedures for the deter-
mination of claims for benefit and to afford benefit 
claimants a speedy determination of their rights; as 
well as the provisions of sections 19 ( j) ( 5) and 19 (f). 
In short, the statute contemplates that the Industrial 
Commission shall determine when benefits are payable 
and in doing so the Commission is under a duty, if the 
question is in dispute, to determine whether the claim-
ant has satisfied all conditions of eligibility including 
the condition enumerated in section 4(e). In arguing 
that no authority to determine the existence of the em-
ployment relationship has been conferred upon the In-
dustrial Commission, amici curiae, by stressing section 
14(b) only, and in arguing that in all cases where "em-
ployment'' is in dispute, the issue can be resolved only 
by a court suit for contributions, appear to have com-
pletely overlooked the mandates of the law contained in 
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sections 4, 5, 6, 19 (j) ( 5) and 19 (f), that such determin-
ations be made by the Industrial Commission, as well 
as the policy embodied in the law which calls for the 
speedy determination of benefit rights by the Industrial 
Commission. See Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122, 124. In addition, their argu-
ment concerning section 14(b) of the statute seems to 
misconstrue completely the effect of determinations of 
"employment" by the Industrial Commission for benefit 
payment purposes and the relati,onship of such decisions 
to court actions to recover contributions (See Amici 
Brief pp. 4 and 5). As was indicated above, section 
19(j) (5) of the law as well as sections 6 and 4(e) em-
power the Industrial Commission to determine the issue 
of "employment" for benefit payment purposes. From 
decisions of this character, employers may appeal to this 
court. (See secti,on 6(h) Chapter 43, Session Laws of 
1937; section 10(i) Chapter 52, Session Laws of 1939). 
Should an employer appeal to this court and the 
court affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission, 
in a subsequent suit by the State Tax Commission for 
contributions on the wages paid to the claimant whose 
status under the Act was determined, the District Court 
would be compelled to follow the decision of this court 
with respect to the existence of the employment rela-
tionship as finally decided by this court for the purpose 
,of paying benefits to the claimant. And should the 
employer fail to appeal to this court from the decision 
of the Industrial Commission, the District Court in a 
suit for contributions would be required to follow the 
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decisi,on of the Industrial Commission m so far as it 
determined for benefit purposes the existence of the 
employment relationship between an employer and a 
claimant, not simply because it was a decision of the 
Industrial Commission, as such, but because the em-
ployer had an opportunity under the terms of the statute 
to secure judicial review of the decision and, in failing 
to do so, was bound thereby. This would not preclude 
an employer from contesting other issues relative to the 
suit for contributions; it would only, under well recog-
nized principles of law, prevent relitigation of an issue 
already decided, or the opening up, by way of a collateral 
attack, of an issue previously settled. Chicago N. S. 
& M. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 331 Ill. 360, 163 N. E. 
141, 147; Hoyne v. Chicago & 0. R. Elevated Ry. Co., 
294 Ill. 413, 128 N. E. 587, 591; Indian Territory Illum-
inating Oil Co. v. Blake, 154 Okla. 151, 7 P. (2d) 153, 
155; Warren County v. Mississippi River Ferry Co., 
170 Miss. 183, 154 So. 349, 351; United States Fidelity 
Co. v. Superior Court of City of San Francisco, 214 
Cal. 468,6 P. (2d) 243; Abrott v. Athanastos, (Cal. App. 
1936) 61 P. (2d) 982, 984. 
B. In conferring authority upon the Industrial 
Commiss1on to make determinations with respect 
to the existence of the employment relationship, 
the unemployment compensation law is not in 
conflict with the State Constitution. 
Amici curiae in their brief (pages 9-15) claim that 
if the unemployment compensation law is so construed 
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as to confer authority upon the Industrial Commission 
to determine the existence of the employment relation-
ship and to require Globe Grain and Milling Company to 
file "tax" liability reports and to pay contributions, 
it is invalid because in violation of Article XIII, Sec-
tion 11 of the Utah Constitution. That provision reads 
in part as follows: 
"The State Tax Commission shall administer and 
supervise the tax lavvs of the State.'' 
When reduced to the form of logical propositions, 
the contention of amici curiae seems t~o resolve itself into 
either or both of the following syllogisms: 
1. The constitutional provision applies to all ex-
actions levied in pursuance of the taxing power of the 
State; "contributions" are "taxes" levied in pursuance 
of the taxing power of the State; therefore, the con-
tributions are subject to the administrative jurisdiction 
of the State Tax Commission. 
2. "Tax Laws", as used in the Constituti,on, signi-
fies all laws levying compulsory exactions; "contribu-
tions'' are compulsory exactions; therefore, contribu-
tions are taxes subject to the administrative jurisdic-
tion of the State Tax Oommission. 
-When expressed in syllogistic form the argument 
has an apparent and superficial validity which disap-
pears upon closer scrutiny and analysis. The Industrial 
Commission denies the conclusions reached because a 
premise of each .syllogism is faulty. For example, in 
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the case of syllogism '' 1'' it is denied that contributions 
are levied in pursuance of the taxing power and are 
taxes. To the contrary, it is maintained that they are 
exactions levied in pursuance of the police power of the 
State. In the case of syllogism "2" it is denied that 
the Constitution uses the words "tax laws" to mean 
any and all statutes levying oompulsory exactions. We 
believe reference is intended, rather, to those laws im-
posing exacti,ons which are justified as an exercise of 
the taxing power exclusively. 
The view that the unemployment compensation law 
may be sustained as an exercise of the police power 
has already been accepted by this court in its previous 
decision in this case. In Globe Grain and Milling Com-
pany v. Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah), 91 P. 
(2d) 512 it was said at page 517: 
"Both workmen's compensation and unemploy-
ment compensation as enacted in this state may, 
we think, be sustained as proper exercises of the 
police povYer, not to be restrained by the due 
process clause.'' 
Likewise, in Howes Bros. v. Massachusetts Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission, (Mass. 1936), 5 N. E. 
(2d) 720, in which an employer denied his obligation 
to pay contributions on constitutional grounds, the court 
sustained the unemployment oompensation law as a 
proper exercise of the State's police power. As in the 
instant case, the plaintiff, among other contentions, 
claimed that the Constitution of the Commonwealth was 
violated in that the contributions were not handled in 
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the manner designated therein for tax receipts. The 
court in answer said at pages 725, et seq.: 
"The Unemployment Compensation Law does 
not throw the burden of its expense upon funds 
obtained by general taxation. It puts that burden 
upon the employers and empl,oyees not exempted 
from its operation. * * * The solution put 
forward after deliberation is the law here assail-
ed. The connection between employers and un-
employment is not remote and is affected by 
general business conditions. This law was en-
acted in the exercise of the police power. * * * 
Many laws which interfere to some extent with 
freedom of contract and which cause additional 
expense to individuals have been upheld as valid 
exertions of the police power. 
"Workmen's compensation acts have been sup-
ported as an exercise of the police power. Their 
effect is to impose on the designated classes of 
employers of labor the burden of compensation 
for injuries to employees arising out of and in 
the cour,se of their employment, leaving the 
employer to reimburse himself for the expense 
as a part of the 0ost of his product. (Citations 
omitted). In reason it is difficult to distinguish 
these decisions from the cases at bar. 
"The principle is familiar that, within reasonable 
limits, the legislative department of government 
in mitigation of a public evil may place the cost 
on those in connection with whose business the 
evil arises. Statutes have been sustained pr,ovid-
ing f,or the collection of a percentage of deposits 
from State banks for the purpose of creating a 
guaranty fund to pay losses caused to depositors 
by the insolvency of any such banks. * * * 
* * * * * * * 
"It cannot rightly be determined that the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law takes the property 
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of the plaintiffs without due process of law. The 
contributions are exacted from the plaintiffs as 
well as from employees to effectuate some regu-
lation of the evils of unemployment, in which both 
groups are inter~sted and which is a subject with-
in the scope of legislative competency. * * * 
The scheme of this law being within the police 
power, minor inequalities are not decisive against 
it. 
* * * * * * * 
"By the Unemployment Compensation Law, in 
substance and effect great sums of money are to 
be collected by compulsion of the Commonwealth 
from employers and employees. rrhese sums are 
described in the law as 'contributions'. These 
contributions are not eollected in the ordinary 
way but are paid to the comission and then paid 
over to the State Treasurer as a fund to be used 
to pay benefits under the Unemployment Com-
pensation Law. The State Treasurer is directed 
to deposit or invest the fund in the 'unemploy-
ment trust fund' of the United States govern-
ment and keep it so deposited and invested, ex-
cept as he may be entitled to requisition such 
sums standing to his account as may be required 
by the commission to pay benefits in accordance 
with the provisions of the Unemployment Com-
pensation Law. These contributions paid by em-
ployers manifestly are received on account of the 
Commonwealth. The contributions under the 
Unemployment Compensation Law are not a part 
of the general revenue of the Commonwealth al-
though paid into the State Treasury. They are 
raised by the Commonwealth for a particular pur-
pose through the exercise of the police power. 
• • * 
* * * * * * * 
"The Commonwealth has intervened in the exer-
cise of its police power to relieve against the 
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acute evils of unemployment. * * * In prin-
ciple these contributions stand on the same foot-
ing as the payments for insurance against per-
sonal injuries which are a valid part of almost 
every workmen's compensation act." (Italics 
supplied). 
The Supreme Court of Missis·sippi has likewise sus-
tained the validity of the unemployment compensation 
law of that State under its police power in Tatum v. 
Wheeless, (Miss. 1936), 178 So. 95, 101. The court said 
at page 101: 
"A state, under its police power, has very large 
authority and discretion as to the recognition of 
public needs, and may pr·ovide for them by suit-
able legislation. This state has often exercised 
this power in the regulation or management of 
business affecting public welfare, and has enacted 
laws in restraint of acts deemed inimical to the 
public welfare or not promotive of the public 
good. * * *'' 
In support of the the·ory that unemployment com-
pensation contributions are taxes, amici cites H elvering 
v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 
301 U. S. 548, and language from Carmichael v. Southern 
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 57 S. Ct. 868 quoted by 
this court in its previous opinion. 
Obviously Helvering v. Davis, supra, and Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis, supra, have no conceivable bearing 
upon the issue of whether contributions under the State 
law are required under the police power or the taxing 
power of a State. These cases adjudicated, respectively, 
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the validity under the federal Constitution of federal 
taxes lo,oking to the receipt of revenue in connection 
with the establishment of the federal old-age insurance 
system and the plan to induce State action with respect 
to unemployment. 
Reliance upon the Carmichael case as an authority 
for the proposition that State unemployment com-
pensation contributions must be regarded as taxes 
1s also misplaced. The Supreme Court of the 
United States has clearly indicated that it is not 
concerned whether a particular exaction 1s sus-
tainable as an exercise of the police or taxation 
power of a State. Its interest is confined to whether, 
in a case before it, the statute involved, whatever the 
power under which the legislature may have enacted 
it, violates a limitation contained in the Federal Con-
stitution. In Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 
U. S. 219, in which was adjudicated the validity of the 
workmen's compensation law of the State of Washing-
ton, requiring payments to be made into State fund (as 
does the Utah unempl,oyment compensation law), the 
United States Supreme Court said (page 237): 
'' * * * "\V e are not here concerned with any 
mere question of construction, nor with any dis-
tinction between the police and the taxing powers. 
The question whether a state law deprives a per-
son of rights secured by the Federal Constitution 
depends not upon how it is characterized but 
upon its practical operation and effect * * * 
And the Federal Constitution does not require 
a separate exercise by the states of their powers 
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of regulation and taxation. Gundling v. Chicago, 
177 U. S. 183, 189." 
Thus, in view of the fact that the United States Supreme 
Court does not undertake to determine the nature (in 
terms of police or taxing power) of a required payment 
as evidenced by its statement to that effect in the Car-
michael case, 301 U. S. 495, 508, the Supreme Court's 
concurrence with the view that the unemployment com-
pensation contribution required to be paid under Ala-
bama law is a tax, is entitled to little weight as a prece-
dent on that point. The effect of its decision was merely 
to accept, for purposes of the Federal Constitution, the 
designation of contributi10ns as taxes made by the 
Alabama Supreme Court in Beeland Wholesale Co. v. 
Kaufman, (Ala. 1937), 174 So. 516. In that case, the 
Alabama Supreme Court denominated unemployment 
compensation contributions as taxes. They were so de-
scribed, however, because, under the Alabama Constitu-
ti•on, as interpreted by its courts, there is: 
"* * * no authority ·Of a State to take the 
property of a citizen except by way ·of taxes or 
eminent domain." (p. 520) 
In short, unlike most other !States in Wlhich govern-
mental exactions may be referrable to either the police 
power or taxing power, in Alabama, if the contributi·ons 
were not considered as an exercise of the taxing power, 
they were wholly invalid because obviously not justified 
as an exer·cise of the power of eminent domain. 
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In view ·Of the circumstances described, none of the 
decisions relied upon by amici curiae are of value as 
precedents in this State where it is permi.ssible to distin-
guish between taxes in the technical sense, (i. e. compul-
sory payments exacted in pursuance of the taxing pow-
er) and t~hose ref err able to the police power. See Globe 
Gmin & Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
supra; State v. Packer Corporation, 77 Utah 500, 297 P. 
1013. This distinction is clearly marked out by this court 
in State v. Packer Corporation, supra, in whi.ch this oourt 
upheld against constitutional attack the validity of a 
statute regulating traffic in cigarettes and levying fees 
and impositions upon their sale. It was claimed that the 
fees represented an exercise of the taxing power but 
the court repudiated this argument and said: 
''As an incident, and as a more efficient means 
of regulation, the act requires payment of a 
license fee by dealers and the payment of an ex-
cise tax on cigarettes. The fact that a consider-
able revenue is raised and paid into the public 
treasury does not itself indicate that the act was 
passed as a revenue measure nor destroy its 
character as a regulat·ory act passed in the ex-
ercise of the police power, where the object is 
to control, regulate and restrict rather than to 
encourage the traffic.'' 
It is ·Of the greatest importanee to observe that al-
though the argument ·of amici is based upon the theory 
that contributions are "taxes", (Amici Brief, pp. 11, 12) 
Article XIII, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution refers 
to "tax laws." Thus, the Constitution does not purport 
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to give exclusive jurisdidi·on to the State Tax Commis-
sion with respect to the administration and supervision 
of all laws involving eompulsory payments, but only 
''tax laws.'' The Constitution, however, avoids the am-
biguity inherent in the use of the common word "taxes" 
and conveys the impression that the Tax Commission's 
jurisdiction is restricted to laws which are imposed ex-
clusively by virtue of the taxing power of the State. This 
is clearly evidenced by the legislative exposition of this 
provisi·on of the State Constitution. For example, the 
monies paid by employers into the State Insurance Fund 
under the Workmen's Compensation Law (a law which 
is predicated on the exercise of the police power of the 
state, Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 
246, 194 P. 122, 124) are collected and administered by 
the Industrial Commission. (Rev. Stat. Utah 1933, Sec. 
42-2-3). Similarly under the fish and game laws, the Fish 
and Game Commissioner collects fees and license monies 
and determines liability therefor independently of the 
State Tax Commission. These fees and monies are de-
posited by the Commissioner in a special fund which is 
administered by him separate and apart from t1he general 
funds of the state collected under "taxing laws." (Rev. 
Stat. Utah 1933, Title 30). The Department of Registra-
tion likewise collects monies and determines issues of 
liability with respect to many matters entrusted by the 
legislature to it for supervision, administration and con-
tl'ol. (Rev. Stat. Utah 19·33, Title 79). Like powers 
have been vested in a?ministrative bodies other than the 
State Tax Commission with respeet to the collection and 
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administration of funds derived by way of fees or as-
sessments from attorneys (Rev. Stat. Utah, 1933, Title 
6); from banks (Rev. Stat. Utah 1933, Title 7, Sees. 7-
1-11 and 7 -1-llx) and fr-om airplane pilots and com-
panies (Rev. Stat. Utah 19·33, Title 4). 
We shall now proceed to indicate t~he nature of the 
taxing power for the purpose of distinguishing it from 
the poli.ee power which requires payments to be made 
into a special fund for a particular purpose: The line 
which distinguishes an exercise of the police power from 
the exercise of the taxing power is difficult to draw, 
but notwithstanding these difficulties, there are criteria 
available for determining whet1her a particular statute 
falls on one side of the line or the other. In this con-
nection, reference should be made to the discussion in 
Cooley, The Law of Taxation, 4th ed. 1924, vol. 4, c. 29, 
entitled "Impositions in Exercise of Police Power." On 
page 3511 it is said: 
"If the purpose is regulation the imposition or-
dinarily is an exer.cise of the police power, while 
if the purpose is revenue the imposition is an ex-
ercise ·of the taxing power and is a tax.'' 
On page 3513 the author says: 
"Only those cases where regulation is the primary 
purpose can be specially referred to the police 
power. If revenue is the primary purpose and 
regulation is merely incidental the imposition is 
a tax; while if regulation is the primary purpose 
the mere fact that incidentally a revenue is also 
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obtained does not make the imposition a tax, 
* * " 
In support of this statement the author cites State ex rel. 
Brewster v. Ross, 101 Kan. 377, 166 P. 505; Davis v. 
Hailey, 143 Tenn. 247, 227 S. W. 1021; Ard. v. People, 66 
Colo. 480, 182 P. 892; Rhinehart v. State, 121 Tenn. 420, 
440, 117 S. W. 508 and other cases. In the Rhinehart case, 
it was decided that a "tax" of one-fifth of 1 per cent. on 
the gross premiums ,of fire insurance companies to pro-
vide a fund for investigation by the insurance commis-
sioner of the origin ·Of fires is not a "tax" although the 
surplus of ·such monies is paid into the State Treasury 
and expended for general State purposes. See also Rell-
foot Lake Levee District v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 171, 36 S. 
W.1046. 
On page 3514 Cooley writes: 
"If, by the common understanding and general 
custom of the country, a particular duty is re-
garded as being imposed upon certain individuals, 
not as their pvoportionate share in the burdens of 
government, but because of some special relation 
to property peculiarly located, or to business pe-
culiarly troublesome or dangerous, s•o that a re-
quirement H1at the duty shall be performed by 
such individuals is usually regarded as only in the 
nature of regulation of relative obligations and 
duties through the neighborhood or the munici-
pality, there is no sufficient reason why this may 
not be considered a mere police regulation, though 
the proceedings assume the form of taxation, and 
are even designated by that name." (Italics Sup-
plied). 
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We do not believe that it is possible to argue t~hat the 
purpose of the unemployment compensation law is ''rev-
enue'' or that revenue is the primary purpose of the law 
and regulation is merely incidental. The statute is de-
clared in section 2 to be enacted under the police powers 
of the State and sets forth an unemployment compensa-
tion system which is self-financing in all respects insofar 
as the public funds of the State are concerned. It pro-
vides for an unemployment compensation fund "whi~h 
shall be administered separate and apart from all public 
monies or funds of the State" (section 9 (a)) and "which 
is to be administered by the State Treasurer, not in his 
regular .capacity, but as ex-officio Treasurer and cus-
todian." (section 9(c) (4) ). The fund consists of all 
contributions collected under the act and the Industrial 
Commission is vested with full power, authority and 
jurisdictiton over the fund (section 9'( a)). Contributions 
are deposited in the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund 
(section 9'(c) (4)) and requisitioned therefrom by the 
Industrial Commission (through the Treasurer acting as 
its fiscal agent) from time to time in such amounts as it 
deems necessary for anticipated benefit payments. When 
requisitioned such monies are required to be deposited 
in the unemployment compensation fund in a special 
benefit account and benefits are to be paid therefrom in 
accordance with such regulations as the Industrial Com-
mission may prescribe (section 9(d) ). It is apparent 
that the system of collection and the payment of benefits 
contemplated by the legislature differs fundamentally 
and radically from that set up by statute for the collec-
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tion of general taxes. See Howes Bros. v. Massachusetts 
Unemployment Compensation Commission, supra, p. 728; 
see als·o Rev. Stat. Utah 1933, Titles 4, 6, 7, 30, 42 and 79 
providing for t!he collection of fees from airplane pilots, 
attorneys, banks, from anglers, hunters, occupations gen-
erally, and employers for insuring under the Workmen's 
Compensation Law. 
It is especially significant that, by statute, (section 
9(a) ), and, in practice, the contributions collected never 
become a part of nor are they ever mingled with the pub-
lic funds of the State in its Treasury which are available 
for defraying the general expenses of Government. The 
contributions are deposited in special acoounts and are 
treated as special monies impressed with a trust in favor 
of those persons who may qualify under the criteria set 
forth in t•he statute as unemployed individuals entitled 
to benefits. This is important because it is generally 
re.cognized that the •outstanding characteristic of a tax, 
and that feature which distinguishes it from a levy under 
the police power, is that a tax is a compulsory exaction 
to defray the general expenses of government. State ex 
rel. Davis-Smith Co. v Clausen, 65 W,ash. 156, 117 P. 
1101; First State Bank of Claremont v. Smith, 49 S. D. 
518,207 N. W. 467, 469; Home Accident Insurance Co. v. 
Ind. Comm. of Ariz., 34 Ariz. 201, 269 P. 501. See parti-
cularly State ex rel. Attorney General v. Wisconsin Con-
structors, (Wis.1936), 268 N. W. 238,242, 243; 26 R. 0. L. 
17, et seq. 
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Contributions, however, are not available for that 
purpose. Indeed, if they were available for any purpose 
other than the payment of unemployment benefits, the 
unemployment compensation law would not be in con-
formity with section 303(a) (5)* of the Federal Social 
Security Act as amended, and se-ction 1603(a) (4)* of the 
Internal Revenue Code (formerly section 903(a) (4) of 
the Sodal Security Act). Such lack of conformity with 
the standards in the cited provisiQns would result in a 
deprivation to taxpayers of the credit against the Federal 
tax to which they would otherwise he entitled upon the 
payment of State contributions, and would deprive the 
State of Utah of federal funds f.or the administration of 
the unemployment compensation law-a consequence 
which would mean complete frustration and nullification 
of the legislative intention expressed in the Utah unem-
ployment compensati·on law. 
Moreover, the statute, section 7 (f) of Chapter 43, 
Session Laws of 1937, and section 7 (e) of Chapter 52, 
Session Laws of 1939, clearly shows that the legislature 
did not regard contributi·ons to be taxes levied under the 
taxing power of the state. These se.ctions provide that 
"contributions paid by an employer * * * shall be 
deductible in arriving at taxable income of such employer 
under the provisions of Chapters 13 and 14, Title 80, Re-
*These sections require all State unemployment compensation laws, 
as a condition of approval for tax credits under the Federal Unem-
ployment Taxing Act and for administrative grants to provide for-
"Expenditure of all money requisiti-oned by the State agency from 
the Unemployment Trust Fund, in the payment of unemployment 
compensation, exclusive of expenses of administration; • • *" 
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vised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended, to the same 
extent as other taxes deductible during any taxable year 
by any such employer." Under Title 80, Ohapters 13 and 
14 of the Revised Statutes, aU taxes payable under tax-
ing laws are permissible deductions with named excep-
tions. If the legislature had regarded contributions to 
be taxes levied under a taxing law, this provision in the 
unemployment compensation law would have been un-
necessary. The contributions would have constituted 
permissible deductions without specific provision being 
made for their deductibility in the unemployment com-
pensation law. The insertion of this section clearly in-
dicates, therefore, that t!he legislature did not view con-
tributions to be taxes and accordingly, in •order to per-
mit their deduction under the income tax law, inserted 
the provision in the law that contributions might be de-
ducted from gross income under the income tax law not 
"as taxes" but merely "to the same extent" as taxes. 
The argument that enforced payments may be re-
ferrable to the police power and not to the power of taxa-
tion, and, therefore, not ''taxes'' is not novel. The field 
of workmen's compensation furnishes an analogy which 
may be the most persuasive in its support. Workmen'•s 
compensation laws have been held to represent exercises 
of a power other than the taxing power of a State be-
cause, like the State unemployment compensat~on law, 
the monies they require to be paid into State funds or 
to be paid by way of premium for ~compulsory insurance 
are not raised for general revenue nor f·or the mis-
cellaneous expenses of State Government, but for a part-
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ieular purpose within the regulatory powers of the State. 
It has been well established that workmen's compensa-
tion laws stem fflom t·he police power. See State ex rel. 
Da.vis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101; 
Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 44 Mont. 
180, 119 Pac. 554; Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal 
Co., 175 Ia. 245, 154 N. ·w. 1037; Home Accident Insur-
ance Co. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 34 Ariz. 
201, 269 Pac. 501; State ex rel. Stearns v. Olson, 43 N. D. 
619, 175 N. W. 714. In State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. 
Clausen, supra, the court said (p. 1116.) : 
"The third principal objection to the constitution-
ality of the act is that it violates the provisions 
of the Constitution designed to secure equal and 
uniform taxation of property for public purposes. 
As the charge laid on the pers,ons engaged in the 
industries named in the ad is a pecuniary burden 
imposed by public authority, it partakes of the 
nature of a tax and, in the language of a distin-
guished judge discussing a similar question, 'for 
many purposes might be so spoken of without 
harm.' Bu;t it is manifest that it is not a 'tax' in 
the sense the umrd is used in the sections of the 
Constitu.tion to W'hva,h reference. is here made. 
No accession to the public revenue, general or 
local, is authorized or aimed at. The purpose of 
the exaction is entirely different. It is to be used, 
not to meet the current expenses of government, 
but to recompense employes of the industries on 
whom the burden is imposed for injuries received 
by them while engaged in the pursuit of their em-
ployment. It is the consideration which the own-
ers of t!he industries pay f,or the privilege of car-
rying them on. It is therefore in the nature of a 
license tax, and ean be justified on the principle 
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of law that justifies the imposition and collection 
of license taxes generally." (Italics supplied). 
In State ex rel. Stearns v. Olson, supra, the court 
said (p. 716): 
"It is perfectly clear that the workmen's com-
pensation fund is no part of the state fund, and is, 
in no sense public money. It is a special fund, 
accumulated by the collection of annual premiums 
from employers, the amount of which is deter-
mined and fixed by the Workmen's Compensation 
Bureau for the empl·oyment or occupation oper-
ated by such employer, * * * When the fund 
is accumulated, the state treasury is by the pro-
visions of the act, made the custodian of it. The 
Legislature, if it had thought it wise, could have 
designated the Commissioner of Agriculture and 
Labor, or the Commissioner of Insurance, or other 
public officer, as custodian of the fund. It might, 
perhaps, if it deemed it wise, ,have designated a 
trust company or responsible banking institution, 
or any other responsible financial agency within 
the state as custodian; this upon the gr•ounds that 
such funds are not public funds, but is a special 
fund, and in a sense a private fund as contradis-
tinguished from a public fund in the sense that 
it is collected from not all the people of the state 
by ·way of taxation, but from certain individuals, 
corporations, associ1ations, etc., of the state en-
gaged in conducting certain occupations and em-
ployments denominated in the act. The purpose 
of the collection of the same into a special fund is 
to compensate f,or a definite length of time, de-
pending on the character of the injury, employes 
who re.ceived injuries while engaged in such em-
ployment, for employers who have paid the pre-
miums assessed against them into such fund." 
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Nor are workmen's compensation laws the ·only laws com-
pelling the payment of contributions into a fund for a 
proper public purpose referrable to the police power of 
the State. In McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S. 
W. 688 ( 1908) a "per capita tax" was levied on dogs to 
indemnify individuals who suffered losses of sheep due 
to the depredat1ons of dogs. The obvious purpose of the 
act was to promote the sheep industry. After pointing 
out that the regulation of dogs was an appropriate sub-
ject of regulation under the police power the court said 
(p. 690): 
"We are also of the opini,on that, the statute not 
being for revenue but an exercise of the police 
power, its provisions are not regulated by any 
section of t~he Constitution relating to fiscal mat-
ters, and, although the sum required to be paid 
by the owner of each dog four months old is called 
a tax, and it is required to be assessed by the 
assessor, oollected by the sheriff and paid over 
to the State Treasurer, this is only a mode of 
regulating the dogs within the state and protect-
ing the sheep industry." 
In Fire Department of Milwaukee v. II elfenstein, 16 
Wis. 142, the statute provided that no person could oper-
ate within the State as an agent of a fire insurance com-
pany until he had filed a bond conditi,oned on the pay-
ment of $2 for every $100 of premiums annually col-
lected. The court held that the statute did not infringe 
the constitutional requirement that taxes should be uni-
form and said (p. 145) : 
''Nor is the requirement an exercise of t~he pow-
er of taxation as to the companies, but only a 
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proper exercise of the police power inherent m 
the sovereignty of the state." 
See Smith v. Commonweal~h, 175 Ky. 286, 1941S. W. 367; 
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; State ex rel. Sher-
man v. Pape, 103 Wash. 319, 174 Pac. 468; Noble State 
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104; State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 
312. See also First State Bank of Sutherlin v. Kendall 
Lumber Corporation, 107 Ore. 1, 213 Pac. 142, in which 
it was held that an Oregon law requiring timber land 
owners to provide a fire patrol and authorizing the !State 
forester in the event of their failure to do so to provide 
a patrol and to charge the expenses thereof against the 
lands protected, was not a taxing statute and is there-
fore not invalid as failing to provide for a uniform and 
equal rate ·of taxation required by t•he Constitution. 
The above cases are referred to principally for the 
purpose of demonstrating that workmen's compensation 
statutes and others which provide for the compulsory 
payment of money to a fund for some purpose within the 
scope of regulatory or police powers, are not by reason 
thereof "taxing" statutes except in the most general 
and non-technical sense of the term. A "contribution", 
"fee", or "assessment" either to a fund or private as-
sociation is frequently referred to as a tax although in 
contemplation of law it has an entirely different eharac-
ter. 
In Wirtz v. Nestos, 51 N. D. 603, 200 N. W. 524, the 
court said that .contributions to a State fund for work-
men's oornpensation is a "species of taxation", but the 
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exaction was sustained under the police power. In State 
ex rel. Da1vis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, supra, the court said 
with reference to the objection that the workmen's com-
pensation law of Washington violated pr•ovisions of the 
Constitution designed to secure equal and uniform taxa-
tion of property for public purposes: 
''As the charge laid on the pers•ons engaged in the 
industries named in the act is a pecuniary burden 
imposed by public authority, it partakes of the 
nature of a tax and, in the language of a distin-
guished judge discussing a similar question, 'for 
many purposes may be so spoken of without 
harm'. But it is manifest that it is not a 'tax' in 
the sense the word is used in the sections of the 
Constitution to which reference is here made.'' 
To sum up, briefly: In referring to "tax laws", 
Article XIII, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution eonfers 
jurisdiction upon the State Tax Commission with respect 
t•o all revenue laws enacted in pursuance of the State's 
power ·of taxation; the unemployment compensation law 
is not such a law; it does not contemplate the collection 
of revenue to defray the general expenses of govern-
ment-to the contrary it reveals its police power origin 
as stated in section 2 of the law, by attempting to regu-
late the evils of unemployment by means of the collec-
ti-on of funds from those who stand in a proximate posi-
tion to the problem, the deposit of such funds in a special 
account in accordanee with procedures which differ radi-
cally from those applicable to general revenue receipts, 
and the payment of such funds to qualified individuals. 
The entire scheme of the law manifests a legislative un-
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derstanding that the c•ontributions are not to be regarded 
as taxes in the technical sense, but police power exactions 
levied by a statute which is not a "tax law" within the 
constitutional provisions. 
The court is also respectfully referred to the widely 
accepted canon of statutory 0onstruction t!hat where a 
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of 
which will uphold its validity and another which will 
render it unconstitutional, the court should favor that 
construction which will result in sustaining the statute. 
See The Best Foods Co. v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285 
Pac. 1001, 1004, and particularly, the cases cited at that 
page. See also State v. Packer Corp., 77 Uta1h 500, 297 
Pac. 1013; Utah State Fair Association v. Green, 68 Utah 
251, 249 Pac. 1016; Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 
Utah 321, 28 P. (2d) 161, 167; Tintic Standard Minmg 
Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491, 16 P. (2d) 637; Salter 
v. Nelson, 85 Utah 460, 39 P. (2d) 1061; 25 R. C. L., p. 
100, et seq., sections 243, 244, 245. 
Thus, where the unemployment compensation law 
may be upheld as an exercise of the police power (as 
was stated by this court in its previous decision in this 
case), (and as is stated by the legislature in its declara-
tion of purpose in enacting the law), and might also be 
referrable to t1he taxing power of the State, the court 
should not hold the statute unconstitutional, or the ac-
tion of the Industrial Commission invalid on the theory 
that t_he statute is a" tax law'' where a holding that the 
statute was enacted in pursuance of the police power, 
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and is not a taxing law, would result in an affirmance 
of the administrative action and the validity of the stat-
ute. 
C. Doubts t!hat might arise concerning the confmm-
ity of the State unemployment compensation law 
with the standards of Title III of the Social Se-
curity Act should induce the court to sustain the 
authority ·of the Industrial Commission to deter-
mine the existence of the employer relationship. 
The Utah unemployment compensation law, in com-
mon with the laws of other States approved by t•he Social 
Security Board under Title IX ·of the Social Security 
Act and financed as to their administration by grants of 
Federal monies under Title III of that act, sets up a 
procedure for determination by an administrative agency 
of the rights of claimants to benefits under the law. It 
provides, in connecti·on with such procedure, for a fair 
hearing to be afforded to individuals whose claims for 
benefits are denied. If the Industrial Commission is not 
permitted to decide issues of "employment" in connec-
ti·on with claims for benefits, serious doubt would exist 
with respect to the .conformity of the :State law with the 
provisions of Title III of the Social Security Act. 
Section 303(a) (3) of that Act requires, as a condi-
tion of Federal grants, that the State law pr•ovide: 
"Opportunity for a fair hearing, before an im-
partial tribunal, for all individuals whose claims 
for unemployment compensation are denied." 
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This pr·ovision has been construed, in the standards of 
the Social Security Board with respect thereto, to re-
quire that the State statute and rules and regulations 
thereunder include provision for a fair hearing before an 
administrative tribunal; opportunity for a fair hearing 
only upon appeal to a judicial tribunal is deemed inade-
quate to sa.tisfy the standard. Hence, to conform with 
this section of the So.cial Security Act, an administra-
tive tribunal must afford a full and fair hearing to all 
individuals whose claims are denied on all issues relevant 
to the validity of their claims. Section 6(c) of the un-
employment compensation law and the regulations of the 
Industrial Commission (Regulations 20-1 through 20-
4), have been accepted by the Social (Security Board as 
conforming with all the essential elements of the type 
of fair hearing contemplated by section 303(a) (3) of the 
Social Security Act. The jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Commission, under the law as found by the Social Se.cur-
ity Board to conform with the requirements of section 
303(a) (3), must extend, to determinations of questions 
of empl·oyment if it is to afford to a claimant an oppor-
tunity for a fair hearing in cases where the payment of 
benefits depends upon the resolution of the "employ-
ment" question. A hearing on this issue must, under 
the requirements of the Social Security Act, be afforded 
regardless whether it may or may not have been adjudi-
cated for the purpose of contribution liability in a suit 
for contributions brought by the State Tax Commission. 
The fair hearing provision in secti·on 303(a) (3) of 
the Social Security Act was obviously intended as a 
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guaranty to those who assert claims for benefits. Such 
hearings must be afforded with respect to all issues in-
v-olving the payment or denial of benefits. Unless it is 
held that the Industrial Commission •Can hold hearings 
to determine such a question, i.e., whether an individual 
earned wages in employment in the amount specified by 
the Btate law, in all cases where such issue is disputed 
in connection with a claim for benefits, serious doubt as 
to the conformity ·of the State law with the provisions of 
section 303 (a) ( 3) of the Social Security Act exists. 
Contrary to the assertions made by amici curiae t>hat 
in all instances the existence of an employment relation-
ship has been determined in suits for contribut1ons, the 
attention of this court is called to the following cases 
in which coverage issues including the issue of ''employ-
ment" have been adjudicated in appeal proceedings which 
arose out ·of claims for benefits. Bronx H omc News v. 
Miller, (N. Y. 1939), 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 55; In rc Batter, 
(N.Y. 1939), 14 N.Y. S. (2d) 42; In re Kinney, (N.Y. 
1939), 14 N.Y. S. (2d) 11; Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. Ram-
sey, et al., Prentice-Hall, Unemployment Compensation 
Service, Wisconsin, ~ 29624. That the number of judi-
cial decisions on coverage questions which •have been 
rendered in proceedings arising fvom claims for benefits 
is relatively small as .c•ompared with the number rendered 
in suits for contributions is easily accounted for. No 
benefits became payable under any State unemployment 
compensation law until two years after contributions 
were payable under the law ·of the State, and except in 
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-Wisconsin, no benefits became payable under any law 
until 1938. ( Cf. section 903 (a) ( 2) of the Social Security 
Act, now section 1603(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which requires an accumulation of funds for a two-
year period under !State unempl·oyment oompensation 
laws before benefits might become payable.) The atten-
tion of the court is again directed to the provisions of 
the unemployment compensation laws of every State and 
Territ·ory setting up provisions for administrative deter-
minations of benefit rights and to the already large vol-
ume of benefit decisions rendered by t!he administrative 
appeal tribunals which have involved coverage questions. 
(Selections from these decisions have been printed by 
the Social Security Board in the "Unempl·oyment Com-
pensation Interpretative Service-Benefit Series", a 
compilation of the benefit decisions of the higher adminis-
trative appeal tribunals.) The provisions for determina-
tion of benefit rights through a system of administrative 
tribunals, ·with limited provision for appeal to the courts, 
are designed to facilitate t•.he speedy determination of 
benefit rights in a manner which would not be possible if 
all issues pertinent theret·o had to be resolved by judi-
cial proceedings. ( Cf. Statement of this Court in Utah 
Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 
122, 123, and 124). If such provisions accomplish their 
purpo_se it is to be expected that questi·ons of covered em-
ployment will, in connection with decisions upon indivi-
dual benefit rights, be generally decided by administra-
tive tribunals. 
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Section 303(a) (1) requires that a State law, to be 
eligible for grants of Federal funds for its administra-
tion, must provide: 
"Such methods of administration (other than 
those relating to selection, tenure of office, and 
compensation of personnel) as are found by the 
Board to be reasonably calculated to insure full 
payment ·of unemployment ·compensation when 
due.'' 
This provision appears to have as its purpose to insure 
that S1tate laws .certified for Federal grants shall contain 
provisions calculated to assure a prompt disposition of 
claims fm benefits and the payment of benefits in accord-
ance therewith. An unemployment compensation law 
which would permit delay in any payment until another 
agency of the State government, not charged with re-
sponsibility for the payment of benefits W!hen due, should 
decide for tax collecti·on purposes to press to ultimate 
conclusion in the courts the legal issue of the existence 
of the employment relationship would fail of its purpose 
because it would not pr·ovide benefits to unemployed 
workers at the time when they are most needed; such a 
law eould only very questionably be regarded as one con-
taining provisions for methods of administration cal-
culated to assure the full payment of benefits when due. 
It_ is submitted that in view of the doubts that might 
arise concerning the conformity of the State unemploy-
ment compensati.on law with Title III of the Social Se-
curity Act should the arguments of amici curiae prevail, 
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this court should be inclined to adopt such a construc-
tion of the State law as would insure the continued con-
formity .of the law with the Federal Social Security Act. 
D. The court should sustain the Industrial Commis-
sion's order insofar as it affects the payment of 
benefits to the claimant, Thomas, and insofar as 
it determines that he was engaged in "employ-
ment'' even if it be held that the portion of the 
Commission's decision which requires the em-
ployer to file reports and pay contributions is 
invalid. 
In point II A, supra, we demonstrated that the au-
thority to administer the unemployment compensation 
law, generally, has been conferred by the legislature up-
on the Industrial Commission, and that the Commission 
is burdened with the duty of determining the eligibility 
of claimants for benefits and the amount of benefits pay-
able to them. In the c.ourse of making such determina-
tions, the Industrial Commission is under the duty of 
determining whether a claimant ''earned wages for em-
ployment by employers" in a specified amount (section 
4(e) ). 
The brief of amici .curiae seems to argue that if the 
Industrial Commission's decis1on requiring Globe Grain 
and Milling Company to file reports and to pay contri-
butions is invalid, that by reason thereof, t~he portion of 
the decision adjudicating the claimant's eligibility for 
benefits and the amount thereof is also invalid. In so 
44 
arguing, amici curiae proceed upon the assumption that 
invalidity of a part of an order necessarily voids it in 
i,ts entirety. While this might be the case where portions 
·Of an order are inseparable and mutually dependent, the 
assumption has no validity where the portions of an 
order are distinct and separable. 
T!here is no direct relationship between a right to 
benefits by a claimant and the obligation of the employer 
to pay oontributions. The two parts of the statute are 
separate and distinct. A claimant may be entitled to bene-
fits notwithstanding that no contributions had been or 
will be paid by his employer if he meets the eligibility 
conditions as set forth in section ( 4) which do not require 
as a C·ondition to the receipt of benefits that an employer 
shall have paid contributions. Likewise, an employer 
might be liable for contributions without any of his em-
ployees ever asserting a claim for benefits or qualifying 
therefor. Therefore, the alleged invalidity of the Com-
mission's decision, insofar as it required Globe Grain 
and Milling Co!lljpany to pay contributions, cannot af-
fect that portion which adjudicated Thomas' claim for 
benefits. In State ex rel. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. 
v. Public Service Commission, 308 Mo. 359, 272 S. W. 
9'57, a somewhat similar situation was involved. In that 
case, the Supreme Court of the 1State of Missouri held, 
after initial hearing, that under the Public Service Com-
missi·on Law, the State Public Service Commission had 
no jurisdiction to construe and enforce a railroad's con-
tract with Kansas City to construct and maintain a via-
duct over railroad yards at its own expense. Subsequent-
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ly, on moti·on to modify the decree, it appeared that the 
City sought only an affirmance of such portion of the 
Commission's order as permitted the construction of a 
viaduct •Over the railroad yards in accordance with pre-
s·cribed specifications, leaving it to subsequent litigation 
to determine whether, under the contract, the railroad 
was obliged to assume the cost of erecti·on and expense 
of maintenance. It was argued in oppositi·on that the 
statute which authorized the Circuit Court to enter judg-
ment "either affirming ·Or setting aside the order of the 
Oommission" did not "permit of a partial affirmance 
or reversal." The c.ourt held, however, that "there was 
nothing relating to the apportionment of costs that could 
have been pr01perly eonsidered by t·he Commission m 
determining the manner ·of crossing'' and that: 
''As the manner of crossing, as determined and 
prescribed, was, and is in no way dependent upon 
the apportionment of costs, the order under re-
view can be set aside as to the latter without in 
any way affecting or modifying it in resped to 
the f•ormer." (p. 963) 
The court, in this case can, theref.ore, take the same ac-
tion as was taken by the Supreme Court of the State of 
Missouri. It can uphold the order of the Industrial Com-
mission with respect to the remedial action of awarding 
benefits to the claimant, leaving it to subsequent litiga-
tion (such as a suit for contributions which may be in-
stituted by the State Tax Commission) to determine how 
the cost to the State unemployment fund of the benefit 
payments is to be borne. 
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Thus, even if contributions be deemed to be "·taxes" 
and the unemployment compensation law, to the extent 
that it requires tJhe payment of contributions, be con-
sidered a" tax law" which, under the Constitution, must 
be administered by the State Tax Commission, it is clear 
that, to the extent benefits are paid and the Industrial 
Commissi·on is required to make determinations of the 
existence of "ellll)ployme'rlt" for benefit purposes, its 
orders must be sustained. The mere fact that both the 
State Tax Commission and the Industrial Commission, 
independently, might be called upon to make determina-
tions as to the existence of "employment" (one for the 
purpose of contributions and tJhe other for the purpose 
of benefits) does not mean that an invalid portion of an 
·Order of the Industrial Oommission adjudicating ''tax 
liability" is inseparable from a portion adjudicating 
benefit rights, nor that its invalidity taints that portion 
of the ·order which the Industrial Commission is clearly 
authorized to issue. Compare Fuqua v. Watson, et al., 
172 Okla. 624, 46 P. (2d) 486; Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co. 
v. Forrester, 72 Okla. 8, 177 P. 593; Ballew v. United 
Sltates, 160 U. S. 187. 
III. 
THE DENIAL BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF GLOBE 
GRAIN AND MILLING COMPANY'S APPLICATION FOU A 
REVUJW OF THE DECISION OF THE APPEAL TRIBUNAL 
WAS PROPE:R. 
In its petition for rehearing, Globe Grain & Milling 
Company alleges that error was -committed in that the 
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"appeal" before the Industrial Commission was deter-
mined without hearing or argument other than that had 
before the appeal tribunal ( Oon:~;pany 's petition for re-
hearing, pp. 2, 3). This contention, not having been 
properly raised by the company on its original petition 
for a review of the decisi,on of the Industrial Commis-
sion, cannot be considered upon the application f.or re-
hearing. Pingree National Bank v. Weber Coun,ty, 54 
Utah 599, 183 P. 334, 336; Dahlquist v. Denver a~Ytd R. G. 
Ry. Co., 52 Utah 438, 174 P. 833, 844. 
But even if it were properly in issue, this contention 
lacks merit. It assumes that there is some constitutional 
necessity for a hearing before the Industrial Commis-
sion as well as befme the appeal tribunal prior to appeal 
to the courts. The only constitutional provision which 
might have any bearing upon this claim would seem to 
be the "due process" provisions of the State and Fed-
eral Constitution. It is submitted, however, that al-
though judicial review may be required of certain types 
of administrative action, an appeal is not a part of due 
process of law in either judicial or administrative pro-
ceedings. Pittsburgh C. C. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 
421; James v. Appel, 192 U. S. 129; United States v. 
Heintz, 218 U. S. 532; Saylor v. Duel, 236 Ill. 429, 86 N. 
E. 119; 6 R. C. L. p. 454. See Morgan v. United States, 
304 U. S. 1; Consolidated Edison v. National Labor Re-
lations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 224-228. 
In Pittsburgh C. C. Ry. Co. v. Backus, supra, the 
United States Supreme Court, in holding that an ad-
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ministrative appeal was not essential to due process of 
law, said (p. 426) : 
"It is urged that the valuation as fixed was not 
announced until shortly before the adjournment 
,of the board, and that no notice was given of such 
valuation in time to take any steps for the cor-
rection of errors therein. If by this we are to 
understand counsel as claiming that there must 
be notice and a hearing after the determination 
by the assessing hoard as well as before, we are 
unable to concur with that view. A hearing be-
fore judgment, with full opportunity to present 
all the evidence and the arguments which the 
party deems important, is all that can be ad-
judged vital. Rehearings, new trials, are not es-
sential to due process of law, either in judicial 
or administrative proceedings. One hearing, if 
ample, before judgment, satisfies the demand of 
the Constitution in this respect.'' 
An administrative appeal not being essential to due 
process of law, the only other question which remains 
for consideration is whether such an appeal is required 
by the terms of the unemployment compensation law. 
Section 6 of the unemployment compensation law, out-
lines the procedure to be followed by the Industrial 
Commission and its representatives in passing on the 
validity of claims for benefits. Under this section, pro-
vision was made by the legislature for a number of stages 
in the administrative determination of claims, and it is 
submitted that all the prescribed steps called for by the 
law were adhered to by the Industrial Commiss~on and 
its representatives in considering the issues involved in 
the application for benefits. 
49 
According to the provisions of section 6(b), immed-
iately following the filing of a claim for benefits, an 
initial determination ,of its validity must be made. This 
determination, except in cases which involve labor dis-
pute issues, may be made in one of two ways. The 
claim may be passed upon by a representative or deputy 
designated by the Commission to perform that function, 
or, if the deputy or the representative, in his discretion, 
decides not to make an initial determination on the claim 
but to refer it for decision to an appeal tribunal, by an 
appeal tribunal consisting of either a three-member body 
or a single salaried examiner (section 6 (b)). In this 
case, the deputy designated by the Industrial Commis-
sion, after examining the facts before him, made an 
initial determination. He concluded that Thomas, the 
claimant, was ineligible to receive benefits under the 
terms of the law. From this determination, Thomas 
appealed to the appeal tribunal which, after affording 
to Thomas and Globe Grain and Milling Company a full 
hearing on all disputed issues, reversed the initial deter-
mination and awarded benefits. An application for a 
review of this decision awarding benefits was thereupon 
filed with the Industrial Commission by Globe Grain and 
Milling Company. The Industrial Commission denied 
the company's application for review and affirmed the 
decision of the appeal tribunal, and in doing so without 
allowing a further hearing of the claim, it is submitted, 
the Industrial Commission acted fully in accordance with 
the provisions of the law. 
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Under the law, a decision <of an appeal tribunal is 
the decision of the Industrial Commission unless re-
viewed by the Commission (section 6 (c)). It is not the 
decision of a subordinate body or of a mere investigator. 
According t,o the language of the statute, further hear-
ings on a claim may be had before the Industrial Com-
mission as a matter of right only by a party to a decision 
of an appeal tribunal which was not unanimous, or by 
a deputy or representative of the Commission whose 
decision was overruled or modified by an appeal tribunal. 
In all other situations, a further hearing on a claim 
decided by an appeal tribunal may not be had unless the 
Industrial Commission, on its own initiative, directs a 
further hearing, or if it grants a hearing upon applica-
tion by a party to the decision of the appeal tribunal 
(section 6 (e) ) . 
The Industrial Commission in this case was not re-
quired by the statute to further review the claim. The 
decision of the appeal tribunal being the decision of the 
Industrial Commission under the statute, the company's 
petition for review amounted to nothing more than an 
application for a rehearing of the claim. Such reconsid-
eration could not have been had in this case before the 
Industrial Commission unless it granted the company's 
application therefor. This, the Industrial Commission 
refused to do, and its action in that regard cannot be 
held to be erroneous since it was fully empowered by 
the legislature to use its discretion as to whether it 
should grant or deny such reconsideration of claims 
in all but two types of situations, neither <Of which ob-
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tained in this instance. Nor was it error for the Indus-
trial Commission to deny the company's application for 
a reconsideration of the decision made for it by the ap-
peal tribunal without affording the company an oppor-
tunity to argue the merits of the case, orally or other-
wise, prior to the Commission acting upon the appli-
cation. Pinyon Queen Mining Co., et al. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 59 Utah 402, 204 P. 323. 
In the Pinyon Queen Mining Company case, the com-
pany sought to review in court an award of workmen's 
compensation to one of its employees. Following the 
award of compensation, the State applied for a rehear-
ing before the Industrial Commission. The rehearing 
was granted and the award was affirmed. On certiorari 
to the court, the company argued that the award should 
be vacated because the application for rehearing had not 
been served upon it and because it had not been afforded 
an opportunity to be heard with respect to the applica-
tion. The court rejected this contention and, in holding 
that an opportunity to be heard in connection with an 
application for a rehearing was unnecessary, said (p. 
324): 
''So far as applications for rehearing are con-
cerned, it would be a useless and cumbersome 
proceeding to have the parties appear for a spe-
cial hearing on the motion for rehearing. There 
is no formal hearing on a motion for rehearing, 
and when a petition for rehearing is pending 
it is properly disposed of ex parte." 
The facts in this case are even stronger than those 
involved in the Pinyon Queen Mining Company case. 
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Here it was the Globe Grain and Milling Company which 
filed the application for rehearing. It had an oppor-
tunity to state its grounds for dissatisfaction with the 
appeal tribunal's decision in its applicati,on and if an 
opportunity to be heard with respect thereto were re-
quired, it is the claimant who would have been entitled 
to the opportunity to argue before the Industrial Com-
miSSIOn. 
But even if it is assumed that the action of the 
Industrial Commissi,on, in passing upon Globe Grain and 
Milling Company's application to annul the decision 
of the appeal tribunal, amounted to a review of the 
proceedings before that tribunal and an affirmance of 
the decision of the appeal tribunal, the Industrial Com-
mission was not required under the statute t,o afford 
the claimant an opportunity to be heard before confirm-
ing the decision of the appeal tribunal. The unemploy-
ment compensation law provides that in the conduct of 
hearings, the Industrial Commission shall not be bound 
by "common law or statutory rules of evidence and 
other technical rules of procedure." (section 6(f) ). And, 
theref,ore, the rules which ordinarily govern the conduct 
of cases in court do not apply to hearings before the 
Industrial Commission. Pinyon Queen Mining Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 59 Utah 402, 204 P. 323; Mc-
Donald v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 120 
Me. 52, 112 Atl. 719. 
The statute, in terms, authorizes the Industrial 
Commission to review and decide claims for benefits on 
"the basis of the evidence previously submitted'' in a 
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case or to permit the taking of additional evidence 
(section 6(e)). It would seem that the statute, there-
fore, not only vests in the Industrial Commission dis-
cretion with respect to allowing a review of decisions 
of appeal tribunals, but also as to the manner, form, 
and extent of the review. Review in the first instance 
being discretionary, it is also discretionary with the In-
dustrial Commission as to whether in reviewing a claim 
on the basis of records previously made, it should give 
the parties notice of such review and afford them oppor-
tunity to be heard thereon prior to reviewing the case. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 
Oklahoma Pipe Line Co. v. State Indu,strial Commission, 
149 Okla. 162, 299 P. 180, 184, supports this view. In 
this caso, the court ruled that the power of the Oklahoma 
Industrial Commission to review a workmen's compensa-
tion award and to set it aside upon petition of a party 
was not defeated by the failure to give notice of the filing 
of the petition and affording the parties an opportunity 
to argue the claim. In that situation the statute, like 
the statute in this case, did not, in terms, require such 
notice and hearing to be given. Whether the Commis-
sion should grant review at all was discretionary, and 
therefme, in the absence of a statutory requirement for 
notice and hearing in connection with reviewing deter-
minations of appeal tribunals, the Commission had the 
authority to dispense with such notice and hearing. See 
Derr v. Weaver, 173 Okla. 140, 29 P. (2d) 97, 99. 
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IV. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DECIDED THAT EMPLOYMENT UNDER 
THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAW IS BROADER 
THAN THE COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. 
A. The legislative history, language and plan of 
of the statute clearly contemplate coverage un-
der the law broader in ~scope than the traditi,onal 
common law relationship of master and servant. 
The unemployment compensation law as originally 
enacted by the legislature in 1936 (Laws of Utah, Sp. 
Sess. 1936 Ch. 1) defined ''employment'' in Section 19 
(g) thereof in the following terms: 
"Employment means service, including service 
in interstate commerce, performed for wages or 
under any contract of hire, written or oral, ex-
press or implied, which service (1) is performed 
in this state by an individual, exclusive, how-
ever, of any service within this state which is 
incidental to the individual's service performed 
elsewhere; or (2) is performed elsewhere but is 
incidental to an individual's service in this state; 
* * * " 
Under this definition it might have been argued that 
coverage under the law was not defined in precise terms 
and it might have been urged that it alluded to the 
traditi,onal common law master-servant relationship. See 
Texas Company v. Wheeless, (Miss. 1939) 187 So. 880. 
But the legislature of this state, in 1937, felt impelled 
to change this definition; to ascribe to the term "em-
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ployment" a more precise meaning, and to give it the 
scope it intended it to have, namely, to cover thereunder 
persons other than those servants under 0ommon law 
concepts. Accordingly, in Session Laws of 1937 Ch. 43, 
Section 19 (j), it re-defined "employment" as "service, 
including service in interstate commerce, performed for 
wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, 
express or implied" and, very significantly, added the 
provision that, regardless whether the relationship be-
tween an individual and the unit for which services 
were performed was that of master and servant or prin-
cipal and independent contractor, all services performed 
for wages shall constitute "employment" unless the 
circumstances under which the services were performed 
met three named conditions for exclusion. The provision 
thus added reads (Section 19 (j) ( 5)) : 
''Services performed by an individual for wages 
shall be deemed to be employment subject to this 
act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction 
of the commission that-
" (a) Such individual has been and will continue 
to be free fr,om control or direction over 
the performance of such ·services, both under 
his contract of service and in fact; and 
''(b) Such service is either outside the usual 
course of the business for which such service 
is performed or that such service is per-
formed 'outside of all the places of business 
of the enterprise for which such service is 
performed; and 
'' (c) Such individual is customarily engaged in 
an independently established trade, occupa-
tion, profession, or business.'' 
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This change in the definition of employment obvi-
ously flowed from a change in intent, and a comparison 
of the definition as written by the legislature shows 
that it adopted, for the purpose of determining coverage 
under the unemployment compensation law, standards 
which were wholly unlike those used to determine em-
ployment under traditional common law master and 
servant concepts. 
The common law approach is outlined by the Restate-
ment of the Law of Agency in Section 220, chapter VII, 
topic 2, title B of Volume I. It reads: 
"b. Generality of definition. The relationship 
of master and servant is one not capable of 
exact definition. It is an important relation-
ship in that upon it depends the liability of 
the master to third persons and to his em-
ployees under the provisions of various stat-
utes as well as under the common law; tho 
relationship may prevent liability, as in the 
case of the fellow servant rule. It cawzot 
be defined, however, in general terms with 
s1tbstantial accuracy. The factors stated in 
Subsection (2) are all considered in deter-
mining the question, and it is for the triers of 
fact to determine whether or not there is a 
sufficient group of favorable factors to es-
tablish the relationship. Where tho infer-
ence is clear that there is, tor is not, a master 
and servant relationship, it is made by the 
court; otherwise the jury determines the 
question after instruction by the court as to 
the matters of fact to be considered.'' (Italics 
supplied). 
Under the common law approach to the master and ser-
vant relationship, the triers of facts must determine 
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"whether or not there is a sufficient group of favorable 
factors to establish the relationship" of master and 
servant as distinguished from that of principal and in-
dependent contractor. The Restatement lists nine such 
factors, which among others, are considered important 
and which must be "weighed". These are: 
" (a) the extent of control which, by the agree-
ment, the master may exercise over the 
the details of the work; 
''(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged 
in a distinct occupation or business; 
"(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to 
whether, in the locality, the work is usually 
done under the direction of the employer 
or by a specialist without supervision; 
" (d) the skill required in the particular occu-
pation; 
'' (e) whether the employer or the workman sup-
plies the instrumentalities, tools, and the 
place of work for the person doing the 
work; 
"(f) the length of time for which the person is 
employed; 
"(g) the method of payment, whether by time 
or by the job; 
"(h) whether or not the work is a part of the 
regular business of the employer; and 
"(i) whether or not the parties believe they are 
creating the relationship of master and 
servant." 
But this process of choosing and weighing "factors" 
is not the method of determining coverage under the 
unemployment compensation law. The statute specifies 
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only three criteria to be considered and a determination 
that a relationship does not conform to any single one 
of these is sufficient to create statutory "employment". 
Common law tests thus become irrelevant under the 
legislative definition, and such factors as are generally 
used to determine relationships at common law, i. e., 
whether or not the parties intended that an "independ-
ent contractor" relationship flow from their action, the 
method of payment whether by the time or job, the kind 
of occupation and the customs of the locality, cannot 
outweigh the statutory criteria. See Unemployment 
Compensation Commission of North Carolina v. Jeffer-
son Standard Life Insurance Co., 215 N. Car. 479, 2 S. E. 
(2d) 584; Industrial Commission of Colorado v. North-
western Mut~tal Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 
P. (2d) 560. 
Whatever doubt might exist as to whether or not 
the legislature intended to adopt a definition of "em-
ployment" unlike the common law master and servant 
relationship and to discard that relationship as the scope 
of coverage under the unemployment compensation law 
is dispelled by the rejection of the Senate at the 1939 
session of the legislature ·of all efforts to amend the 
definition of employment so ~s to confine coverage 
under the law to the traditional master and servant rela-
tionship. The following appears on page 5 of the 1939 
Senate Journal, Day 52: 
"Further oonsideration of S. B. No. 83 on second 
reading. Senator McFarland moved to amend the 
bill as follows: 
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"Page 28, line 16 (referring to section 19(i) (1), 
f,ollowing subdivision (6) insert subdivisions as 
follows: 
" '(7) Any employing unit which has in its em-
ployment under such conditions as to amount to 
a relationship of master and servant and not 
that of independent contractor of four or more 
individuals, irrespective of whether the same indi-
viduals are or were employed in each such day.' 
"Page 28, line 28 (referring to sections 19(j) (2) 
(b)) following subdivision (2) (b) insert subdivi-
sion (c) as follows: 
'' ' (c) The employment is not performed under 
a contract which creates a relationship of inde-
pendent contractor or does not amount to a re-
lationship of master and servant.' 
"Page 29, line 10 (referring to section 19(j)(5)) 
strike all of Section 5 and subdivisions (a), (b), 
and (c), ending on line 22, page 29, and insert 
in lieu thereof the following: 
" '(5) Services performed by an individual for 
wages shall be deemed to be employment subject 
to the act when it is shown that the services were 
performed under such conditions as amount to 
a. relationship of master and servant and not that 
of independent contractor.' 
"Page 30, line 17 (referring to section 19(j) (6) 
(i)) new subsection (i) as foUows: 
" '(i) Services performed under a contract 
which does not create the relationship of master 
and servant or which are performed under a con-
tract or condition which give rise to a relationship 
of one doing services of an independent contrac-
tor or services here performed under a special 
contract under such conditions that the person 
performing the work performs it as an independ-
ent contrador.' 
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"Page 31, line 13 (referring to section 19(p)) 
after the word 'payable' insert 'to an empl,oyee 
and not to an independent contractor.' 
"On motion of Sen a tor Hopkin a roll call was 
ordered. 
''The amendment failed to pass on the following 
r'oll call: 
"Yeas 8; Nays 11; absent 4." 
This extract from tho legislative history of the defi-
nition of "employment" in the statute shows, free from 
all doubt, that the legislature adopted a plan of coverage 
broader in scope than the common law of master and 
servant and that it wished t,o have coverage controlled 
by the criteria it enumerated in Section 19 (j) ( 5) of the 
law rather than by the tests generally used for deter-
mining the master-servant relationship at common law. 
This view is further bolstered by the fact that all words 
of art are carefully excluded from the enactment. Its 
operative words are "employment", and "service", 
and "employing unit", not "servant" "agent", or "in-
dependent contract·or", or "master", "principal", or 
"contracting party". The traditional "control test" or 
similar tests available to courts under the general body 
of law when confronted with propositions surrounding 
the concept of respondeat superior are wholly omitted 
from this law, and although the Industrial Commission 
has no quarrel with the value of the tests proposed in 
the Restatement of the Law of Agency, as such, it should 
be noted that the section relied upon by amici curiae to 
bolster their argument that secti,on 19 ( j) ( 5) should be 
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construed in the light of these tests, is ripped from its 
context. Section 220 is taken from Chapter VII, Topic 
2, Title B of Volume I of that work. The chapter is 
entitled: Liability of Principal to Third Persons; Torts; 
Topic 2 purports to discuss Liability for Authorized 
Conduct or Conduct Incidental Thereto, and Title B 
assumes to discuss the topic Torts of Servants. More-
over, not only does the Restatement thus point out that 
the criteria in Section 220 are £or the purpose of deter-
mining ex delicto liabilities of a master rather than the 
existence of a general employment relationship, but 
the Restatement goes further and warns that the criteria 
it enumerates do not and should not be substituted for 
statutory definitions. On page 486 the Restatement con-
tains the following cauti,onary remark: 
"d. Statutory usc of scrva11t. Statutes have been 
pa::-;secl in whieh the \vords 'servant' and 
'agent' have been used. The meaning of 
these words in statutes varies. The context 
and purpose of the particular statute con-
trols the meaning which is frequently not 
that the same word bears in the Restatement 
of this Subject.'' 
The authors of the Restatement ,of the Law of 
Agency would probably be the last to urge that, in a 
discussion of tort liability, they had finally established 
not only a perfect concept of employment for all pur-
poses, but also that, in enumerating the criteria set forth 
therein, they had limited fm all time legislative power 
in dealing with problems of employment. See "Interstate 
Bards and Yale Reviewers", H. F. Goodrich (Advisor 
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on Professional Relations to the American Law Insti-
tute) 84 U. of Penn. L. R. 449. 
Before proceeding to an analysi.s of the criteria by 
which the existence of the empLoyment relationship, 
defined in the Unemployment Compensation Law, should 
be determined, it should be noted that Section 19 (j) ( 5) 
squares with the reasons underlying the enactment of 
the unemployment compensation law. The general pur-
pose of the unemployment compensati,on law is to alle-
viate the evils of unemployment. These objectives the 
law is designed to achieve by the imposition of liability 
for contributions to provide funds for benefits and by 
adjustments in the rates ,of contributions as an incentive 
to employers to stabilize employment. The basic risk 
with which unemployment compensation is concerned is 
the termination of the receipt of remuneration by per-
sons performing services for others. Under our ec;onomy 
this is the hazard which initiates the evils of unemploy-
ment. In enacting the unemployment compensation law, 
the legislature, consistent with this purpose, could not 
have concerned itself solely with the different and in-
numerable situations wherein the activities ·of one person 
are controlled in .such detail by another as to warrant 
the imposition of tort liability or some other liability 
nor with the type of risk originally 0overed in employ-
er's liability and in workmen's compensation laws. These 
liabilities are imposed because the principal who has 
authority to control and supervise the particular activ-
ities of his employee is obviously in a position to min-
imize the risk of injury by the installation of safety 
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devices, or the imposition of strict rules and regulations 
respecting operations. In such situations it might be 
of importance whether the master could order a particu-
lar type of ~service or the kind of transportation to be 
used. The existence of such control ,over the particular 
details of the employee's activities or over the instru-
mentalities used by the servant justifies the determin-
ation that the master should bear the burden of injuries 
resulting from such riskcs, and the absence of such con-
trol over the particular instrumentality or act which 
caused an injury justifies freeing the employer fr,om 
liability. 
The risk of unemployment and the power to stabilize 
employment, however, as distinguished from the risk of 
injury to workmen or to a third person arises from 
the dependence of an individual upon the continuance 
of a relationship with the business of another. This 
risk arises where the receipt of remuneration for serv-
ices is dependent on the will of another or the continu-
ance of a relationship with the business of another. It 
is a risk which is not peculiar or restricted to individuals 
within the traditional and technical common law rela-
tionship. It may not be minimized or augmented to the 
same degree as other risks which can be minimized or 
augmented by virtue of an employer's authority to con-
trol or supervise a particular detail of an employee's 
activities. The risk of unemployment exists with respect 
to all employment regardless of whether, in connection 
with a particular tort or workmen's eompensation ques-
tion, the relationship between the worker and his em-
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ployer is or is not such as to impose liability on the 
master. The fact that an employee might choose his 
means of travel or be completely in charge of a place of 
business of his employer does not negative the fact that 
unless he is a truly independent merchant or business-
man, an entrepreneur in his own right, the continua-
tion of his employment and his continued right to re-
muneration is dependent upon the will of another, or 
the continuance of the business of another. The exist-
ence or non-existence of a technical master servant rela-
tionship under such circumstances is irrelevant and has 
no realistic significance to the state whose concern it is 
to pr,ovide means whereby persons temporarily unem-
ployed can maintain their morale and their health until 
they find jobs. These same considerations also apply 
to the raising of funds to pay benefits. Equality of 
treatment of business enterprises is related to the sim-
ilarities between the general activities of the persons 
through which enterprises are conducted. It is not re-
lated to the extent the management might choose to ex-
ercise control over its employees or to delegate functions 
or to the extent to which persons pedorming services 
for them may for ·some purposes be either "employees" 
or "independent contractors". 
Further, liability for contributions, in the computa-
tion of wage credits on which benefits are based under the 
unemployment compensation act, cannot, and should not, 
shift from moment to moment with each variation in the 
degree of control exercisable by the principal over the ac-
tivities of the individual performing services, nor can it 
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or should it vary with the ownership of the particular 
tool or instrumentality used in connection with the em-
ployment whieh may cause an injury to an employee or 
third person. Liability, under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, however, may so vary. To interpolate, there-
fore, this doctrine into unemployment eompensation 
would ereate an impossible administrative task. It would 
be utterly eonfusing if under the statute it should be 
necessary to weigh the relationship in terms of possible 
tort liability at each moment and to determine, for the 
purpose of benefits or contributions, the amount of re-
muneration paid to an employee for the specific activities 
of the employee for which the employer might have 
incurred a tort liability. It is the general relationship, 
the general status of the individual and his economic 
relationship to an enterprise, which is significant under 
the stattt,te. These distinctions between the operation 
of the doctrine of respondeat superior and the principles 
applieable to the unemployment compensation law are 
well summarized in Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Company 
v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, (Circuit Court, 
Dane County, \Visconsin, March 13, 1939, CCH Unem-
ployment Insurance Service, \Vis. para. 8122) *, in which 
the eourt, in construing a statutory definition of employ-
ment similar to that contained in section 19 (j) of the 
Utah unemployment compensation law, said: 
"Unemployment compensation (to use the com-
mission's rather scholarly diction) is predicated 
*A copy of this opinion is atta;ched hereto marked "Exhibit C", p. 
122 infra. 
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upon the 'flovv of time' element in employment 
whereas tort liability or liability in the field of 
workmen's compensation focuses upon the 'in-
stant of time' element." 
Thus, it is submitted, that this statute in Section 19 
(j) ( 5) clearly evidences a realistic approach towards 
solving questions of coverag·e for the purposes of unem-
ployment compensation. Under the statute, it is the status 
of the individual that is all important; not his relation-
ship at a particular moment of time. The importance of 
this shift in emphasis for the purposes of unemployment 
compensation as well as the necessity therefor was fully 
recognized by Mr. J·ohn C. Gall, .counsel for the National 
Association of Manufacturers, when he wrote (3 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (1936) p. 122): 
''A paywll tax * * * is a tax imposed upon 
an economic relationshi;p which has escaped legal 
definition. At c.ornmon law the relationship of 
master and servant was marked out under the 
law of contrad aiHl tort. vVell established de-
lineati·ons carried us into the law of principal and 
agent, or succeeded in creating a new relationship 
of independent contractor. Under modern statute 
law the emphasis has shifted frotn contra;ct to 
status, and delineation of the employer-employee 
relationship has been controlled by the impact of 
public policy represented in modern lcqislation. 
For example, the relationship, under workmen's 
C·ompensation laws and employer's liability acts 
is defined to relate the employer's liability to the 
degree of control exercised over the employee or 
his place of employment. Under more recent leg-
islation pertaining to lahor disputes, the relation-
ship of employer and employee is differently de-
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fined (citing 29 U. S. C. A. (Sup. 1935) sec. 152 
(5)) to effectuate an entirely different public pol-
icy. It is obviou.s that under unemployment com-
pensa-tion la.ws the relations.hips must be even fur-
ther defined to reflect the new social responsi-
bilities imposed upon employers." (Italic sup-
~)lied). 
To hold, therefore, that Section 19 (j) (5) is merely 
declaratory of the traditional common law master-ser-
vant relationship would not only ignore the legislative in-
tent thereof as evidenced by the history of the section 
and the plan and purpose of the statute, but also to deny 
to the legislature the power to fix rights and liabilities 
under the act in the manner it deemed best suited to meet 
the problems .of involuntary unemployment. It would 
also mean a complete denial on the part of the court of 
power in the legislature to emphasize for the purposes 
of this s·tatute the status of individuals; to regard re-
lationships in terms of the dependence of individuals for 
remuneration on the will of another, or the continuation 
of Hw business of another; and to prevent the legisla-
ture, by a redefinition of concepts, fr.om accomplishing 
that which many legislatures have already done even for 
workmen's compensation purposes, i.e., to enlarge the 
s·cope of coverage so as to include thereunder persons 
who, under traditional common law master-servant tests, 
might otherwise be regarded as independent contractors. 
See Cales v. Williamson (Mo. 1938), 117 S. W. (2d) 655; 
McDowell v. Duer, 78 Ind. App. 440, 133 N. E. 839; 
O'Hoyle v. Parker-Yottng Co., 95 Vt. 58, 112 Atl. 385; see 
also "Digest of ~Workmen's Compensation Laws" (1937 
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ed.) issued by Association of Casualty and Surety Exe-
cutives, p. XIII. 
It is highly significant that in all but one instance 
the courts of the several states when called upon to de-
termine the scope .of coverage under an unemployment 
compensation law which embodied a definition of "em-
ployment" and definitions of "employing unit", 
"wages", and "employer", like those in the Utah un-
employment compensati.ou law have held that their re-
spective legislatures, in the definition sections of the laws, 
showed ''a carefully considered and deliberate purpose 
to leap many legal barriers which ·would halt less am-
bitions enactments as far as language will permit it" and 
"to sweep beyond and to include, by redefiniti.on, many 
individuals who would have been otherwise excluded from 
the benefits of t:he act by the former concepts of master 
and servant and principal and agent as recognized at 
common law.'' North Carolina Uuemploytnent Compensa-
tion Commission v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance 
Co., 215 N. Car. 479, 2 S. E. (2d) 584; Industrial Com-
mission of Colorado v. N orthwestcrn Mutual Life In-
surance Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 560; Wisconsin 
Bridge and Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wis-
consin and Ramsey, Exhibit C, p. 122, infra; Pond v. 
Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission and 
Heinz Lumber Co., Circuit Court, Michigan, Marquette 
County, September 18, 1939. * 
*A copy of this opinion is attached to this brief, Exhibit D, p. 137 
infra. 
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The single de<Cisi·on which has not so held is that of 
Washington Recorder Co. v. Ernst, (Wash. 1939) 91 P. 
(2d) 718. This decision was rendered by Department II 
of the Washington Supreme Court and is, moreover, at 
variance wit:h a decision rendered by Department I of 
the Washington Supreme Court in M cDerrnott v. State of 
Washington CWash. 1938), 82 P. (2d) 568. No hearing 
has ever been had ou either of these cases before the 
\Yashington Supreme Court en bane as in the \Y ashing-
ton Recorder case, the Department which decided the suit 
refused to allow a petition for argument and hearing be-
fore the full court. Moreover, not only is the vY ashington 
Reeorder decision in conflict with all other cases which 
have eonstmed a definiti.on of "employment" similar to 
that coutained in Section 19 (j) (5) of the Utah law, but 
it is also inconsisteut ~within itself. In construing sec-
tion 19 (g) (5) of the Washington unemployment com-
peusation act it purports t.o hold that the "A" and "C" 
provisions thereof are merely restatements of the com-
mon law tests of the existence of the master and servant 
relationship, but that the "B" provision is wholly unlike 
the c·ommon law and represents a statutory criterion. 
Thus within a single section of the law defining employ-
ment there is contained, aceording to its view, both a 
common law definition and a statutory definition. It is 
submitted that in reading this opinion the oonclusion is 
inescapable that it is but an isolated instance of w:hat 
Mr. Justice Holmes once described as "One of the mis-
fortunes of the law" in that "ideas become encysted in 
phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke 
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further analysis." Hyde v. United States, 22,5 U. S. 347, 
391. 
B. The relationship between Thomas and Globe 
Grain and Milling Company constituted employ-
ment as defined in Section 19 (j) ( 5) of the law. 
The three statutory criteria in section 19 (j) (5) are 
m the oonjunctive. A showing of conformity with all 
three is a prerequisite to an exemption of coverage under 
t'he law. The finding of this court that Thomas was in 
employment was based upon a consideration of subsec-
tion C of section 19 (j) (5) and it is this finding which 
Globe Grain and Milling Company assails in its petition 
for rehearing. The provision reads: 
"Such individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, pro-
fession or business.'' 
The C·Olllpany urges that the court should consider 
"customarily" in this subsection as "existing". If by 
this the company seeks to substitute a theoretical stand-
ard based on the existence of businesses or occupations in 
which entrepreneurs perform activities similar to that 
of an employee who is not the operator of an established 
business, it is urging a standard that has no relationship-
ship to the problem of unemployment. The statute speaks 
in terms of the individual and therefore the test is not 
whether others might "customarily" be engaged in in-
dependently established businesses but whether the in-
dividual involved is so engaged. Thus the statute speaks 
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of the business as being "independently established"; 
not merely of being independent. The nature of the es-
tablishment governs whether the individual is subject to 
the type of risk which should be covered by unemploy-
ment ,compensation-whether the individual is so es-
tablished that notwithstanding tho fact that a particular 
connection is severed, he is in a position to continuo to 
operate on his O>Yn account. This criterion is not met 
unless tho individual is so sot up that he is not dependent 
upon the continuance of a connection with a single com-
pany for a livelihood. In addition, he must be in a posi-
tion to perform the duties incident to his business in 
accordance with his own methods; he must be free to buy 
his merchandise in tho competitive market; the good will 
of the business must be his own transferrable at his 
pleasure and for a considorati.on satisfactory to him; he 
must be able to select his tools and fixtures; determine 
his sales policy and his met hod ·Of advertising; and he 
must he free to perform the same or similar services for 
others while he is serving a particular eompany. This 
is the essence of being "independently established" and 
"customarily" in a business, trade, or occupation and 
it was so defined by the Colorado Supreme Court in 
Industrial Commission of Colorado v·. Northwestern 
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550; 88 P. (2d) 560. 
In that case, the court said: 
''The third test as to exemption from coverage 
is that the 'individual' is customarily engaged 
independently in an established trade, oocupa-
tion, profession or business. This would neces-
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sitate a showing by the company to the satisfac-
tion of the Commission that its agents are estab-
lished in the business of selling insu:ra!f~ce, inde-
pendent of whatever connection they may have 
with the company." (Italics supplied). 
See also Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. Wisconsin Industrial 
Commission, Exhibit C, p. 122 infra; Pond v. Michigan 
Unemployment Compensation Commission, Exhibit D, p. 
137 infra. 
Under the construction which the 0ompany urges, 
the provision requiring a showing that the individual in 
question must be s'hown to be customarily and independ-
ently established in a trade or business would be mean-
ingless. There is practically no activity in which an em-
ployee may be engaged that may not be the substance of 
an 1 independently established business. Every brick-
layer, salesman, painter, cook, truck driver, etc., is en-
gaged in activities which are parallelled by existing and 
independently established businesses. There are estab-
lished brokerage houses which sell and handle feed for 
livestock and processed agricultural products. Such a 
broker may solicit customers or take ·orders from manu-
facturers, nevert1heless their businesses, unlike that of 
Thomas, is not subject to summary termination through 
the ads of a person with whom they 0ontract and the 
good will they develop is their good will. 
But by no stretch of the imagination could Thomas 
have been c·onsidered to be a broker. He could not and 
did not hold himself out as being ready and able to handle 
the distribution of livestock feeds generally for any 
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manufacturer or distributor who might seek his services. 
The contract required him to dev·ote himself exclusively 
to the development and distribution of the company's 
products in a particular territory. Upon the termina-
tion of his connection with Gl.obe Grain and Milling Com-
pany, Thomas could not undertake to continue the dis-
tribution of feed for livestock. Before he c.ould engage 
in such activity he ·would have to secure a new job. He 
ihad no right to the customers and the company owned 
the good will he had developed. In brief, his business 
was in no sense independently established; it was entirely 
dependent upon the continuance of a contractual asso-
ciation with the company and, in all material respects, 
·was restricted to the company and subordinated to its 
interests. See Comer v. State Tax Commission, (N.Mex. 
1937), 69 P. (2d) 936. 
Kor can it be successfully .contended that Thomas 
,,·as independently established as an insurance broker. 
There is no evidence in the record to show that he had a 
broker's license nor that he had any resource other than 
to seek a job selling insurance. In this respect the situa-
tion herein involved is substantially like those involved 
in Pond v. MichipMt Unemployment Commission, Exhibit 
D, p. 137 infra, and in Wisconsin Bridge and Iron Com-
pany v. Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation and 
Ramsey, Exhibit C, p. 122 infra, in which it was held 
that the mere fact that a trade might be the subject of 
an independently established trade or business did not 
exclude an individual from the scope of coverage under 
the act unless the individual was independently estab-
74 
lished and customarily in the trade, business, or occupa-
tion ·Or was independently established and customarily 
in some other trade, business or occupation. 
Moreover, under the facts of this case the Industrial 
Commission re,asonahly held that the relationship be-
tween Thomas and Globe Grain and Milling Company 
failed to meet the criterion for exclusion in Section 19 
(j) (5) (a) of the law. 'l1his condition requires a showing 
that-
"Such individual has been and will continue to be 
free from contr.ol or direction over the perform-
ance of such services, both under his contract of 
service and in fact." (Italics supplied). 
To conform with this condition, the party claiming ex-
emption from the act must show not only that under the 
contract of employment tho principal has not exorcised 
and does not have the right to exercise control over the 
performance .of service, but that the person performing 
the service is free from control or the possibility of con-
trol in tho future both under the contract and in fact. 
The statutory test .above cited is considerably dif-
ferent fr.om the test employed at common law to doter-
mine tho existence of tho master-servant relationship 
in that there is absent therefrom tho factor of control 
over tho details of the services performed which is com-
monly referred to in the Restatement definition relied 
upon by the company and amici curiae. Subsection (~a) 
of the statutory test contains a positive requirement that 
the individual performing services be free from control 
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over his performance if exemption is to be granted. The 
approach in section 19 (j) (5) (a) to the question of free-
dom from control differs from t:he appwach at common 
law, because the common law statement of the contr.ol 
test, as is indicated by the cases cited in the company in 
its original brief, requires that control extend to the de-
tails of performance. This requirement, however, does 
not appear in the statute. Under the statute, it is un-
necessary to determine what is a detail and what is ''sat-
isfaction 'vith a result." The statutory relationship exists 
if the employer has a general control over the service 
performed. Such general control for the purposes of the 
statu.tory starndard is present when the manner and 
means .of performance are either predetermined by con-
tract, necessarily resulting from the circumstances under 
which the services are performed, or flow from the eco-
nomic relationship which the persons performing t:he 
services bear to the enterprise for which they are per-
formed. In recogniti.on of this difference between the 
statutory test provided in section 19 (j) (5) (a) and the 
common law test relating to control, the Supreme Court 
of Colorado in Industrial Commission of the State of 
Colorado t". Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 
103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 5GO, stated, with respect to a 
statutory definition of employment identical ~with that 
contained in the Utah statute: 
"The first condition in the statutory test relates 
to freedom of control and direction over the per-
formance of services, both under coutraet and in 
fact. rrhe test of freedom is either under contract 
or faot. Does the company control and direct the 
performance of services, or will it have the right 
t·o do so under the con tract, if it desires to do so? 
We are not here concerned with details but with 
general control. The possibility of control in the 
future is as important as no actual control at the 
present. 
"In discussing the evidence we shall be controlled 
primarily by the undisputed facts, such as the 
contracts and the 'Rules and Instrudions' gov-
erning the persons involved herein in their rela-
tions with the company. The question of control 
and direction, as set forth in section 19 (g) (5), is 
not a matter of degree. Undoubtedly, it relates 
to general control. It is not satisfied by some 'de-
tail' in which the individual may be free to exer-
cise his own judgment. The power to terminate 
a contmct for personal service at any time with-
out liability is an important factor in arriving 
at a conclusion as to whether the individual is 
free of c-ontrol and direction, 'because the right 
immediately to discharge involves the right of 
eontrol.' Industrial Com. v. Bonfils, 78 Colo. :306, 
308, 241 Pac. 735." (Italics supplied). 
The view excpressed by the Colorado court with re-
speet to the significant differences between the common 
law test of control and the statutory test ~was adopted by 
a Wisconsin court. See Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. 
lndw;trial Commission, Exhibit C, p. 122 infra. In the 
course of interpreting statutory language identical with 
section 19 ( j) ( 5) (a) the Wis0onsin court said : 
"For purposes of the present decision, we need 
not go into all the points wherein the present ler~­
islative definition of employment departs from 
prior accepted standards. For instance, it has 
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been regarded-and must still be so viewed under 
the workmen's compensation law-that lack of 
right to control is what precludes, in essence, the 
empl.oyment status. But by the first test of exclu-
sion prescribed in 108.02 ( 5) (a), it must be estab-
lished that there is freedom from control not only 
(1) under the contract but also (2) in fact. Fur-
thermore there must be established not only free-
dom from coentrol in the past but that the indivi-
dual 'will continue to be free from the employer's 
control or direction. * * *' '' (Italics sup-
plied). 
If, therefore, the power of contr.ol exists under the con-
tract or in fact, proof of the extent of its actual exercise 
or even proof of its non-exercise is wholly immateriaL 
The startute looks to control which may be exercised in 
the future and it is sufficient under the statute to con-
stitute employment if the employer has the power, if he 
chooses to exercise it, over the performance of service 
at any time during the continuance of the relationship. 
Applying the foregoing analysis of section 19 (j) 
(5) (a) to the facts in this case, it would seem to be clear 
that Thomas was not either under his contract or in 
fact, free from control or from the possibility of such 
control in the future. The company at any time could 
have conditioned the .continuance of the relationship be-
tween it and Thomas upon his submission to any instruc-
tions or restrictions which it might have chosen to im-
pose. The company could have conditioned its accept-
ance of any order and the payment of C•ommissions to 
Thomas on his compliance with its instructions as to any 
phase of his activities. The company could have condi-
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tioned the -continuance of the relationship on compliance 
with its instructions as to when, where, and whom Thom-
as should solicit. His remuneration could have been made 
conditional on his covering a designated territory at a 
particular time, on answering correspondence in a certain 
way, or on his refraining from disclosing informati.on 
as to the ·company's operations. T:he company not only 
could have vetoed any assistants fm Thomas but it 
could have refused to permit him to utilize assistants. 
See Ludlow v. lndustr·ial Co•mmission, 65 Utah 182, 235 
P. 884, 888. 
By the terms of the arrangement, it was clearly con-
templ·ated that Thomas would personally promote the 
sale of the company's •products. The company could 
have at any time fired Thomas, or ,conditioned continu-
ance .of his services for it on submission to its will. \Vhat-
ever freedom T:homas had in the performance of his 
services was at the sufferance of the company. Under 
such circumstances it is only reasonable to conclude that 
Thomas was not and would not continue to be free from 
the employer's right or power to exercise control either 
under the contract or in fact. 
Further, under these circumstances it would not even 
be unreas.onable to hold that the relationship between 
the company and Thomas was tihat of master-servant 
at common law. The company and the amici in discuss-
ing the common law relationship of master and servant 
have overlooked a primary conditi·on for the existence 
of the status of an "independent contractor"; namely, 
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that a person performing services is not an "independ-
ent contractor" unless the contract f.or the services pro-
vides a fixed and definite result upon the completion of 
which such person is entitled to the contract price. See 
Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, supra. N.o sucJh pre-
determined result existed in this case. The power of the 
company to determine from time to time, the price, 
quantity, and the product to be sold by Thomas and to 
en£orce its will on all matters affecting the manner and 
means of his performance of the services by conditioning 
the continuance of the relationship on the acceptance by 
Thomas of the company's will, negatives the existence 
of a ''result''. The .company did not undertake to make 
available any fixed quantity of goods to be sold by 
Thomas, nor did it undertake not to discontinue the line 
he was handling. 
Jn addition, Thomas' compensation was subject to 
change by the company at any time. The company through 
the simple device of giving notice of termination of the 
contract could change or threaten to change Thomas' 
commission rates, or require him to service his 
or other accounts of the company as a condition 
to recmvmg remuneration. Thus, the company's 
power growing out of such right .of termination to 
condition performance and compensation upon sub-
mission to such conditions as it might from time to time 
have imposed negatives the existence of a "result" and 
demonstrates the company's rights or powers of con-
tract. The absence of a predetermined result upon the 
completion of which Thomas would be entitled to the con-
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tract price not only brings the relationship within the 
statutory definition of employment but under the author-
ities would establish a common law master-servant rela-
tionship. 
In Indu,<;trial Commission of Colorado v. Bonfils, 78 
Colo. 306, 241 Pac. 735, a workmen's compensation case, 
one C. Sprigg, was engaged to haul coal with his own 
truck at a fixed price per ton by the Continental Invest-
ment Company, and was accidentally killed while so en-
gaged. The question before the court was whether or 
not the deceased was an employee under section 9 of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act which reads as follows: 
"The term 'employee' shall mean and include: * * * 
Every person in the service of any other person * * 
* 
*" 
under any oontract of hire, express or implied. * * 
The cotwt said (at p. 736) : 
''A servant is one whose employer has t<he order 
and control of work done by him, and who directs 
or may direct the means as well as the end. Arnold 
v. Lawrence, 72 Colo. 528, 530, 213 P. 12D. By 
virtue of its pmuer to discharge, the company 
could, at any moment, direct the minutest detail 
and method of the work. The fact, if a fact, that 
it did not do so is immaterial. It is the power of 
control, not the fact of control, that is the princi-
pal factor in distinguishing a servant from a con-
tractor. Franklin Coal & Coke Co. v. Ind. Com., 
296 Ill. 329, 129 N. E. 811. The most important 
point 'in determining the main question [c.ontrac-
tor or employee] is the right of either to termi-
nate the relation without liability.' Ind. Com. v. 
Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 Pac. 1006. This is 
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a ·confirmation by this court of the rule above 
stated as to control, because the right immediate-
l.v to discharge involves the right of control." 
(Italics supplied). 
In L. B. Price Mercantile Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, et al., 4:3 Ariz. 257, 30 P. (2d) 491, the court, in de-
termining that a commission salesman was performing 
services as -an employee under common law concepts, 
said (at p. 494): 
''And in determining if the employer retains con-
trol the most important factor is whether either 
party may terminate the relation without liability. 
'-Where such right exists,' to use the language of 
the C'Ourt in Industrial Commission v. Hammond, 
77 Colo. 414, 236 P. 1006, 1008, 'the workman is 
usually a servant. \Vhere it does not exist, he is 
usually a contrac~tor.' The power of the employer 
to end the employment at any time he sees fit is 
incompatible with the full control of the work 
which au independent contractor enj-oys. 14 R. 
C. L. 72; Press Publishing Co. v. Industrial Ace. 
Commission, 190 Cal. 114, 210 P. 820; New York 
Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Commission of 
California, 80 Cal. App. 713, 252 P. 775; Clark's 
Case, 124 Me. 47, 126 A. 18." 
In Aiscnberg v. C. F. Adams Company, Inc., et al., 
95 Conn. 419, 111 Atl. 591, a travelling salesman whose 
c-ompensation depended on commission sales, was held 
to be an employee within the workmen's compensation 
act, which provided: "Employee shall mean any person 
who has entered into or works under any contract of 
service -or apprenticeship with an employer." In reject-
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ing the company's claim that the deceased ~was not work-
ing under a contract of service because he was free to 
sell to anyone, the Connecticut cour1t emphasized that the 
employer's control over the kind and quantity .of product 
to be sold negatived the existence of a result which is es-
sential to the existence of the independent contractor 
relationship. The court said (p. 592) : 
"The means and method of conditioning this busi-
ness, as we have in part detailed, comprise the 
essence of this business. The subject of sale, the 
terms of sale, and the proceeds of sale remained 
in the control of the compa.ny. Practically this 
constituted a general control. 
"But the liberty to go anywhere in the entire state 
enlarged the freedom of action of this salesman 
over that of the ordinary salesman, but it llid not 
enlarge his .control over the go.ods sold, the tenus 
of sale, or the proceeds of the sale. The fad 
that the deceased could regulate his ovYn hours 
of work is without signifieance. His pay depend-
ed upon the results of his sales. The particular 
hours he v\'orked were unimportant to his em-
ployer, provided adequate sales were made. \Yheu 
this did not result, the company was at liherty 
at any time to discharge the deceasecl from their 
employment. The right of discharge is one of 
the str.ong indications that the relation was one of 
ernploymen t. An independent contractor rm1st be 
permitted to finish his contract in the absence of 
breach on his part. That the deceased was paid by 
commission is not a. drtermining test, but, as a 
rule, it is quitr immaterial how the payment is 
made, tuhcther in wa .. ges, salary, or commission, or' 
by t1he piece o1· job." (Italics SUipplied). 
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For similar holdings with respect to comnusswn 
salesman see W,ilson v. Times Printing Company, et al., 
158 ~Wash. 95, 290 Pac. 691; Borah v. Zoellner Motor Car 
Compa1ny (Mo. App. 1924), 257 S. W. 145; Burgess v. 
Garvin, et al., 219 Mo. App. 162, 272 S. \V. 108; Mitchem 
v. Shearman Concrete Pipe Company, 45 Ga. App. 809, 
165 S. E. 889; Dishman v. Whitney, et al., 121 Wash. 157, 
209 Pac. 12; Leuis v. National Cash Register Company, 
84 N.J. Law 598, 87 Atl. 345; Singer Manufacturing Com-
pany v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518; Brown, v. Industrial Acci-
dent Commission of California, et al., 174 Cal. 457, 163 
Pa·c. 664; Dillon v. Prudential Insurance Catnpany of 
America, et al., 75 Cal. App. 266, 242 Pac. 73G; Howell 
v. Continental Casualty Co. (Texas 1937), 110 S. W. (2d) 
210; Auer v. Sinclair Refining Company, et al., 103 N. J. 
Law 372, 137 Atl. 555; United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Company of Baltimore, Maryland v. Lowry (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1921), 231 S. ~W. 818; Bronx Home News v. 
Miller (N. Y. 1939), 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 55. 
C. The statutory definition does not impair the ob-
ligwtions ·Of con tracts. 
Globe Grain and Milling Company urge t:hat the un-
employment com pen sa tion law "abrogates the contract 
between it and Thomas, creates an entirely new relation-
ship and, therefore, the application of the statute is un-
constitutional.'' This assumes that the statute abolishes, 
or prohibits, the exercise of any rights of the parties 
under their contract. This assumption is, however, un-
tenable. T:he law does not affect any element of the 
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preexisting contra-ctual obligations between the company 
and Thomas, nor does it interfere with their right to 
make any contract they may choose. The a0t imposes 
an exaction upon the exercise of the right t·O· employ as 
defined in the statute, hut does not impinge on the right 
to contract or on the performance of the contract. The 
definition of employment does not change the status of 
the parties nor prevent them from entering into or per-
forming any contract they may see fit to make. The law 
takes the parties in the situation they have created. That 
the imposition of an exaction on the exercise .of a right 
to -contract or arising out of a contract does not impair 
the obligation of contracts is a principle of lmv that is 
beyond question. ~1he parties do not have the right to 
enter into an agreement that they shall not be subject to 
an exadion. BaruFise v. Sheppard, 299 U. S. 33; Pro-
vidence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 514; Kehrer 1). 
Stewart, 197, U. S. 60. The Kehrer ease is closely ana-
logous t.o this case. In that case a state exaction was 
levied upon ''all agents of packing houses doing busi-
ness in'' the State of Georgia. It vvas claimed that the 
exaction impaired the obligations of a preexisting con-
tract between a packing :house and a local salesman. The 
court, however, in holding that the statute did not impair 
the obligations arising under the contract, said: 
"The argument that the tax impairs the obliga-
tion of a contract between the petitioner and N el-
son M.orris & Company is hardly worthy of seri-
ous ·Consideration. The power of taxation over-
rides any agreement of .an employe to serve for 
a specific sum. H;s contract remains entirely 
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undisturbed. There was no stipulation for an 
employment for a definite period; and if there 
were, it is inconceivable that the State should 
lose this right of taxation by the fac:t that the 
party taxed had entered into an engagement with 
his employer for a definite period." (p. 70) 
The argument of the plaintiff that the unempl.oy-
ment compensation law impairs the obligation of its con-
tract with ~'homas is further disposed of by the decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in Providence Bank 
v. Billings, 4 Pet. ( U. S.) 514. In that case it was held 
that in the absence .of a specific grant of exemption from 
exactions by the State subsequent to the date of the grant 
of a corporate franchise, a State could require the pay-
ment of exactions on 1the exercise of rights created under 
such a franchise. 
But even if it be assumed that the statute does in-
terfere with the performance of the c.ontracts or the 
rights of the party, it would not eontravenc the constitu-
tional prohibition agaiust impairment of contracts. In 
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 47:3, the United States 
Supreme Court said (p. 480): 
"It is the settled law of this eourt that the inter-
diction of the statutes impairing the obligation 
of ·contracts docs not prevent the State from ex-
ercising such powers as arc vested in it for the 
promoti.on of the common weal, or arc necessary 
for the general good of the public, though con-
tracts previously entered into between individuals 
may thereby be affected. This power, which in its 
various ramifications is known as the police pow-
er, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the 
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Government to protect the lives, health, morals, 
comfort and general welfare of Hw people, and is 
paramount to any rights under contracts between 
individuals. Familiar instances of this are, where 
parties enter into contracts, perfectly lawful at 
·the time, to sell liquor, operate a brewery or dis-
tillery, or carry on a lottery, all of which are sub-
ject to impairment by a change of policy .on the 
part of tho State, prohibiting tho establishment 
or continuance of such traffic ;-in other words, 
that parties by entering into contracts may not 
estop the legislature fr.om enacting laws intended 
for H1e public good. 
"~While this povver is subject to limitations on cer-
tain cases, there is wide discretion on tho part of 
the legislature in determining what is and what is 
not necessary-a discreti.on which courts ordinari-
ly will not interfere with." 
See also Bacon v. W allcer, 204 U. S. 311; N orthrwestern 
Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486; Village of Euclirl 
v. Ambler, 272 U. S. 365, 392; Rosenthal v. N erw York~ 
226 U. S. 260; Lilmiewx v. Young, 211 U. S. 489; Kidd, 
Dater & Price Co. v. Musselnwm Grocery Co., 271 U. S. 
461; Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 
U. S. 151; Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 520; Sli,(}h 
v. Kirbough, 237 U. S. 52, 58. 
D. Tho argument of amici curiae that if coverage 
extends beyond the common law master-servant 
relationship, the statute is a guaranteed income 
law is disproved by the provisions of the statute. 
Amici curiae assert that to extend the s.c.ope of cov-
erage of the unemployment compensation law beyond the 
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common-law master-servant relationship would render 
the law a "guaranteed income" statute. This attack 
upon the law is merely an argument addressed as to the 
wisdom .of unemployment compensation laws and is a 
matter which the legislature already has decided. More-
over, amici seemed to believe t:hat the receipt of bene-
fits follows automatically from the termination of em-
ployment. They overlook the legislative requirements 
that an individual, to receive benefits, must meet the con-
ditions for eligibility set forth in section 4 of the lav\'. 
Such conditions require that the individual shall have 
earned "'wages' in employment," that he must be un-
employed, be ready to work as well as willing and able to 
work. Whether o1· not a person when employed was sub-
ject to that degree of control which would have made his 
employer liable for his torts, such pe1·son when unem-
ployed presents the same social and economic problem 
as the individual who unquestionably was subject to such 
control. Both have lost their jobs, and both are seeking 
an employer. Thomas, when he was no longer in the em-
ploy of the company, had to seek a new job. Only on the 
basis of his being willing to work but unable to find 
work, is he entitled to benefits. 
Amici also argue that contributions are an exc1se 
and, theref.ore, a rule of strict construction should be 
applied in fixing the scope of coverage of the law. But all 
rules of construction yield to a stated legislative intent, 
and in ,section 2 of the act the legislature has declared 
its policy to be the establishment of a statutory plan to 
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alleviate distress caused by involuntary unemployment 
under the "police power". The statute seeks to solve 
and ameliorate the problems of unemployment and thus 
pmmote the public health, morals, and welfare. The 
problem of coverage under the act relates not only to an 
exaction from employers but to individual benefit rights. 
The legislative reference to the police power indicates 
that the plan as a whole should be liberally construed. 
But even if it be assumed for the 1purpose of argument 
that contributions are taxes, the rule contended for by 
amici would not apply. The statutory definition of em-
ployment, by stating in clear terms the scope of c,overage 
under the act, bars application of the principle that ex-
cise taxes are to be narrowly construed. The problem 
here presented is not that of adopting a strict or liberal 
constructi,on of the statute, but of applying the statutory 
definition of employment rather than the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior. In Alexander v. Casden, 290 U. S. 484, 
496, the Supreme Court said: 
''Although imposing a tax, tlley are to be con-
strued reasonably and the in tent and purpose of 
each is to be ascertained by examining all of its 
provisions.'' 
To allow full operation t,o. the definition of employment, 
would not contravene rules of construction, but would 
conform to such rules. Meaning must be given to each 
provision of a law. In II elvering, Comr. of Internal Rev-
enue v. Stockholms Enskilda Bamk, 293 U. S. 84, the Su-
preme Court said (p. 93): 
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''In the foregoing discussion, we have not been 
unmindful of the rule, frequently stated by this 
court, that taxing acts 'are not to be extended by 
implication beyond the clear import of the lan-
guage used,' and that doubts are to be resolved 
against tihe government and in favor of the tax-
payer. The rule is a salutary one, but it does not 
apply here. The intention of the la vvmaker con-
trols in the construction of taxing acts as it does 
in the oonstruction of other statutes, and that in-
tention is to be ascertained, not by taking the word 
or clause in question from its setting and viewing 
it apart, hut by considering it in connection ·with 
the -context, the general purposes of the statute 
in which it is found, the .occasion and circum-
stances of its use, and other a!ppropriate tests for 
the ascertainment of the legislative will. Compare 
Rein v. T_1ane, L. R 2 Q. B. Cases 144, 151. The 
intention being thus disclosed, it is enough that 
the word or clause is reasonably susceptible of 
a meauinq consonant there with, whatever 1night 
be its meaning ·in another and different connec-
tion. vVe are not at liberty to reject the meaning 
so established and adopt another lying outside 
the intention of the legislature, simply because 
the latter would release the taxpayer or bear 
:heavily against him. To do so would be not to 
resolve a doubt in his favor, but to say that the 
statute does not mean what it means. 
'' 'The rule of stt·ict construction is not violated 
by permitting the words of a statute to have their 
full meaning, or the more extended of two mean-
ings. The 1cords are not to be bent one way or 
the other, but to be taken in the sense which w·ill 
best manifest the lc,gislative intent. United States 
v. Hartwell, 6 \Vall. 385, 396; United Stales v. 
Corbett, 215 U . .S. 233, 242.' Sacramento Nav. Co. 
v. Salz, 273 U. S. 326, 329. The rule of strict 
construction applies to penal laws, but such laws 
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arc not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the 
obvious intention of the lc~islaturc; .or so applied 
as to narrow the >vords of the statute to the ex-
clusion of cases which those words, in the sense 
that the legislature has obvi.ously used them, \V(mld 
comprehend. United States v. W iltbre/}er, 5 
\Vheat. 76, 9·5. That view, expressed by Chief 
.Justice Marshall, has since been frequently fol-
lowed by this court. See, for example, American 
Fur Co. v. Ur1,ited States, 2 Pet. i358, 367; United 
States v. Morris, 14 Pet. 464, 475; United States v. 
Ilartwell, supra, 395-6; Donnelley v. United States, 
276 U.S. 505, 512." (Italics supplied). Sec also 
Board of Education of Carbon County School Dis-
trict v. Bryner, 57 Utah 78, 192 P. 627, G2H. 
v. 
CONTHARY TO THE CONTENTIONS OF AMICI, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE OPINIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE NOT 
RESTRICTED THE SCOPE OF THE A-B-C PROVISIONS TO 
THI<; COMMON LAW MASTER-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP: 
THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE UNDER THE STATUTE IS NOT 
IDENTICAL WITH COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDEHAL LAW, 
OR UNDER STATUTES DEFINING EMPLOYMENT IN TimMS 
01<' THE MASTER-SERVANT REILATIONSHlP: A DISREGARD 
OI<' THE STATUTORY DEFINITION \\'ILL NOT INSURE UN-
Il<'OHMITY OF COVERAGE. 
The company and amici curiae insist that (a) cover-
age under the State law should be restricted to that of 
the Federal law as intenpreted by the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue; (b) this court should reverse the :holding in this 
case and foUow the opinions rendered iu the cases of 
Washington Recorder Publishing Company v. Ernst, su-
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pra, and Texas Oil Company v. Wheeless (Miss. 1939), 
187 t;o. 880 ( deride(l on demurrer and remanded for trial 
under a statute which eontaim; a definition of "employ-
ment" unlike the one set forth in section 19(j) (G) of the 
Utah law) ; and (c) this court should disregard the opin-
ions in the eases of Industrial Commission of the State 
of Colorado v. Northwestern 11futual Life lnswrancc Co., 
supra; Unemployrnent Compensation Commission of 
North Carolina v. J eff'erson Stmulard Insurance Com-
pany, supra; aml McDermott v. Stale of JVashington, 
supra. rrhis procedure, it is urged, will bring about uni-
formity in the interpretation of unemployment eompcm;a-
tion laws. 
Tlw \Yhole strudure of this argument falls when it 
is realized that (1) the Bureau of Internal Revenue, eon-
trary to the decision in the Mississippi case, has ruled 
that the 1pers.cms involved in that ease, i.e., persons en-
gaged in the operation of bulk distribution plants of the 
Texas Company, \Vere in employment under titles 1400 
and lGOO of the lntemal Revenue Code (formerly titles 
VIII and IX of the Social Seeurity Aet)*; (2) in the 
case of Bnmx 11 ome ]•lews v. Miller, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 55, 
the court, in interpreting the New York unemployment 
(•ompensation law, held a 11ewspaper route carrier to be 
in "employment" under practically the same fads as 
those presented in the case of ~Washington Recorder Pub-
lislti11/J Company v. Er11sf; and (3) the lVashinqton Rec-
*A copy of this ruling as it appears attached to bill of complaint 
of the Texas Company in Texas Company v. Higgins in the United 
States Distriet Court, Southern District of New York is appended 
hereto, l£xhibii E, p. 143 infra. 
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order ease ·was decided by one of the departments of the 
Washington Supreme Court, and in view of the decision 
of the other department of that court in McDermott v. 
State of Washington, the ultimate position of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, with respect to the scope of cov-
erage of the ·washington unemployment compensation 
law, i:,; :,;peculative. A:,; was indicated above, the court 
·which wr,oto the Washington Recorder opinion was not 
the court which had written the McDermott decision, and 
the Washington Supreme Court has not, as is claimed 
by amici," specifically and explicitly repudiated any such 
construction as the Colorado court had attempted to 
place upon the McDermott case''. Furthermore, amici's 
attempt to distinguish the ease of Jefferson Standard 
Life Insuirance Company on the assertion that the court 
in t;Jtat case did not consider the rulings of the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue, is absolutely groundless. The dis-
senting ,opinion in that ease referred to rulings of the 
Bureau of Internal Hevenue, and in Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission of North Carolina v. Wachovia 
Hank & Trust Co., 2 S. E. (2d) 592, decided on the same 
day as the Jefferson Standard case, the North Cawlina 
Supreme Court, in inte11preting the term "instrumental-
ities" in the State act which, unlike the definition of em-
ployment, parallelled the term "instrumentalities" in 
the Federal act, said: 
"We cannot eoncei ve that the ruling of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, exempting the de-
fendant from the payment of tax under the S.ocial 
Security Act, is based on sound reason or logic. 
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While we fully appreciate the high purposes of 
the national plan and concur in the desire of this 
State to cooperate therein, we are unable in this 
instance to follow or to adopt the ruling of the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in his inter-
pretation of language in the Social Security Act 
w'hich is similar to that contained in our act. Nor 
is the fact that the North Carolina Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission for a time like-
wise interpreted the language in the North Caro-
lina act, while persuasive, conclusive upon us." 
A similar approa,ch to the problem of whether states 
should follow Bureau of Internal Revenue rulings was 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Capitol 
Bttilding & Loan Association v. Kansas Commissioner 
of Labor and Industry, (Kansas 1938) 83 P. (2d) 106, 
where the court refused to follow a ruling of the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue wit;h respect to its interpretation of 
the term "instrumentalities". Also, we have carefully 
read the majority opini,on in the Jefferson Standard Life 
Insurance Company case and cannot find the language 
"clearly involving independent contractors" which amici, 
on page 31 of its brief, purport to quote from that opin-
1on. 
It would, therefore, seem that the uniformity sought 
by amici curiae would not be achieved by attempting to 
apply the indefinite distinctions governing the employ-
ment relationship at common law nor by f,ollowing the 
rulings of a Federal administrative agency under ana-
logous or nonanalogous statutory provisions. Yet this 
is precisely the position of amici. 
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The other statements made by amici in attempting 
to sustain the argument that this court can and should 
follow administrative determinations by the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue are like~wise groundless. The assertion 
that the decision in Industrial Cmnmission of the State of 
Colorado v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins·urance Corn-
pany, 103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 560, "is now obsolete" 
overlooks entirely that the Colorado legislature has 
amended its definiti,on of employment only with rospeet 
to insurance agents. T·he general statutory dofmition 
of employment under the Colorado law has not been 
changed. This indicates an affirmance of the prior ad-
ministrative and judicial interpretation of the definition. 
Soc 25 Ruling Case Law, p. 983, see. 230 in which the 
pertinent rule in this c.onnection is stated in tho follow-
mg: 
"The exeeption of a partieular thing from ilw 
operation of the general words of a statute shows 
that, in tho opinion of tho lawmaker, tho thinf!; 
exeeptod ~would he within the general ·worcls, had 
11ot tho exc-eption been mmle. '' 
The amendment excluding only one group out of the 
many relationships within tho scope of the statutory de-
finitioll, as applied in the N orthn·estern Mutual J>ife In-
surance Compatly case, thus dearly imllratos that the 
general scope of t:l10 dofini ti.on was not intended to be 
affected by the amendment. The Colorado legislature 
did not ill sort an cxomptio11 into its law of "independent 
contraetors" uor did it repeal tho statu tory dofini tion of 
employment. 1'-,urthermore, the Supreme Court of \Vis-
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consin has not taken a position inconsistent ~with the .one 
taken by this court in its opinion in this case. Slocum 
Straw Works v. lnd11strial Commission (\Vis. 1939), 286 
N. \Y. 39:~, cited on page 25 of the brief of amici, did not 
involve the scope of c.overago of the \Visconsin unem-
ployment compensation law nor of the scope of the stat-
utory definition of employment in that law. T'ho ques-
tion there involved was whether or not a married woman 
~who had been employed and returned to her household 
duties, was self-employed and hence not entitled to bene-
fits. The eourt held that under the circumstances of the 
case, she ~was performing services for the household, the 
head ,o.f which was a parent, not her husband, aiHl there-
fore she was not unemployed as required by the law. 
The -Wisconsin court did not have before it the scope of 
the employment relationship under its law, and there is 
absolutely no indication nor any reason to suppose that 
t'he court in that case intended to pass on the criteria 
for determining the existence of the employment rela-
tionship. Further, in Wisconsin Bridge ((J; Iron Cornpany 
v. 11ulustrial Commission of Wisconsin, Exhibit C, p. 122 
infra, the ~Wisconsin Circuit Court recently held that 
tht~ three criteria tests for employment ~were more in-
clusive than any common law test, and that tho ronrept 
of independent contractor was not pertinent to a deter-
mination of coverage under the \Visconsin unemploy-
ment compensation law. 
Nor do amici's assertions with respect to the ad-
miuistrati\'e rulings of other jurisdidions withstand 
analysis. It is true that most employers coming within 
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the terms of the Federal Act are likely to be included 
within the coverage of State unemployment compensa-
tion laws unless they are not specifically exempt. The 
coverage of State laws is generally at least as broad as 
that of the Federal Act. But this does not establish that 
administrative exemptions from coverage under the Fed-
eral Act are to be applied automatically to all State laws 
nor that the coverage of State laws is restricted to that 
of the Federal Acts. The administrative rulings from 
other jurisdictions upon ·which amici rely were not in-
troduced in evidence nor made a part of the record. In-
deed, from aught that appears, these rulings dealt with 
fact situations, wholly dissimilar from the .one involved 
in this case and with statutes containing different de-
finitions of employment than t:hat incorporated into the 
Utah law. If the rulings refer to insurance brokers, they 
may be correct; but if they refer to commission sales-
men, they, or amici's interpretations of the rulings, rep-
resent a new and novel doctrine. Moreover, even in re-
gard to soliciting agents of insurance companies these 
rulings would not be controlling in this State. This court 
has held such agents be in "employment" under the 
workmen's compensation law. Commercial Casualty Co. 
v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 359, 266 P. 721. How-
ever, we seriously question whether the opinion <?ited on 
page 7 of the brief of amici is representative or typical 
of "at least twenty-four states' jurisdiction" or that it 
even represents the present position of ·the Delaware 
agency. 
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In the absence .of disclosure of facts involved and 
the circumstances .surrounding the issuance of the ad-
ministrative determinations upon which amici rely, it 
cannot be accepted as a fact that final administrative ac-
tion is represented by either the Delaware quotation or 
the other unJisdosed rulings which amici allege to have 
in their possession. Certainly a statement beginning, 
"In my .opinion, * * * ", as does the Delaware state-
ment quoted on page 27 of the amici brief, ~would indicate 
that some individual is expressing a .personal opinion on 
the law rather than that the pronouncement \Vas a formal 
ruling by an administrative agency. As a matter of fact, 
contrary to the contentions of amici, as far as the Indus-
trial Commission of this state has been able to determine, 
the Delaware Unemployment Compensation Commission 
as well as the other agencies administering unemploy-
ment compensation laws which contain the "A" "B" 
"C" provisions have interpreted such provisions as ex-
tending the scope of coverage under their laws beyond 
that of the common law master-servant relationship. In 
an .official interpretation of the Delaware unemployment 
compensation law, issued on August 17, 1937, the Del-
aware Unemployment Compensation Commission inter-
preted the lavY as follows: 
"II. What is l1Jmployment1 
''A. It! ore than the rnaster-servant relation-
ship. (Section 2 (i) (1) and (5) )-Every service 
performed by an individual for wages or under 
any contract of l1ire is employment covered by the 
Law with the exception .of certain services ex-
98 
plaincd in 1Scdion li-B, following. Usually it 
will not br~ difJ'icult to dctcnnim~ what \Yorkers 
are coYcrcd by the Law. The term 'employment' 
includes all t>ervi (:cs md speci fir· ally exclmled hy 
the Law rendered by those workcr::i who stand in 
the master-servant rclatiouship io tlw employer. 
This term, however, inl'lnrlcs scrvicc~s whid1 may 
be rcudcrcrl by incliviclnals who arc not usm1lly 
regarded as employees and "·hose relationsl1ip to 
the I·~MPLOYEH may not be !he legal relation-
ship of master and servant. 'l'hc services of all 
individuals arc inelucled unless it has been estab-
lished to the satisfadion ,of the Commission that 
auy suC'lt incliviuual has been aml will coutinnc 
to be free from C'ontrol or diredion over the per-
fonnancc of his serviees, lJoth under his contract 
.of service and in fact. Snch smTiec, 'ho\\·ever, 
mnst be perfo rmecl either on tsi cle the usun 1 conrsc 
of the husincss or outside of all the plnees of lmsi-
ness of the entm·prise for which tsueh service i8 
performed. And eaeh sueh individual nmst cus-
tomn rily he enp;aged in an independcn ily esin h-
lished 1 rade, oeeupation, profession or lmsiuess. '' 
(Sec CCH Uuemploymcnt Immrauec Servicc>, Del-
aware, Vol. 2, Sel'. 8002.02, p. 11 ,50;).) 
This interpretation has not been revoked and was 
fono.~wed in an opiniou of the General Counsel of that 
agency published as a general guide to the iuterpretntion 
of the Delaware law. This opinion of the General Coun-
sel of the Delaware agcmey dealt with a situation not un-
like that presented in this cnse. The .opinion rends as 
follows: 
",'-J'fa.tnnent of Facts: '!'he M Com pan)' opL>r-
ntPs a retail grocery store. ~\moug other indi\'l-
duals, they ('lllploy a man to solicit on1ers. The 
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comlitlons of this man's employment arc set forth 
by the {'ompany as follows : 
(1) Compensation computed on a comm1sswn 
basis; 
(2) Has no drawing account; 
( 3) Has no fixed hours of work; 
(4) Solicits orders from people of his own 
selection; 
(5) Only store work required of him is that he 
fill from the company's stock such orders 
as he may obtain; 
( 6) Is free to work for others if he chooses. 
''Advice is requested as to whether or not this 
individual's earnings should be included in total 
taxable pay roll for unemployment compensation. 
"Opinion: Section 2(i)(5) of the Delaware 
Unemployment Compensahon Law provides that: 
''Services performed by an individual for 
wages shall be deemed to be employment subject 
to this Act unless and until it is shown to the sat-
isfaction of the Commission that-
"(A) such individual has been and >vill con-
tinue t.o be free from control or direction over the 
performance of such services, both under his con-
tract of service and in fact; and 
"(B) such service is either outside the usual 
course of the business for v.~hich such service is 
performed or that such service is performed out-
side of all the places ,of business of the enterprise 
for ~which such service is performed; and 
" (C) such individual is customarily en-
gaged in an independently established tmde, oc-
cupation, profession, or business. 
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"It will be noted that these paragraphs of 
the above-quoted section are j.oined by the con-
junction 'and', and must be read together as one 
long sentence. Therefore all the conditions re-
ferred to must be present concurrently in order 
to establish the relati.onship of independent con-
tractor. In our opinion, this relationship in the 
instant case fails specificall.r to meet the test im-
posed by paragraph (B) in that a portion of this 
individual's service is performed on the premises 
of the employer in filling the orders he has obtain-
ed. rrlms, the service is neither outside the usual 
eourse of business of the M Company nor wholly 
outside of all its places of business. Somewhat 
analogous eases arising under the workmen's c.om-
pensation laws of this State hold that the Indus-
trial Aec~ident Board has jurisdiction mHlPr 
similar eireumstances. In addition, it has not been 
shown to the sa tisfaetion of the Commission that 
the individual in questiou is engaged in an in-
dependently established trade or occupation. On 
the basis of the facts submitted, it is held that 
this individual is an employee of the :M Company, 
and his earnings must be included in total pay 
roll for tax purposes. * * *" (!See CCH Un-
employment Insurance Service, Delaware, Vol. 2, 
See. 2002.02.) 
Practically every jurisdietion having the "A" "B" 
"C" provisions have issued statements and interpreta-
tions similar to that issued by the Delaware Commission. 
See, for examples, Commerce Clearing Honse, Unemploy-
ment Compensation Service, Georgia, page 14,503; Wy-
oming, page 55,503; ~Wisconsin, page 52,029-2; Tennessee, 
page 45,518. The statement of the Tennessee agency 
contains the following: 
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"Thus the term 'employment' covers all servi.ce 
rendered by those individuals who stand in the 
master-servant relationship to you, and all other 
individuals who perform service for you, unless 
it has been established to the satisfaction of the 
Commissioner that: 
( 1) Such individual 1has been and will con-
tinue to be free from control or direction ,over the 
performance of said service both under his con-
tract of service and in fact; and 
(2) Such service is either outside the usual 
course of the business for which said service is 
performed or that such service is performed out-
side of all the places of business ·Of the enterprise 
for whieh said service is performed; and 
(3) Such individual is customarily engaged 
in [an] independently established trade, occupa-
tion, profession or business.'' 
These examples do not exhaust the list .of state unem-
ployment compensation agencies which have ruled that 
the "A" "B" "C" criteria extend the scope of cover-
age under their laws beyond the master-servant relation-
ship. As a matter of fact, the Industrial Commission 
has been unable to find any ruling representing final 
admiuistrat,ive action which has not taken such a posi-
tion. 
A complete answer to amici's assertion that the 
court should reverse its holding in this case in order to 
follow a ruling of the Bureau ·Of Internal Revenue is the 
fact that there is nothing in ~he record, nor even in the 
assertions made in the briefs, to indicate that the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue has ruled on the status of Thomas or 
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on the status of any of the other salesmen employed by 
the company. 1\\l:ould amici regard a ruling by the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue holding that the relatiou-
sllip between Thomas and the company is employment 
for the purposes of ihe Federal Unemployment Tax Act 
or the Federal Olcl Age Insurance Tax Act as removiug 
all objecti,ons to the inclusion of such relationship within 
the terms of the Utah law~ Do not the rompany and 
amici take the position that administrative rulings of the 
Industrial Commission of this State should be ignored i~ 
determining the status of persons performing services 
for others, and that coverage under the act should be 
determined by some undisclosed rulings of another 
agency "When in fact the position of the Utah agency is 
consistent with that of ,other State agencies having 
similar lavvs? Do not amici and the company take the 
position that this court should reverse its holding and 
disregard the administrative determinations made by 
the Industrial Commission of t1his State in order to fol-
low what amici assert are determinations of other State 
agencies, \vhen such rulings have, insofar as this com-
pany is concerned, not been issued, lack finality, and may 
not even be binding upon the agencies which issued them~ 
In considering the foregoing questions, we should 
not overlook the fact that the cases now pending in the 
courts of otiher jurisdictions indieate that the administra-
tive agencies of jurisdictions having unemployment com-
pensation laws which contain definitions of employment 
similar to the one in the Utah law, have taken the posi-
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tion that such definitions extend the scope of coverage 
of their laws beyond the common Jaw relationship of 
master and serv,ant, else these suits would not exist. 
·wisconsin Bridge & Iron Company v. Industrial Com-
mission of Wisconsin, supra; Bonifas-Gormarn Lumber 
Co. v. Michigarn Unemployment Compensation Commis-
sion (Circuit Court, Keweenaw County, Michigan); 
Brindley-Roth, Inc. v. Michigan Unemployment Com-
pensation (Cir.c·uit Court, Wayne County, Michigan) ; 
Mid-American Company, Ban,krupt (UiSDC, So. Dist., 
N. Div. of Illinois); Hearst Consolidated Publications, 
Inc. v. Huiet & Cruce, (super. Ct. DeKalb County, 
Georgia); Memphis Commercial Appeal v. Bryant, Chan-
cery (Davidson County, Tennessee). 
A fundamental reason why the scope of coverage un-
der the Federal Act docs not express the ultimate limits 
of coverage under the Utah unemployment compensation 
law, is that the Federal Employment Taxing Act (£orm-
erly Title IX of the Social Security Act) docs not con-
tain any provisions resembling those in section 19 ( j) ( 5) 
of the Utah law. The definition of employment in the 
Federal Act, section 1607 (c) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code (formerly section 907(c) of the Social Se-
curity Act) as it eXiisted at the time of the enactment 
of the Utah unemployment compensation law, was as 
follows: 
"The term 'employment' means any service of 
whatever nature, performed within the United 
States by an employee for an employer, except-" 
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and there follows a list of exceptions similar to those in 
section 19 (j) ( 6) of the Utah law. The 1939 amendments 
to the Social Security Act, although amending the ex-
emptions from the scope of coverage of the Federal law, 
do not change this definition of employment. The in-
clusion in the Utah statute of the exceptions to "em-
ployment" originally set forth in the Social Security 
Act, makes it evident that the Utah legislature had be-
fore it for consideration the definition of "employment" 
in the Social Security Act, but that it rejected such 
definition of "employment'' in favor of a definition 
which is entirely unlike anything found in the Federal 
Act. If the Utah legislature had adopted the Federal 
definition of "employment", it might be claimed that 
the construction thereof by the Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue was pertinent to a construction of the Utah act; 
hut even this proposition ~would be debatable. 
The significant fact concerning the relationship be-
tween the State and Federal laws is that the Utah leg-
islature did not adopt the lj'ederal definition of employ-
ment but chose to define ''employment'' by reference to 
the criteria in section 19 (j) ( 5) of the law-and conse-
quently, neither the regulati,ons of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue nor the interpretations of the Federal Act by 
that agency can properly be regarded as defining the 
limits to be placed on the defined term "employment" 
in the Utah law. The definition of "employment" in 
the Utah act does not follow the definition of "employ-
ment" in title IX of the Federal Act. Instead it sets 
up a definition which is broader in scope than any 
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common law concept and when faced with the proposal 
to return to a commou law test rejected it. (see p. 58, 
supra.) This fact alone should be sufficient to show in-
tention of the legislature to extend the coverage of the 
act beyond the scope of the Federal Act. But it oven 
went further and adopted other provisions which do 
not parallel any provisions of the Federal law. 
Section lU ( i) ( 2) On and ( 4) group various enter-
prises, not subject to the Federal tax, for the purpose 
of coverage under tho State act, and under these pro-
visions many enterprises, not subject to the Federal 
tax, are suhjoet to tho State law. Also, the Fed-
eral Act defines ''employer'' to include only those 
meeting cortaiu requirements ''during the taxable 
year" which is defined as a calendar year. Sec-
tion 19(i)(5) of the State law defines a covered employer 
iu ienm; that include those meeting certain requirements 
iu either the caloudar or the "preceding calendar year". 
Under section 8 of the State law, oven though an employ-
ing unit does not meet coverage requirements in the 
calendar year, it may be required to pay contributions 
to tho State for such year if its employment experience 
during tho preceding year met the requirements or if it 
failed to file certain notices with tho Commission. No 
such provision is found in the Federal law. Section 
8(c) of the State act provides for the voluntary election 
of coverage, and this is also not found in the Federal Act. 
These sections definitely indicate the independence of 
approach to questions of coverage by the Utah legisla-
ture, and demonstrate that the scope of coverage under 
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the State law was not intended to be limited to that of 
the Federal law. 
Further, the ]'ederal Act does not purport to fix the 
scope of coverage of State unemployment compensation 
laws. Underlying amici's entire argument with respect 
to rulings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and other 
State agencies is the misconception that Congress, in 
enacting title IX of the Social Security Act, intended to 
limit the scope of coverage of State laws to that pro-
vided under the Federal law. Unquestionably, the Fed-
eral law was intended to act as an incentive for the 
enactment of State unemployment compensation laws, 
but the very purpose of having a Federal-State system 
rather than a single Federal system was to enable the 
States to adopt their laws to local conditions. The legis-
lative reports to Congress on the Social Security Act 
emphasi7:es that, but for compliance with a few stand-
ards set forth in section 303 (a) of the Social Security 
Act and section 1603(a) of the Federal Employment Tax 
Law, (formerly section 903(a) of the Social Security 
Act) the States were free to determine the scope of cov-
erage under their laws. The Senate Report contains 
the following: 
"Exeept for a few standards which are neces-
sary to render certain that the state unemploy-
ment compensation laws are genuine unemploy-
ment compensation acts and not merely relief 
measures, the states are left free to set up any 
unemployment compensation system they wish, 
without dictation from \Vashington." (Senate 
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Report No. 628, Calendar No. 661, 74th Congress, 
First Session.) 
The House of Representatives' report contains this 
statement: 
''The bill permits the states wide di,scretion with 
respect to the unemployment compensahon laws 
they wish to enact." ( 1!. R 74th Congress, First 
Session, Report No. 615.) 
None of the standards to which State acts must conform 
in order to be approved by the Social Security Board 
relate to the scope of coverage of the State acts. The 
Social Security Board in its pamphlet, "Unemployment 
Compensation-What and Why" (Publication No. 14, 
Govemment Printing Office, March 1937) discusses the 
provisions a State law must have for approval under 
the Federal Act and states (p. 33): 
'' Dcfinit,ions of who shall cot/tribute to the State 
fum,d, the amount anrl duration of benefits, eligi-
bility requiremenh;, and similar questions, arc 
all left e1dircly to the discretion of the States in 
formulating their own laws." (Italics supplied.) 
The wide variation in the provisions of State unem-
ployment compensation laws approved by the Social Se-
curity Board indicates that no conformity of coverage 
was required or effected. The variance in State unem-
ployment compensation laws is reported in "A Compar-
ison of State Unemployment Compensation Laws" issued 
by the Soeial Security Board on August 1, 1938. This 
comparison based on the State laws then in force shows 
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that of the 48 State laws, and laws of the District of 
Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii, 29 cover employers of 
eight or more for twenty weeks or more in a calendar 
year; 9 cover employers of four or more for the same 
period; 10 eover employers of one or more, and the 
other laws cover employers of varying numbers of 
persons for varying periods of time. These laws also 
vary as to the length of time the employer remains 
liable for contributions. Unlike the provisions of the 
Federal Act, 47 of ihe laws provide that the employer 
once liable shall continue to be liable for contributions 
for the whole of the calendar year in which he becomes 
subject and through the succeeding calendar year. One 
State extends liability on a <ruarterly basis, and 3 treat 
liability aeeruiug in the early years of their operation 
in a manner which is different from the treatment of 
liability in the latter years of operation. Variations 
likewise occur in the treatment of subsidiaries and 
separate establishments under joint control. Variations 
occur in the definition of employment. Thirty-three 
laws, as a part of the definition of employment, contain 
the statutory criteria set forth in section 19 (j) ( 5) of 
the State law. The Alabama and Oregon laws contain 
the first and third criteria and Iowa the first only. 
Connceticut defines coverage in terms of the master-
servant relationship. The Kentucky law defines cover-
age in terms of the employer-employee relationship. 
'J'he foregoing examples of variations in State 
laws arise not out of interpretation of such laws, 
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but from express provisions of the laws and by 
no means exhaust the variations among the provisions 
of such laws. The benefit provisions ,of the laws show 
as great or greater variations than those found in the 
contribution provisions of the laws. All of these laws 
are approved laws. In Steward Machine Co. v. Dav,is, 
301 U. S. 548, the court, in denying that the Federal 
law called for the surrender of the independence of 
the States, said: 
''A wide range of judgment is given to the several 
states as to the particular type of statute to be 
spread on their hooks.'' 
It is apparent, therefore, that the States not only may, 
but have, determined the scope ,of coverage of their laws 
and that uniformity of coverage between the State and 
the Federal Acts was not contemplated by either Con-
gress or the State legislatures. 
Only one further contention of amici on the relation-
ship of the State law to the Federal law need be men-
tioned. Amici asserts that secti,on 11(1) of the state 
law which deals with "State Federal Reciprocal Benefit 
Arrangements" indicates a legislative intent to restrict 
the scope of the .statutory definition of employment con-
tained in section 19 (j) ( 5). This section is directed 
primarily to a solution of the administrative problems 
created by transitory and multi-state workers. The 
section authorizes neither an extension nor a restriction 
of the legislative definition ·of employment. Cooperation 
between Federal and State agencies with respect to 
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unemployment compensation .is designed only to insure 
that State laws comply with certain minimum standards 
set forth in section i~03(a) of the Federal Act so that 
the State may continue to qualify for grants under title 
III of the Social Security Act to cover expenses ,of 
administration, and with the conditions of section 1603 
(a) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Law, to assure 
that the credit against the Federal tax is allowed only 
under a bona fide State unemployment compensation law. 
Further cooperation between State agencies is designed 
to solve some of the problems of multi-state workers. But 
these requirements do not affect the scope of coverage ·Of 
State laws. State discretion in this respect is not only 
highly desirable but necessary when we recall that the 
State and not the Federal Government has the responsi-
bility ,of obtaining coverage broad enough to insure the 
payment of benefits with respect to unemployment. 
VI. 
TH18 COURT DID NOT ERR IN DI'~CLARING THAT THE ISSUE 
IN THIS CASE WAS TO DETERMINE WHE.THER THE EVI-
D.I!JNC.I!J WAS SUCH AS TO SHOW THAT THE COMMISSION 
WAS ARBITRARY OR UNREASONABLE IN NOT FINDING 
THAT TH.I!J RELATIONSHIP BETWI<]EN THE CLAIMANT 
AND THE COMPANY COMPLIED WITH THE THHEE TESTS 
8.1!JT FORTH IN SECTION 19 (j) (5). 
The brief filed by amici curiae argues that the court 
erred in limiting its review of the Industrial Commis-
sion's decision to a determination of whether, from the 
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record, the decision of the Commission was arbitrary or 
unreasonable. In support of this contention amici curiae 
urge that the existence of the employment relation 
between the company and the claimant is a "jurisdic-
tional fact'' capable of determination ·only by courts and 
hence, .such a determination by the Industrial Com-
mission is subject to redetermination by this court on 
the basis of the preponderance of the evidence. Amici 
curiae do not make clear the extent to which such an 
independent review of the facts by the court would affect 
the result in this case, but refer to certain workmen's 
compensation cases as illustrating the "jurisdictional 
fact'' doctrine. 
In this state, the leading case on the "jurisdictional 
fact'' doctrine, and the one m1 which most of the others 
are based, is Industrial Commission of Utah v. Evans, 
52 Utah 394, 174 Pac. 825, decided under a statute that 
provided: 
''The Commission shall have full power and au-
thority to hear and determine all questions with-
in its jurisdiction pertaining to the payment of 
compensation and benefits, and its decision there-
on shall he final, * * *" (J1Jmphasis by the 
court). 
In that case the court pointed out that the statutory 
provision expressly referred to ''payment of compensa-
tion and benefits." It also assumed that the claimant 
and the employer came within the scope ,of the act. But 
apparently because of the qualification in the statute, 
"within its jurisdiction", the court was of the opinion 
112 
that the provision did not purport to lend finality to any 
deeision of the Industrial Commission on what was 
deemed to be ''jurisdictional'' facts. The court then 
enumerated three such facts: (1) \Vhether the claim-
ant was ·within the scope of the coverage of the act; 
(2) ·whether the injury arose in the course of employ-
ment; and (3) ·whether, in cases of death, the claimant 
was a dependent of the deceased. The court was of 
the ,opinion that as to these facts the statute did not 
make the administrative findings conclusive. 
It is not entirely clear whether, in this respect, 
the Evans ease and those based upon it clearly reflect 
the present state of the law. It should be noted that 
under the Utah workmen's eompensation statute as 
amended (Revised Statutes 1933, sections 42-1-79, 42-1-
80; Sessions Laws of 1921, p. 165, section 1348), there 
are decisions by this court, as well as by courts of other 
jurisdictions having similar statutes, ·which hold that 
a finding by the Industrial Commission that a claimant 
is a covererl employee, or that the injury arose in the 
course of the employment, or that the claimant is a 
"dependent" of the deceased, is conclusive upon the 
court if it is supported by competent evidence and it is 
not arbitrary or unreasonable, Colonial Build-ing & Loan 
Ass'n v. Indu,strial Cmnmission, 85 Utah 65, 38 P. (2d) 
737; Utah Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission, 57 
Utah 246, 194 P. 122; Chase v. Industrial Commission, 
81 Utah 141, 17 P. (2d) 205; Ntamanakis v. Industrial 
Commission, 67 Utah 197, 246 P. 706; Jlavalinakis v. 
Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 196, 246 P. 698; cf. as 
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to a finding of the employment relation, Roman Catholic 
A t·chbishop v. Industrial Accident Commission, 194 Cal. 
660, 230 P. 1; Taylor v. Blackwell Lumber Co., 37 Idaho 
707, 218 P. 356; index 1lfines Corp. v. Industrial Com-
Jnission, 82 Colo. 272, 259 Pac. 1036; Emack's Case, 232 
Mass. 396, 123 N. E. 86; But see Miller v. Industrial 
Commission, (Utah 1939), 92 P. (2d) 342. 
But irrespective of these decisions and regardless 
of the seope of judicial review in workmen's compensa-
tion cases of the issue of '' emp}oyment' ', the nature of 
court review of the Industrial Commission's finding of 
"employment" for benefit purposes under the unemploy-
ment compensation law has been dearly limited by the 
lcgisla t ure in section 19 ( j) ( 5) of the law. Thus we are 
faced at the outset with the first part ,of section 19(j) (5) 
whieh provides: 
''Services performed by an individual for wages 
or under any eontract of hire, vvrittcn or oral, 
express or implied, shall be dc(mwd to be em-
ployment subject to this act unless and ~tntil it is 
slunrn to the satisfaction of the commission 
* ~, *'' (Italics supplied). 
By this provision the legislature has designated the 
agency or tribunal to determine the existcnec of facts 
satisfying the three criteria upon which exclusion from 
the law shall be based. The only position taken here is 
that the provision expresses the clear legislative inten-
tim1 that the findings of the Industrial Commission with 
respect to the existence of "employment", so long as 
they arc not unreasonable or arbitrary on the basis of 
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the record, shall not be disturbed. It should also be 
noted that none of the statutes inv,olved in the work-
men's compensation cases attempted in any way to vest 
expressly and as completely in the administrative agency 
the power to determine whether or not the covered em-
ployment relationship existed. This difference in the 
statutes is but another example of the legislative pur-
pose to adopt for the unemployment compensation pro-
gram concepts and procedures unlike those employed 
under workmen's compensation laws, and it is not un-
reasonable to assume that the difficulties in administer-
ing the latter, difficulties with which this court is fa-
miliar, (Kavalinakis v. Indu.strial Commission, 67 Utah 
196; 246 P. 698, 701) contributed substantially to the 
adoption of the more precise and effective methods under 
the unemployment compensation law. 
Finally, it need only be pointed out that neither the 
Federal Constitution nor that of Utah prohibits the leg-
islature from limiting the scope of judicial review of 
findings of even so-called jurisdictional facts, at least 
as long as unreasonable or arbitrary findings are subject 
to judicial correction, Utah Fuel v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 57 Utah 246; 194 P. 122, 124; People v. Globe Grain 
and Millinp Co., 211 Cal. 121, 294 P. 3; Phillips v. Com-
missioner, 283 U. S. 589; St. Joseph Stockyard Co. v. 
U. S., 298 U. S. 38, 50-52; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 
505; Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metall,ic Door Co., 256 N.Y. 
199, 176 N. E. 141 aff'd 284 U. S. 594; Shields v. Utah 
Idaho R. Co., 305 U. S. 177. 
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The rule that the legislature may limit the scope of 
judicial review to the reasonableness of findings by an 
administrative tribunal which it appointed to act with 
respect to matters within the province of the legislature 
(see St. Joseph Stockyard Co. v. U.S., 298 U. S. 38, 51) 
is ably summarized in lleetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505 
in which the United States Supreme Court quoted the 
following language from the opinion of the Supreme 
Court of Utah in People v. Jlasbrouck, 11 Utah 291, 305: 
"The objection that the statute attempts to confer 
judicial power ~on the hoard is not well founded. 
Many executive officers, even those who are spok-
en of as purely ministerial oflicers, act judicially 
in the determination of facts in the performance 
of their official duties; and in so doing they do 
not exercise 'judicial power', as the phrase is 
c;ommonly used, and as it is used in the organic 
act in conferring judicial power upon specified 
courts.'' 
As the legislature was free to establish the condi-
tions under which employing units shall be exempt from 
coverage, and to declare that benefits shall be paid or 
denied in accordance with establishment ,of those con-
ditions, it could enlist the aid of an administrative 
agency to determine the question of fact whether a 
particular relationship satisfied the conditions for ex-
ception and could make that factual determination, after 
hearing and upon evidence, conclusive. Shields V'. Utah 
Idaho R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 180; Virginia Railway Co. 
v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 663, St. Joseph Stock-
yard Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38, 51. 
116 
These views are m substance similar to those ex-
pressed by the Supreme Courts of North Carolina and 
Colorado in Industrial Cornrn:ission of the State of Colo-
rado v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., supra, 
and Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. North Car-
olina Unemployment Compensation Commission, supra. 
Both courts recognized that the scope of judicial review 
under pr,ovisions of law, like those in sections 19 ( j) ( 5) 
and (6) of the law of this State, was limited to a deter-
mination of the reasonableness of the Commission's posi-
tion, and that the legislatures of both North Carolina and 
Colorado could so limit the scope of judicial review. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH CIIEL';, 
Attorney General, 
S. D. HUI<~FAKER, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
A. M. F'ERRO, 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General. 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION DIVISION 
SIXTH FLOOR UNION PACIFIC BUILDING, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
EMPLOYERS STATUS REPORT 
OCT 31 1936 
all employers and employing units regardless of number or employees and whether or not subject to the 
Unemployment Compensation Luw of Utah 
o be returned within ten (10) days to the Unemployment Compensation Division, Sixth Floor 
Union PBA:ific Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
1. Business name of employing unit ..... GLQBE .... GRAlli .. A.NJL!flLLI.IE/ .... C.O.MI'ANY.................... . ............................. . 
2. Business headquarters in Utah ........................................................ Ogde.n..... . ......................................... Yit'.b.e.r ................. . 
(City or Town) (County) 
3. Location of separate establishments where business is carried on in Utah (for each such location describe fully exact nature 
of business and list each separate type of business) .... Tr.e.mo.nt.on, ... Lo.g_an, .. S.alt .... La.k:e .. Ci.~ .•........................ 
S_prip_gy1.lli .... ~ .... S.II.l.e."' .. w.<.>.x:e.h.o.uae a. . Lwnpo, .. .Niphi, .JfJil.laville, .. H.y:ruo,. 
L.!!'lll.fl.too ... ~ .. E:uyin8 ... gra1.n .•... 
4. List of principal products manufactured or traded in .. __ F_lOUI ..... O.'t.h~.l" ___ _gr~_i_n._ prod.:UC .. 'to.EJ ...... F.~_e:d . .._ ... &;_ 
G_rll.i!1 __ , ___ .. 
6. Type of organization .. C.o.n.o..mt..i.o.n. -···--·--- ------ ···-·······-- ........ - ---. 
(Individual, lloJXtnership, corporation, t:tc.) 
6. Date of organi,.tion .. Q.:ualifi.id ... in.U.tah . .tto.v.ember . .29 .•.. 1.~1113.• ........................................................ . 
(If a coqmratlon, gl,;e ~nato of Incorporation ancl (latt> (•f in"Ol por,dh.n, (•r Qtuliifl<:atlon to do buslne!ls In the State) 
'7. Predecessor, if any, from whom business was acquired _.. .. . .. ..... ..... ............. . . ............................... . 
(AnS\\(·r· (lniy if busrness WUt; acquired since the beginn1n~o; <•f the prcced1ng cakndar }'tear) 
Date acqu~red . .. ···························-··-·······-·--·-············-········· ...... ···-····--·--···-··············--------···········--·--- .... -----·-······················· ~ 
8. Is the busmess of the employing unit named in Item 1 ovtm'cl or conb·olled by another company or individual, whether by 
legally enforcible means or otherwise?. N 0 . . .... _ . ................ . ................................ ' 
(Yes or no) I '1 ~! :~·e g~:t~:er:I::~ :add:d:;e~:eo:0:~~~l~i~:r;~~P::~.~~-~-~~ -~~e~l .. er t~-~---~-~-~l~yment 0~---~-~-~~---~-=~~:-~~---~:~-~--=~~--~@~ . \ tJ 
' . 
············-······----··········-······-·······································-·················-······--······· ················-·--·····-··········--·········································· ······• 
(a) Does such controlling company own or control any other employing unit? ......... ·········-··{y~-~--~~--~~) .................... . 
If so, give the names and addresr-es of each . 
9. Average weekly nun:. her of employees in employment in Utah t0 date in lh(' currrnt calendar year ........ ll~-
10. Do you claim exemption as a "corporation, community ehest, fuild, or foundation, organized nnd operated exclusively for reli-
gious, chn.ritable, scicnlific, literary, or educational purposes, or for tLc prevention o! cruelty to children or animals, no part 
.. of the net earnings of whieh inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual?" ........ .NO. .. . 
···················a.,.,., 
. ······················-~"'"'' (If t;o, folluw ln,;tru<"t1on 6 Implicitly.) "~~t-1 
11. (a) !1 you Lelieve that the provisions of the law do not make you subject to it, Jo you wish to elect to be subject to con-";")'0 
trrt.i'O'tions and to have your employees become eligible for bPnefits? ·····-- .............. ·····-···············-------················ ·0 ' t (b) If you be1ieve that you are subject to the law, but that e~rk'l.in of your employees <:.re performing- services of exempted:o~g 
types, do ycu wish to elect to make ALL of your employees st:bj(;~t to the Ia>.-? .................. ''-~ 
12. Do you believe that the nature and extent of employment in your Lusiness during the preceding calendar year and U> date in 
the current calendar year was such as to make you lJU!Jle, under the provisio:1s of the Utah Unemployment Compensation 
Law, for contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Fund e~.tnbli:-,hed fY ti1at Law? ........... Y_e_;:,_ --················--·-·············-· 
13. Name, adclre~>s nnd title of c.fficial who will fumish payroll d:>.ta. If different of:f;cials at differe-nt locations, give names, 
addresses and titics L_• J.L. S.i.e.ve.ns ...... Ogde_n,, __ Utah._ •.. C~ah . .i0X ._ __ 
_...,--... ... 
Use ar,d attaeh extra sheet in answering any question, if more space i~ required. 
Datc .. .llPV.~!ll.R.~T ... 9. H 36.... Name of e'"PiOJ''rl • 2:"0·· ..• \lb.IJ ..... G:r?,i.P .. JillJ,L !Jill.m.g 
By c;''. ' ~_.AA..<./V\c~ ···- .. 
Officwl positio:J t.:/ ____ C .s.biel: ... 
IF THE EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYING UNIT DOES NOT FEI.:!".J THAT HE IS SUBJECT TO THE LAW AND DOES NOT 
WISH TO ELECT TO BE SUBJECT TO IT, BUT IS NOT CLAI~:lNG EXEt.fPTION UNDER QUESTION 10 ABOVE, THE 
REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM MUST BE FILLED OUT AS HlS CLAIM FOR EXEMPTION. 
From the Unemployment Compensation La\\: 
Section 16 (b). Penalty: " • • "' Any officer or agent of an emp!Gying unit • • • who fails or refuses to make 
any such contributions, • * • or to furnish any reports required !1ereunder, or to produw or permit the im:pection or copy-
ing of reconls, as required hereunder, shall be punished by a fine of not less th<Jn $20.00 nor more than $200.00, or by i:nprison-
ment for not longer th~n .sixty days, or by both • • • ar.d eaeh such false st<..tement r•r rcpre."ent.ation or failure to disclose 
a material fact • • • shail conslit".Jte a separate offense." 
I hereby certify that the foregoing 0tatus neport is a true and 
correct copy of t.l"ie original StHtus Report filed by the Globe Grain 
and ;~1illing Company, on November 10, 1936, with the Department of 
Pl&cement and Unemployment Inf.urance of the Industri&l Commission of 
"'~- ~V1,~~ 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
co. 
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EXHIBIT B. 
No. 14591. 
Colorado Public \V elf are Board, I 
Plaintiff in Error, 
v. 
Edmond L. Viles, 
Defendant in Error. 
IN DEPARTMENT. 
Error to the Distriet Court of the City 
and County of Denver. 
Ron. George F. Dunklee, Judge . 
. JUDGxfENT REVERSED IN PART. 
Ron. Byron G. Rogers, Attorney General. 
Mr .• Joseph D. Iskow, Assistant Attorney General. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error. 
Mr. Edmond L. Viles, Pro se. 
Mr. Justiee Burke delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Defendant in error, hereinafter referred to as plain-
tiff, alleging that he was entitled to a pensi,on because 
of blindness, brought mandamus against plaintiff in er-
ror, hereinafter referred to as the board, to eompel the 
allowance thereof. An alternative writ was issued to 
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which the board demurred on the ground ''that the court 
had no jurisdiction ,of the person of the respondent or 
the subject of the action." That demurrer was over-
ruled, the board elected to stand, and to review the 
judgment entered accordingly it brings error. 
A number of propositions are argued in the brief,s 
but from the foregoing it is clear that the only question 
before us is the question of jurisdiction. 
Mandamus is the proper remedy ''to compel the 
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins 
as a duty resulting from an office. 
Sec. 342, chap. 30, Vol. 1, '35 C. S. A. 
From the petitim1 it appears that plaintiff made the 
necessary application to the county director, was exam-
ined and his case referred to the board which determined 
that he was eligible except that the board "did not 
believe the reports of the three optholmologists above 
mentim1ed.'' And this under section 37 to 50, inclusive, 
chap. 22, vol. 2, 'i~5 C. S. A. Therefrom it appears 
that the duty devolved upon the county director and the 
board to have a fair hearing, consider all the facts and 
circumstances and make award aceordingly, in any event 
not to exceed a total of $30.00 per month. Thus the 
duty to exercise discretion, and the ba,sis and limits of 
that discretion are specified by law. From tho complaint 
we learn that all the evidence and all the facts and 
circumstances established that plaintiff was entitled 
to relief which was denied, "arbitrarily, and unrea-
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~sonably and capriciously", without shadow of excuse 
except that the board paid no attention to its own wit-
nesses. It is thus sufficiently made clear that the hoard 
ignored the hearing and exercised no discretion, and that 
the holding of the district court was correct. 
In the record before us is the so called answer of 
the board. ~We ignore it for two reasons. First, be-
cause it is an answer to the petition instead of to the 
alternative writ. 
Chipman v. Forward, 41 Colo. 442; 92 Pac. 913. 
Second, because that answer did not enter the judgment 
of the district court and is not involved in the question 
before us. 
Ii is said no statutory court review is provided. The 
district court under its general jurisdiction, and this 
court by writ of error under its constitutional powers, 
may review the acts of any board or commission where 
it is contended that legal rights have been denied, or that 
such body is vested with a discretion which it refuses to 
exercise. 
It is further urged that this is not an action to 
compel the exercise of discretion, but to control that 
discretion, because plaintiff makes demand for the max-
imum ~statutory allowance. vY e look to the substance of 
the petition and are not conholled by the prayer. If 
his demand was excessive the question was one for an-
swer, not demurrer. 
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The alternative writ required the board to pay $30.00 
per month or show cause. The final judgment was 
simply that the writ be made peremptory. As to 
the payment the judgment is erroneous. The refusal 
of the board to exercise discretion neither vested 
the eourt with the discretion nor entitled plaintiff to the 
max1mum. The mandate should have been to act. 
The demurrer \vas properly ·overruled, but for the 
last mentioned reason the judgment is amended and it is 
ordered that the cause he considered by the hoard, its 
discretion exercised as demanded hy statute, and dispo-
sition be made accordingly . 
.Mr. Chief .Justice Hilliard and 
Mr. Justice Bakke concur. 
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EXHIBIT C. 
STATE OF WISCONSIN 
CIRCUIT COURT - DANE COUNTY 
WISCONSIN BRIDGE & IRON 
COMPANY, (Unemployment 
reserve account of), a corpor-
ation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMMISSION 
OF WISCONSIN and ROY 
RAMSEY, ROBERT GEHRT, 
BUD W. LIPSCOMB, and 
FRED AHL, 
Defendants. 
Before lion. Alvin C. Reis, .Judge. 
DECISION. 
BY THE COURT: 
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These are aetions to review Industrial Commission 
orders under the Unemployment Compensation Act. 
They involve the eligibility for unemployment benefits 
of the four eo-defendants named. 
We say at the outset that the complaint in the Ahl 
case should be dismissed for the obvious reason that 
the commission's order was in plaintiff's favor; and, 
although plaintiff may not agree with some finding or 
conclusion expressed by the commission, there is not 
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order of which it can complain in this case (the fourth 
above). 
The conception of "employe "-under the Unem-
ployment Compensation Act-is said by these cases to be 
presented for the first time to a ~Wisconsin court. The 
commission maintains that employment, under this stat-
ute, has a much different meaning from that attributed 
to the term in the workmen's copensation law. 
Sec. 108.02 ( 5) (a) of the Wisconsin Unemployment 
Compensation Act reads : 
"(5) El\1PLOYMENT. (a) ':BJmployment', 
subjeet to the other provisions of this subsection, 
means any service performeu by an individual for 
• pay, including service in. interstate commerce, 
under any eontraet of servH·e for pay or contract 
of hire, written or oral, express ,or implied, wheth-
er such inuividual 's c·ontract was directly made 
with and paid by the employer or through a per-
son in his employ, provided the employer had 
actual or constructive knowledge or such con-
tract; and each individual thus engaged by any 
employer to perform services for pay shall for the 
purpose of this chapter be treated as in an 'em-
ployment', unless and until the employer has 
satisfied the connnission that such individual has 
been and will eontinue to be free from the em-
ployer's control or direction over the perform-
ance ,of his work both under his contrac·t of service 
and in fact, and that such work is either outside 
the usual course of the employer's enterprise 
or performed outside of all the employer's places 
of business, and that such individual is custo-
marily engaged in an independently established 
trade, business, profession or occupation." 
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The attorneys for the plaintiff company and for 
the defendant commission are, to a great extent, at cross 
purposes as to what constitutes the issue in these cases. 
They do agree that the question presented is essen-
tially one of law, not whether evidence supports a par-
ticular finding or findings of fact. Counsel for the com-
mission stated in oral argument that the case offered a 
"legal proposition". Plaintiff's attorneys so contend 
in their brief (p. 42 seq.). 
The question concerns the status as "employe" 
of 'one Drews, to whom the plaintiff "Wisconsin Bridge 
& Iron Company allegedly sub-let a contract. If Drews 
is the "employe" of \Visconsin Bridge & Iron Company, 
then concededly the co-defendants-Ramsey, Gehrt and 
Lipscomb-arc employes of the company, and admittedly 
are entitled to unemployment 0ompensation benefits out 
of its reserve. 
Referring to Drews, plaintiff's brief expresses the 
gist of its position by the statement (p. 44) that ''if the 
Court is of the opinion that he was an independent con-
tractor as a matter of law, then the decision of the com-
missi,on must be reversed " 
This is not conceded by the commission to be the 
issue, however, for in its brief the commission asserts 
(p. 31) that "the short and complete answer to plain-
tiff's position is that independent contractors are not 
excluded from coverage under the Unemployment Com-
pensation Act.'' 
125 
The question, as we view it, is not whether Drews 
became an "independent con'tractor," as that term 
is used in a long line of decisions under the work-
men's compensation law. The question is whether 
he must he regarded, for purposes of these cases, as an 
"employe" under the definition in sec. 108.02 ( 5) (a) 
of the Unemployment Compensation Act, even though he 
may he regarded as an independent contractor for any 
other or for all purposes. 
This delineation of the issue, if it be sound, renders 
it unnecessary to dig·est a great part of the testimony, 
whieh has been so painstakingly summarized by plain-
tiffs counsel in thirty-five pages of brief. Much of the 
evideure goes to show that Drews acted as an inde-
pendent contractor in the instant situation. But that is 
not determinative of whether he is an "employe" under 
the description in 108.02 (5) (a) of the Unemployment 
Compensation Act. 
Similarly, the respective counsel are at loggerheads 
as to the presumptions respecting "employment" which 
108.02 (5) (a) sets up. 
Plain tiff's brief ( p. 61) cites the general doctrine 
that presumptions "completely disappear when sub-
stantial credible evidence is offered rebutting such pre-
sumption". The commission's brief, however, (p. 27) 
refers to the "unique procedural aspects" of 
108.02 (5) (a) whereby the employer must "as·sume the 
burden of proof if he is to prove an exclusion,'' the brief 
adding (p. 28): "The Legislature has substituted for 
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the common law presumption (that, in the absence of 
any evidence to the contrary, an employer-employe rela-
tionship exists) a statutory presumption which does not 
disappear >vhen thrown into the scale against any evi-
dence but remains to be decisive of the case in the face 
of an insufficient showing. The provisiou specifies 
that the presumption remains 'unless and until the em-
ployer has satisfied the commission.' '' 
We concur, that this clause creates a ''unique'' pro-
cedure. The presumption i,s neither prima facie (to be 
rebutted by some evidence) nor conclusive (and incap-
able of rebuttal) but persists only "unless and until" 
the commission (a) is satisfied (b) by the employer as 
to certain facts. 
~We need not anticipate in this decision the attack 
which may be made upon a provision requiring that the 
commission be satisfied; nor need we explore the rami-
fications as to what "satisfied" means. Suffice it that in 
the instant proceeding there has not been any showing 
to demonstrate the third of the three bases of exclusion 
made necessary by the statute if the person performing 
service for pay is not to be held an employe, namely, 
''that such individual is customarily engaged in an in-
dependently established trade, business, profession or 
occupation . " (Our italics.) 
The very presentation of the divergent views of the 
parties in their approach to the legal question herein has 
served to crystallize the issue and to reveal, in our 
judgment, the foundation upon which the commission's 
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orders must be sustained. The Unemployment Compen-
sation Act, in our opinion, has evolved a new concept 
of employment-different from that at common law and 
broader than the one contained in the workmen's com-
pensation law-and no attempt has even been made to 
show that Drews complies with all the tests which must 
be met if he is to be excluded as an employe, under the 
"unique" procedure provided by sec. 108.02 (5) (a). 
vY e adopt from the commission's brief (p. 12) the 
following: 
"SgCTION 108.02 (5) (a), SUBSTANTIVI~LY 
CONSIDERED, SETS UP A NEW CONCEPT OF 
'EMPLOYMENT' RELATIONS. IT COMPRE-
HENDS ALL SERVICES FOR PAY UNLESS THEY 
ARE PERFORMED BY A BUSINESS (OR PROFES-
SIONAL) .MAN IN Tl-IE COURSE OF THE BUS-
INESS (OR PROFESSION) vVHICH CUSTOMARILY 
ENGAGES HIS EFFORTS 
'' S cction 108.02 ( 5) (a) establishes a new concept 
of employment . a reference to the legislative 
history of the provision removes any doubt as to the 
intention of the legislature to break with the traditional 
concept of the employment relationship as f,ound in com-
mon law and substitute in lieu thereof the new and 
unique creation here under consideration, and shows, 
furthermore, that this statutory creation was intended to 
extend coverage under the Unemployment Compensa-
hon Act.'' 
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The commission's brief then goes on to point out 
that originally the definition of employment under Chap-
ter 108 (Unemployment Compensation) was substan-
tially the same as under Chapter 102 (Workmen's Com-
pensation). The brief continues (p. 13): 
"There was an identity in the contemplated cover-
age in that both Acts defined the term employment as 
services performed under a contract of hire. This term 
embraced and called into operation the body of common 
law principles known as the doctrine ,of master and 
servant. A consideration of services that were not 
contracts of hire fell outside the scope of the law. Hence, 
services performed pursuant to an independent con-
tractor relationship were not within the province of the 
Act.'' 
Pursuant to thiH original contemplation of the Un-
ernployrnen t Compensation Act, the Industrial Com-
mission formulated a rule in which it declared that 
persons who \Vere considered independent c~ontractors 
under the vVorkmen's Compensation Act were not 
''employes'' under the Unemployment Compensation 
Act. 
This rule 2 read as follows: 
'' Pers,ons doing work for an employer as contractors 
and Hubcontractors who are deemed independent con-
tractors under the workmen's compensation act shall 
also be deemed independent contractors (and not 'em-
ployes') within the definition of Chapter 108. of the 
Wisconsin Statutes.'' 
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Then came the 1935 amendments which, ac0ording 
to the commission's brief (p. 13), represented a "clean 
break'' with the contract of hire concept and substituted 
the ''presumptive coverage of all contract services.'' 
The essential parts of 108.02 ( 5) (a), after the 
ameudments of ,June 26, 1935, ~were as follows: 
"An 'employment' shall mean any 
persoual service for pay, . nuder auy con-
tract ,of personal servic~e for pay or eoutraet of 
hire . . . ; and each individual engaged by any 
employer to perform services for pay shall for 
the purposes of this chapter he treated as in an 
'emplo~'IIlOnt' unless and until the emplo~'er has 
satisf1ecl the eormnission that sueh indiviclual has 
lweu and will continue to be free from the em-
ployer's control or direction over the perform-
ance of his work both under his contract of 
service aud in fact, and that such work is either 
outside the usual course of tho employer's cuter-
prise or performed outside of all the employer's 
places of business, and that such individual is 
customarily engaged in an independently estab-
lished trade, business, profession or occupation; 
" 
Subsequently, "personal service", as above quoted, 
was amended to read simply "service". 
From this legislative "evoluti,on" the commission 
draws the following conclusion in its brief (p. 15): 
"It is subrnittcd that under a proper constntction 
of the section coverage of the act is extended to 
the performance of aU contracts involving sermces 
except in those insta;nces where the services are per-
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formed by a business or professional ma~t~ engaged in his 
business or profession. ( 11 owever, even the exception 
fails where the performance of the services is so related 
to the employer's business as to be in the usual cmtrse 
of the employer's enterprise and performed on/ or at the 
employer's place of business.)" 
For purposes of the present decision, we need not 
go into all the points wherein the present legislative 
definition of employment departs from prior accepted 
standards. For instance, it has been regarded-and 
must still be so viewed under the workmen's compensa-
tion law-that lack of right to control is what precludes, 
in essence, the employment status. But by the first test 
of exclusion prescribed in 108.02 (5) (a), it must be 
established that there is freedom from control not only 
(1) under the contract but also (2) in fact. Further-
more, there must be established not only freedom from 
control in the past hut that the individual "will continue 
to be free from the employer's eontrol or direction 
'' (Our italics). 
This prospective outlook and invisioniug of the fu-
ture lends credence to the broad suggestion made by 
the commission's brief (p. 20) herein, namely, that it is 
only the ''tradesman, business man or professional man'' 
as sueh, who is beyond the pale of the Unemployment 
Compensation Act. 
The principle that there must be not only an inde-
pendent but a customary and established trade, business 
or profession-in order for the individual to be omitted 
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from the Unemployment Compensation Act- is em-
phatically and, in haec verbcL, declared in the third 
test of exdusion laid down in 108.02 ( 5) (a), "that such 
individual is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, business, profession or occupation." 
This last criterion is decisive of the present cases. 
No effort could be made to show that Drews was an 
established, customarily engaged entrepreneur in the 
constructim1 business. He had been an employe of the 
cmnpany for years before the short-termed transaction 
here involved. Ife became admittedly the employe of the 
company after the transaction here involved. Two and 
two simply make four. 
Granting that there was a hiatus in which Drews' 
relations to the eompany became that of independent 
contractor-granting that the alleged subterfuge could 
not operate to destroy the independent contractor rela-
tionship (York v. Industrial Commission, 223 ~Wis. 
140)-still there is no pretense made, and none can be 
made, under the undisputed evidence, that Drews wa,s 
"customarily" engaged and "established" in the con-
struction business as an independent contractor. No 
testimony was offered or even suggested that Drews was 
known as a business or professional man or held himself 
out to the public as being engaged in the construction 
business as an independent and customary profession. 
lie had been, and thereafter was, the company's em-
ploye. 
"\Ve realize that it is quite a jump from the classic 
"master and servant" doctrine to the almost horizon-
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less concept of employnient reflected by the present 
Unemployment Compensation Act. The rationale behind 
this change is plain, however. Unemployment compen-
sation (to use the commission's rather scholarly diction) 
is predicated upon the "flow of time" element in 
employment whereas tort liability or liability in 
the field of workmen's compensation focuses upon 
the "instant of time" element. Unemployment reserves 
must be accumulated. Employes reap no advantages 
until the employer has been subject to contribution pro-
visions for two years. In contrast, the right to recovery 
in a workmen's compensation case or for tort may accrue 
instantaneously, upon the employment relationship 
arising. It is relatively immaterial, in workmen's com-
pensation cases, that empl,oyment is temporary and 
ephemeral. But to have an efficient unemployment com-
pensation system, dependence cannot be had upon day-
to-day or short-time relationships. There must be rea-
sonable permanence and stability. 
The essential nature and quality of the "long pull" 
are illustrated in the present cases where the co-defend-
ants, Ramsey, Gehrt and Lipscomb, are not entitled to 
benefits if they are employes of Drews because he has 
made only six months' contributions rather than the 
twenty-four months' contributions demanded by law. 
\V e note reliance by plaintiff in this regard on the 
circumstance that Drews petitioned to come under the 
Act and that such petition was allowed by the commis-
sion. We do not conceive, however, that the adminis-
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trative act of granting such permission is significant in 
determining the present controversy on the merits and 
obviously there is no genus of estoppel which can be 
arrayed against the commission in this connection. 
\V e observe also plaintiff's remonstrance (reply 
brief, p. 8) that to adhere to the requirement that one 
must be shown to the established and customarily in a 
trade, business or p11ofession, before he may be regarded 
as uot an employe, is to declare that "once an employe, 
always an employe''. Indeed, counsel for plaintiff re-
marks in closing its main brief (p. 63): 
'"l'o deny validity to the independent contractor 
relationship ereated in this ease would he to rob the 
American citiz.en of his inalienable right to direct 
his ·own destiny, to rise to any status he desires, and to 
choose whether he prefers compensation protection to 
the privilege of engaging in an independent enterprise." 
This colorful appeal for the ''inalienable right to 
direct his own destiny'' is answered by the cold fact 
in this ease that Drews, within five months after he 
initiated his assumed destiny, was back with a job in 
Kansas on the eompany 's payroll, with his "destiny" 
already behind him. 
\Ve conclude that Drews was an "employe" of \Vis-
cousin Bridge & Iron Company; from which it follows-
without question-that Ramsey, Gehrt and Lipscomb 
were its employes. 
Counsel for plaintiff raise a jurisdictional point, 
to-wit: The Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Company peti-
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tioned the commission for review of the so-called ''appeal 
tribunal'' decision on September 3, 1938. On September 
13, 1938, (within the ten day limit set by statute) the 
commission ",set aside" the appeal tribunal's decision. 
It was not until October 15, 1938, that the comm1sswn 
affirmed the appeal tribunal's decision. 
The contention is that, this affirmance not having 
been within ten days from the date of the company's 
petition, the commission lost jurisdict~on. 
The pertinent provision of the Unemployment Com-
pensation Act-108.09 (6) (b)-reads: 
"Ji~ither party may petition the commission 
for review of an appeal tribunal decision, pur-
suant to general eommission rules, within ten 
days after it was mailed to l1is last known ad-
dress. Within ten days after ihe filing of such 
a petition, the commission may affirm, reverse, 
change, or set aside sueh decision, on the basis 
of the evidence previously submitted in such ease 
or direct the taking of additional testimony. The 
failure of the eommission to ad on sneh a petition 
within such ten days shall constitute an affirmance 
of the appeal tribunal decision.'' 
This raises the question as to the effect of the com-
mission's action on September 13th (within the ten 
day period) in setting aside the appeal tribunal's de-
cision. \V e think that this clearly connotes a suspense 
of the decision and a holding of it in statu quo. 
Unquestionably and expressly this is the effect of 
setting aside (as distinguished from reversing) an ex-
aminer's award under the vV orkmen 's Compensation Act 
(Chapter 102). However, as plaintiff's counsel points 
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out, sec. 102.18 of the workmen's compensation law 
specifically states: 
"If no petition is filed within twenty days 
from 1he date that a copy of the findings or order 
of the eommissioner or examiner \Vas mailed to 
the last known address of the parties in interest, 
such findings or order shall be considered the find-
ings or order of the industrial commission as a 
body, unless set aside, reversed or modified by 
sueh eommissioner or examiner within such time. 
If the findings or order arc set aside by the com-
missioner or examiner the status shall be the same 
as prior to the findings or order set aside." (Our 
italics). 
By virtue of the legislature having omitted this 
precautionary provision in the Unemployment Compen-
sation Ad, counsel for plaintiff maintains that it cannot 
be read in, by judicial decree. \Ve acknowledge that 
there is persuasiveness in the company's point. 
However, we reiterate that-taken by itself and 
without any such reservation as was written into the 
workmen's compensation law on this point (102.18)-to 
''set aside'' must mean something different from '' re-
verse" and it cannot mean "affirm". The common 
acceptance of to "set aside" is that the situation is re-
stored to what it was before and now awaits further 
disposition. We so interpret the meaning of "set aside" 
in the Unemployment Compensation Act-sec. 108.09 
(6)(b). 
Having "·set aside" the appeal tribunal decision 
on September 13th (within ten days), the commission 
effectively held the matter open. Its subsequent affirm-
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ance on October 15th was therefore an act within its 
powers and jurisdiction. 
See Milwaukee County v. Industrial Commission, 
224 ~Wis. 302. 
We need not allude to the hopeless impracticality 
of an opposite construction which would require the 
Industrial Commission to definitely and finally decide 
every case submitted to it within ten days after sub-
mission. The task could not humanly be done with in-
telligence and any appreciable measure of judicious con-
sideration. 
The commission's findings and order should be con-
firmed. 
It is so ordered. 
The eommission 's attorneys may prepare and sub-
mit to opposing counsel the judgment. 
Dated March 13, 1939. 
I, Paul A. Raushenbush, Director of the Wisconsin 
Unemployment Compensation Department, hereby cer-
tify that I have compared the attached decision of the 
Circuit Court fm Dane County, ~Wisconsin, with the 
original on file in the offices of said Department, and 
that the same is a true and correct copy of such original. 
Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 28th day of 
March, 1939. 
/s/ Paul A. Raushenbush. 
Paul A. Raushenbush. 
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EXHIBIT D 
STATE OF MICHIHAN 
THE, CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY 
OF MARQUETTE 
PE11ER POND, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MICHIGAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION COMMIS-
SION and HEINZ LUMBgR 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
No. 13i325 
OPINION OF THJ1~ COURT 
I have given this case eonsiderable study. The case 
came in just at the end of our summer terms and I have 
given it a lot of thought and study and I am sure you 
won't be offended if I tell you that I feel that I should 
dispose of the case now and not wait for briefs in view 
of the importance of t:he case. So I think we won't take 
any time for briefs. I will dispose of it now. 
This case comes in here by certiorari. vV e all know 
that under our pradice certiorari ordinarily brings up 
only questions of law upon the record that is made in the 
court from which the case is appealed. The statute, un-
der which the case is brought, as I read it, provides for 
appeal and author·izes the court under certain circum-
stances to review the facts as well ·as to review the law. 
I am at a loss to know just what the rights and duties 
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of the court are in view of the fact that the case is here 
by certiorari instead of by appeal, but it seems to me I 
.can dispose of the case without determining that ques-
tion, and I feel that it can be disposed of on the record 
under the law applicable to the statute, or I might say 
under a reasonable construction of t1lw law applicable 
to the statute. 
The facts are well stated, if I exclude the argument, 
in the decision of the referee as amended by the decision 
.of the board, and confining myself solely to the facts 
stated in those opinions and not to any arguments there-
in, I can adopt the statement of facts made by the refereP 
and the board, and so we go right to the statute itself. 
L-14-i39 
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I have been greatly interested m the argument of 
counsel on both sides, not only because of the study that 
I have given the case, but because this is a part of the 
new so.cial program that has come upon the country with-
in the last few years. Of course the court is uot con-
cerned with whether or not this statute is just or unjust 
to industry, whet!hcr it is just or unjust to labor, nor 
with possible abuses on both sides that may follow from 
the execution of the law. I must try to get at the mean-
ing of this statute and apply the facts as they are here 
to it. 
\Ve have referred in the argument repeatedly to Sec-
tion 42, Paragraph 6, Subdivisions A, B and C, which 
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provides that serviens performed by an individual for 
remuneration s1hall be deemed to be employment subject 
to the act, unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction 
of the commission that three certain things arc present 
in the case, which I shall enumerate. I take it that under 
the language of the statute the burden of showing these 
three is on the employer, and I shall so consider the 
testimony. 
/Subdivision A of the statute, reacling back a little 
bit, provides that the service shall be deemed to be em-
ployment subject to the aet unless it is shown to the sat-
isfadion of the commission, "A", that such individual 
has been and will continue to be free from control or 
direction over the performance of such scrviscs both un-
der his contract of service and in fact. In disposing of 
this question I must eonfine myself to the record as made 
and I am thoroughly satisfied that the record in this case 
shows that the labor here was that of an independent 
contractor. In saying this, I confine myself to the rec-
ord here. No one who lives in this country can fail to 
apprecia tc that in every such eontraet there arc certain, 
I might say, implied provisions that could probably be 
shown that mig1ht possibly make a different result, hut 
it appears here flatly that the Heinz Lumber Company 
had no control over this man. 
W c know as a matter of fact that any man ~who takes 
a job of cutting a strip of timber must cut the kind of 
timber that he is ·Cutting clean. vV e know that if he went 
in and bntehcrcd a strip of timber he wouldn't be al-
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lowed to proceed on the job. \V e know a man peeling 
posts and poles, eit1wr in the woods or on a landing, at 
so much per pole, is working as a piece maker, but going 
along vvith his contract, the duty on his part to peel the 
poles that are brought to him. He wouldn't last very long 
on his job if he picked out the medium size and easy to 
peel poles and left the knotty ones and big ones for 
someone else to peel. We know that the peeling of posts 
and poles is seasonal. ·whether the contract provides 
for it or not it must be done at eertain seasons of the 
year to bQ effective and efficient. But that isn't here. 
I merely mention that so that you will understand that 
the court has not overlooked the possible situation that 
may arise later. 
So I am holding that this man was an independent 
con tractor. 
Now Subdivision B provides that the servwe s'hall 
be presumed to be employment unless such serviee is 
either outside the usual course of business for whic·h such 
service is performed, or that such service is performed 
outside of all the premises of the business or enterprise 
for which such service is performed. 
L-14-i39 
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The testimony indicates that the business of the 
Heinz Lumber Company is getting out timber, among 
other kinds, the kinds that were peeled under this con-
tract. I think it must be held on the evidence as a mat-
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ter of law that the work done here was within the usual 
course of business for which the service was performed 
for the employer, and I think it must be further held 
that such service was performed at the place of business 
of the enterprise for which it was performed. I know 
of no other way ·Of treating a statute of this kind than 
to so hold. If I own a piece of land and let another a 
.contract to cut the timber on that land at so much a 
thousand or so much a piece, it is my operation, and even 
thougih I pay him by the piece, he is on my premises. He 
may be an independent contractor, but he is on my place 
of operation. 
But I g-o one step further in answer to the argument 
that has been made by counsel for the defendant. If I 
let the contract to an independent contractor to do the 
·work and he employs others to do it, that other is his 
employee and not mine, and it is his operation and not 
mine. He is merely my contractee. 
Now we go to the third question, that the person 
doing the work is an employee unless he is customarily 
engaged in an independently established trade, occupa-
tion, profession or business. It appears here that the 
work of peeling posts is in a sense a trade, but the lan-
guage of the statute is ''independently established 
trade". Now it does appear that this employee at anoth-
er date was employed by a jobber for the Heinz Lumber 
Company in an entirely different class of business, and 
it appears that he sometimes worked by tlhe month. I 
think it cannot be said that this was an independently 
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established trade at which he was customarily engaged 
because he was customarily engaged in other lines of 
work, and the particular business of peeling was seasonal. 
So, that being true, the statute furnishing· these de-
finitions of employment, I must hold t:hat this man was 
employed within the meaning of this section. I haven't 
overlooked the rulings of our courts, many of which have 
been made in connection with our \Y orkrnen 's Compensa-
tion Act, and I haven't overlooked certain decisions of 
the social security ad, but I think this act goes further, 
and whether it is a good act or a bad one, whether it is 
;just or unjust, I think it is the duty of the court to con-
strue it as I see it, so the litigants vvill have an oppor-
tunity to have the question finally settled by the court 
of last resort, if they desire to do so. 
I haven't overlooked either the splendid argument 
that the counsel have made on t'he question of the rela-
tion of these statutes to the common law, but I feel that 
while there may be some difficulty in the application of 
the statutory provisions to the facts in many cases, yet 
the difficulty springs rather from the application than 
from the language of the statute, as the language seems 
clear. I think it was the intention of the legislature to 
take a forward step in the matter of social legislation. 
The courts should give a workable construction as they 
have done with the Wiorkmen's Compensation Act. 
L-14-i39 
js/ FRANK A. BEL,L, 
Circuit Judge. 
Dated September 18th, 1939. 
COPY 
Office of 
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EXHIBIT E 
WASHINGTON 
May 311938 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
Address reply to 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
and Refer to 
SST:RR:2 
The Texas Company, 
13G East 42nd Street, 
New York, New York. 
Rec'd: Jul 27 1939 
Region No. 5 
Social Security 
Board, 2 :00 p.m. 
Attention: Mr. Albert E. Van Dusen, 
Attorney. 
Sirs: 
Reference is made to your letter dated January 15, 
1938, with which was submitted certain information re-
lative to the facts and circumstances under which a par-
ticular individual operates a bulk plant for the marketing 
and distributing of products supplied by your company 
on a consignment basis. !Such information was submitted 
for the purpose of enabling this office to determine the 
status of such individual for purposes of the taxing pro-
visions of the SocG.al Security Act. 
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There were submitted with your letter a photostatic 
copy of the consignment agreement, Form S-82 1-37 12M, 
together with certain amendments thereto, entered into 
between your company and Mr. J. E. Thomas, Marion, 
Virginia; a copy of a manual called ''Successful Bulk 
Station Operation," which is furnished to Mr. Thomas 
by the company; and copies of rulings from various State 
governmental agencies relative to the status of con-
signees under certain aets and regulations of the parti-
cular States. 
The information submitted discloses that Mr. Thomas 
is appointed as a consignment agent of The Texas Com-
pany at Abingdon, Virginia. The company ships its 
products to the consignee at its own expense and title 
thereto remains in the company until the products are 
sold by the consignee in accordance with the terms of his 
agreement with the company. The consignee is pro-
hibited by the company from selling its products, direct-
ly or indirectly, at less than the authorized prices estab-
lished by the company. He be.r~omes personally responsi-
ble for any credit extended in excess of the limit placed 
on eaeh aecount by the company, or for any sum due on 
any account opened by him without authority from the 
company. He is required to perform services in col-
lecting and remitting all amounts due the company as 
the result of sales of its products from his bulk plant. 
If any deliveries of the company's approved accessories 
stocked in his bulk plant are made outside of the regular 
truck delivery radius of his bulk plant, the company 
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The Texas Company. 
bears the cost of transportation from the bulk plant to 
the destination. 
Mr. Thomas Is required to submit detailed reports 
as requested by the company, on forms prescribed and 
furnished by tho company, of all the company's money, 
goods, produets, equipment, etc., in his possession or 
coming into his custody. It appears also that tho books 
and records and everything at the bulk plant pertaining 
to tho company's business are subject to inspection by ac-
credited station auditors .of the company. The consignee 
agrees to furnish his own trucks and other equipment 
required for the distribution of the company's products, 
but such trucks and equipment must conform with stand-
ards pres(~ribecl therefor by the company. l-Ie is required 
to indemnify the company against Ji,ability for any pre-
miums, taxes or contributions for workmen's compensa-
tion insurance, unemployment insurance or old-age pen-
sions imposed by any State or Federal law, whieh are 
measured by the remuneration paid to individuals en-
gaged by him to perform services under his agreement 
with the company. He is further required to furnish a 
bond satisfactory to the company, protecting the com-
pan;· against the loss of any of its property coming into 
his custody. The consignment agreement may be termi-
nated by either Mr. Thomas or The Texas Company on 
five days' written notice. 
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You are advised that careful consideration has bet•n 
given to all of the information submitted concerning the 
facts and circumstances under which Mr. rrhomas oper-
ates his bulk plant under a consignment agreement with 
your company, and in the opinion of this office ::mch in-
formation di::;eloses that your company exercises or re-
tains the right to exercise the control over the services 
of such consignee which is prescribed by the regulations 
under rritles VIli and IX of the Act as being necessary 
to establish the relationship of employer awl employee 
for purposes of the t 1axes imposed thereunder. Such 
right of c~ontrol is evideneed in part by the fact that the 
consignee is required to perform certain services as cli-
rcded by the company, such as submitting reports and 
collecting money due the eompany. The company also 
controls the extension of crc<1it by the con::;ignce, antl the 
minimum prices at which its products may be sold. Trucks 
and other equipment furnished by the consignee must 
conform with standards set by the company therefor. 
Also, the right of the eompany to terminate the agree-
ment without cause on five days' notice, while not con-
clusive in and of itself, is nevertheless a fartor indieating 
direct or indirect control on the part of the com pan~·. 
In view of the right of control whieh The Texas 
Company retaiu::; over the services of the consignee in 
question, the fad that in certain respects he is free to 
usc his own judgment and initiative in conducting the 
business at the bulk plant is not considered ronclu::;ive 
for the purpose of determining his status under Titles 
VIII and IX of the Ad. It is concluded, therefore, that 
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Mr. Thomas is an employee of The Texas Company for 
purposes of the taxing provisions of the Act. 
You are further advised that this office has con-
sistently held that iu cases in which the employees of a 
company, with either the express or implied consent of 
that company, engage other individuals to assist them 
in the performance of their services for the company, 
such other individuals are also employees of the com-
pany rather than of the individuals by whom they are 
engaged. Therefore, since Mr. Thomas is held to be an 
employee of The Texas Company, any individuals en-
The Texas Company. 
gaged by him with the express or implied consent of the 
company to perform services in connection with his em-
ployment by the company are also, to the extent that 
they perform such services, employees of the company 
for purposes of the taxing provisions of the Act. 
For the purpose of determining the taxable wages 
of Mr. Thomas, the total amount of the wages of each 
employee engaged by him which is attributable to serv-
ices performed in the business of the company should be 
deducted from the total amount of his commissions. A 
deduction from such amount may also be made for any 
other expenses he incurs in the business of The Texas 
Company, provided he aecounts to the company for all 
such expenses and the company maintains adequate 
records in substanti'ation thereof. ff proper accounting 
is not made of such expenses, or if the necessary records 
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with respect thereto are not maintained, the taxable 
wages of Mr. Thomas will be the total amount of his 
commissions minus the total ,amount of the wages of the 
employees engaged by him which are attributable to the 
services mentioned above. 
It is neeessary, therefore, for your company to main-
tain such records as ~will show, in addition to other in-
formation, the portions of the total amount of Mr. 
Thomas' eommissions \vhieh represent, respeetivcl:v, his 
taxable wages and the taxable wages of eac'h of the em-
ployees engaged by him, and if a deduction is to be made 
for the uxpenses incurred by Mr. Thomas or his helpers, 
records must be kept of such expenses. 
In connection with the provision in the agreement 
with Mr. Thomas, whereby Rucib individual aRsumes 
liability for certain taxes, contributions and premiums 
vvith respect to the remuneration of his helpers, it may 
be stated that the Bureau will interpose no objertion to 
the execution of an agreement between a taxpayer and 
another person whereby such other person assumes pay-
ment of the taxes imposed under the Social Seemity Act. 
However, your attention is directed to the fact that the 
taxing provisions of the Act arc mandatory and that such 
an agreement does not relieve the taxpayer from re-
sponsibility for keeping the necessary records and filing 
the prescribed returns, or from liability for the payment 
of the taxes imposed under Titles VIII and IX of the 
Act. Accordingly, it will be necess,ary for your company 
to include in its returns filed under those titles of the 
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kct the wages of Mr. Thomas and of each individual en-
gaged to assist him in the performance of :his services 
for the company. 
Although the ruling set forth above is made upon the 
basis of the information submitted concerning Mr. 
Thomas, such ruling is also applicable to the cases of 
other consignees similarly engaged by your company, 
provided the facts of such other eases do not vary in any 
material respect from the facts upon which this ruling 
is based. 
Respectfully, 
JD 
DAP:MEH 
A TRUE COPY 
Charles Weiser jsj 
Clerk. 
GUY T. HELVERING 
Commissioner. 
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